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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of five chapters: 1.The Mechanical View, 2.Social Machines, 3.The FCC 
Auction Machine, 4.Self-Interested Knaves, and 5.Self-Interested but Sympathetic. In the first 
three chapters, I advance a methodological account of current design and engineering in 
economics and political science, which I call methodological mechanicism. It is not ontological 
or literal; it relies on a technological metaphor by describing market and state institutions as 
machines, and the human mind as consisting of a number of mechanisms.  
I introduce the Mechanical view on scientific theories as distinct from the Syntactic and 
the Semantic views. The electromagnetic theories from the nineteenth century are used to 
illustrate this view as well as the use of minimal and maximal analogies in model-building in 
normal and revolutionary science. The Mechanical view is extended to the social sciences, 
particularly to mechanism design theory and institutional design, using the International 
Monetary Fund, the NHS internal markets and the FCC auction as examples. Their blueprints 
are evaluated using criteria such as shielding and power for calculating joint effects as well as 
libertarian, dirigiste, egalitarian and inegalitarian properties; and the holistic and piecemeal 
engineering they adopt. Experimental parameter variation is introduced as a method 
complementing design.  
Any design assumes a particular moral psychology, so in chapters four and five I argue 
that the moral psychology of universal self-interest from Bernard Mandeville, and the related 
ideas on design and engineering, should be chosen over the moral psychology of self-interest, 
sympathy and sentiments of humanity from David Hume. Hume finds no solution for knavery 
in politics and civil society. He accepts egalitarianism as useful and consistent with utilitarian 
principles; however he rejects it because of some difficulties with its implementation. I show 
how those difficulties may be overcome, and I explain why his objections are unbalanced and 
not sufficiently justified.    
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‘The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little 
 they really know what they can imagine they can design’  
Friedrich von Hayek 
The Fatal Conceit  
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to present the results of my research on the methods of design 
and engineering in the social sciences and the philosophy about them. Design and engineering 
have experienced a new interest and growth in the social sciences, particularly in economics and 
political science. Branches such as institutional design, mechanism design theory, experimental 
economics and analytical sociology are examples of this methodological stance, which I call 
methodological mechanicism. This stance must be distinguished from methodological naturalism in 
the social sciences, which is based on methods taken from the natural sciences such as 
functionalism, which is adopted from biology. Functionalism is based on an organic metaphor, 
while mechanicism is based on a technological metaphor.  
Methodological mechanicism is taken from engineering and it relies on the machine 
metaphor, which describes institutions as machines made of different mechanisms. Efficiency and 
reliability are defining properties of machines, and therefore they become defining properties of 
institutions. Such metaphor and method are justified because of the good results they can lead 
to, and they can be critically revised and even abandoned if they cease to be useful. Because it is 
methodological and metaphorical, this stance carries no ontological commitment trying to turn 
any person and institution into real machines. Such a possibility is open to a monistic 
materialism or physicalism, and the reductionism needed to reduce the psychological and 
biological to the physical.  
Methodological mechanicism and the machine metaphor are pervasive in economics, 
political science and sociology, and even in psychology where behaviour is explained through 
mechanisms operating in the mind. Criticisms have been made of this view because it can turn 
any person into an automaton and the whole society into a collection of them. This criticism is 
fair only to the extent that an alternative view is provided or considered, where a concern with 
efficiency and reliability can be resolved, considerably reduced or abandoned. Otherwise, such a 
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method and metaphor can continue having a place in science and philosophy. This criticism 
may be unfair if it attributes to this stance the kind of ontological commitment just described. 
Therefore, my argument and defence of this methodological stance and metaphor do not adopt 
this commitment; my argument and defence are conditioned to the effectiveness and 
fruitfulness of this stance, and any criticism welcome.  
Besides scientists, philosophers too have adopted this stance. The Mechanical 
philosophy of the seventeenth century is an example. Currently, philosophers such as Nancy 
Cartwright and Jon Elster adopt this view. Outside the work these philosophers have published 
on social machines and social mechanisms, there is hardly any substantive further work 
published by philosophers on these topics. Therefore, the results I present in this dissertation 
were developed from a rather small body of literature.  
The dissertation consists of five chapters, which can be separated into two parts. The 
first part covers the first three chapters, and the second part the last two chapters. The second 
part covers the topic of moral psychology, and the first one covers methodological aspects. In 
the methodological part, the Mechanical view is introduced and applied to both natural science 
and social science, particularly to the electromagnetic theories from the nineteenth century, 
analytical sociology, institutional design and mechanism design theory, which is illustrated with 
the case of the multiple-round simultaneous ascending auction.  
Because any design in economics and political science assumes a determined moral 
psychology, the last two chapters remain related to the first chapters, in particular to chapters 
two and three where mechanism design theory is discussed. There is a vast body of literature on 
current moral psychology, so I decided to work instead on the moral psychology from the 
eighteenth century where new contributions can be made, and also because during this period 
the foundations of the current debate were established.  
In chapter one, I introduce the Mechanical view in opposition to the Syntactic and 
Semantic views. I illustrate the Mechanical view with the case of electromagnetic theories from 
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the nineteenth century. The role of metaphor and analogy in models is discussed, and a rule on 
minimal analogy is also introduced which can be applied to type-hierarchies. Type-hierarchies 
are representations of natural and social kinds ordered according to their level of generality 
forming a pyramid or a three-like classification. Type-hierarchies, metaphor and analogy are all 
part of the Mechanical view.    
In chapter two, I review the current application of the Mechanical view to the social 
sciences, in particular to mechanism design theory, analytical sociology and institutional design. 
I concentrate on the production of blueprints for new institutions and the methodological 
principles which can regulate such a production. I discuss the principles advanced by Nancy 
Cartwright for the design of sociological machines. A further methodological evaluation of 
blueprints is made by distinguishing between holistic and piecemeal engineering, and also by 
distinguishing between libertarian and dirigiste designs.    
Chapter three examines the multiple-round simultaneous ascending auction, which was a 
new kind of auction designed and built by mechanism design theorists and experimental 
economists. This new kind of auction was used for the allocation of licences to 
telecommunication firms for the use and the exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. I 
describe and evaluate the blueprint for this auction using the types of design and principles 
discussed in chapter two, and the rule of minimal analogy and type-hierarchies from chapter 
one. I also introduce the method of experimental parameter variation from aeronautical 
engineering to account for the experiments performed as part of the design and implementation 
of the multiple-round simultaneous ascending auction.  
In chapter four, I discuss the moral psychology of self-interest from Bernard Mandeville. 
The aim is to carry out an epistemological evaluation of such moral psychology using the 
standards from the eighteenth century. I also discuss the method used by Mandeville and his 
refutation of the moral psychology of Lord Shaftesbury. Mandeville’s definition of vice is 
explained as a case of functional explanation in contrast to those explanations attributing a 
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specific moral philosophy to him. In the last part, I discuss Mandeville’s ideas on design, which 
emerge from his psychology of self-interest. In particular, his ideas for the prevention of 
knavish behaviour in politics and his blueprint for a commercial precapitalist society.  
In chapter five, I discuss the moral psychology of self-interest and sympathy from David 
Hume, and his refutation of Mandeville’s moral psychology. I discuss Hume as an early modern 
scientist, so I also examine his descriptive sociology of utilitarian morality, and the ideas on 
design which can be extracted from his work. In particular, his criticisms and rejection of 
egalitarian distributive justice and his own ideas for the prevention of knavish behaviour in 
politics. The quotations from the works of David Hume, Bernard Mandeville and other authors 
from the same period have been made keeping the old spelling of words used in the critical 
editions, so the reader may see words such as ‘mony’ instead of ‘money’ or ‘controuling’ instead 
of ‘controlling’, and so on.   
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Chapter 1 
The Mechanical View  
 
 
1.0. Introduction 
In this chapter I argue for the following four theses: The introduction and characterisation of 
the Mechanical view on theories in opposition to the Syntactic and Semantic views. The 
definition of analogy as a class and the definition of a class as a collection of analogies, this 
property of interdefinability is added to the argument on the logical validity of an inference 
from analogy. The role and importance of intensional criteria in establishing any analogy, class 
and type-hierarchy, such criteria underpin the descriptive elasticity needed for the creation of 
diverse analogies and systems of classification over the same ontology of properties and causal 
structures. The introduction of minimal analogy supported on a methodological rule advocating 
minimal similarity for the construction of models and type-hierarchies, this rule and type of 
analogy are defined in contrast to the opposite rule and the corresponding maximal analogy, 
which is commonly presented as the only relevant analogy.  
These theses are put forward through the discussion of five topics organised in seven 
sections. These five topics are the distinction between the Syntactic, Semantic and the 
Mechanical views of theories; the definition of analogy; the validity of the inference from 
analogy; the use of metaphorical language in science; and type-hierarchies as a solution to some 
problems related to the use of analogies and metaphors.  
In section 1.1., the differences between the Syntactic and the Semantic views are 
discussed through the work of Rudolf Carnap and Bas van Fraassen using geometry as an 
example. Two main aims justify this choice. The first one consists of making a contrast between 
the Syntactic and the Semantic views and the Mechanical view. The Syntactic view argues for 
the elimination of geometrical shapes and any graphic model, the Semantic view keeps those 
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shapes and models but only as means for identifying structures. In the Mechanical view shapes, 
models and knowledge of mechanisms constitute the foundations of science. The second aim 
emerges from an interest in blueprints from design and engineering in the natural and the social 
sciences. Geometrical shapes are graphic models for axioms, theorems and equations. A 
relationship could therefore be established between graphic models and blueprints, and 
analogical inference and other kinds of inference performed with them. This aim is only partly 
achieved in this dissertation because I concentrate on the social sciences, where no blueprints in 
graphic format are used. The application to design and engineering in the natural sciences waits 
for a separate work.  
In section 1.2., I introduce and characterise the Mechanical view as a third view on 
scientific theories besides the Syntactic and the Semantic views. Currently, there is no such term 
and category which unifyies the work philosophers of science such as Norman Campbell, Mary 
Hesse, Rom Harré, Nancy Cartwright, and Ronald Giere. Currently the work of these and other 
related philosophers is either placed as part of the Semantic view, or it remains an orphan with 
no family and no generic name or characterisation. Each philosopher is therefore treated 
separately, or is regarded as unrelated or weakly related to others.  The introduction of the 
Mechanical view as a comprehensive position within the philosophy of science has at least three 
advantages: First, it unifies apparently dissimilar and unrelated positions economising and 
enhancing both analysis and understanding as well as helping the reappraisal of the work done 
by forerunners. Second, it helps to correct the wrong classification of the work from 
philosophers like Ronald Giere, whose work is placed as part of the Semantic view. Third, along 
with the Syntactic and the Semantic views, the Mechanical view exhausts virtually all 
philosophical research done on models, and in other areas in the philosophy of science. A 
unified characterisation can bring benefits to the Mechanical view itself by systematising and 
empowering its own view and future research.  
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In section 1.3., I discuss Mary Hesse’s definition of analogy as a dyadic relation between 
two objects with similar and dissimilar properties divided into positive and negative analogies 
respectively.  In contrast, I put forward a definition of an analogy as a class by showing that a 
class relies on an unacknowledged analogy by gathering items which are not identical to each 
other but similar and dissimilar. An analogy, therefore, becomes the small unit of class by 
relating two objects. The relevant difference between a class and analogy is the larger size of the 
negative analogy in the latter.  The interdefinability of class and analogy shows a continuous line 
between the two, and it complements Hesse’s argument on the validity of the inference from 
analogy. The size of the positive and the negative analogies can be modified using different 
intensional criteria, which have an important effect on the formation of any analogy and any 
class. Analogy and class can be turned into one or the other by enlarging the size of the negative 
and positive analogies. I call this property descriptive elasticity, which also has important effects on 
the formation of type-hierarchies as representations of natural kinds.  
In section 1.4., Hesse’s argument on the validity of the inference from analogy is 
discussed in the three different frameworks that she considers, namely the logical interpretation 
of probability, the method of falsification and Bayesianism. The validity or, more precisely, the 
justification of an inference from analogy relies on a rule prescribing the selection of the 
hypothesis and model more similar than others to the event to be explained or predicted. This 
selection is made before any test. The justification from the logical interpretation and 
falsification fail, so Hesse found the answer in Bayesianism, where a high subjective prior 
probability can be given to the more similar hypothesis and model supported on relevant causal 
knowledge. Besides subjective probabilities, such a Bayesian argument relies on two other 
components, namely a cluster postulate and the property of exchangeability of probability 
values given to individual events within a class. As a complement to these two components, I 
am adding the interdefinability of analogy and class, so that the exchangeability of the prior 
probabilities given to individual events can be applied.   
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The definition of analogy and the argument on validity given by Hesse fall into the kind 
of logicism criticised by Rom Harré. I made the choice of engaging with Hesse’s logical 
arguments whilst aware of the criticism because I believe it has historical value, and also because 
it is still relevant in current logic and Bayesianism. At this stage of my research, the choice made 
does not mean the rejection of other possible justifications of an inference from analogy to be 
provided from cognitivism, pragmatism or other positions in philosophy.  
Section 1.5., contains a discussion on the use of metaphor in science from the seminal 
work Rom Harré published on this topic. He identifies two accounts of metaphor, the 
comparative view and the interactive view. The first one explains metaphoric meaning with 
reference to an original source of literal meaning, the second one holds that the introduction of 
a metaphor also affects the original source by changing its initial meaning. Hesse and Harré 
support the interactive view, however Harré has two criticisms. The first one is about the lack 
of explanation as to why some metaphors are selected while others are dismissed; he calls this 
the problem of principled filtering, which also affects analogy. The second one is about 
establishing the semantic and logical priority of literal and metaphorical language. Hesse believes 
metaphor is logically prior, while Harré believes there is no fixed foundation. He argues instead 
for a historic explanation, where both metaphoric and literal languages are constantly shifting 
places, or are superseded due to shifts in the meaning of central scientific terms. A third related 
problem he identifies is the risk of establishing trivial analogies and metaphors unless criteria on 
relevance are provided. He offers a unified solution to these three problems through the use of 
type-hierarchies, which I also discuss adding the problem of inference from analogy.  
In Section 1.6., type-hierarchies are characterised and analysed against the four problems 
mentioned above. Type-hierarchies are used by Eileen Way as graphic tree-like representations 
of natural kinds; they are on the side of the mind, while natural kinds are on the side of the 
world. Types are organised hierarchically in a pyramidal shape having at the top the most 
general types called supertypes; types and subtypes are placed below and tokens lie at the 
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bottom. There are two important semantic properties of type-hierarchies: Their masking effects 
and meaning shifts. Each type is built from a semantic mask, which hides and exposes different 
aspects of natural kinds, while a meaning shift causes the reshaping of the hierarchy through the 
introduction of a new supertype. Supertypes cause the largest meaning shifts; smaller shifts also 
take place in the lower levels. Because of the constant meaning shifts, literal and metaphoric 
languages have no logical priority over one another.  
When type-hierarchies are large enough, they can prevent trivial similarities as well as 
reduce the use of ad hoc criteria by guiding the selection of relevant similarities from the 
properties that are inherited from a supertype or a type to any token. Such an inheritance of 
properties also supports an inference from analogy, which can even be deductive since tokens 
just need to be placed under the right supertype resembling inferences made with the covering-
law models of explanation and prediction. This can only happened when the hierarchy is almost 
fully built; with a half-built hierarchy ad hoc criteria are used instead. This process captures how 
type-hierarchies work in normal science, it does not tell us how new supertypes are introduced 
and their hierarchies built in revolutionary periods. I introduce minimal analogy as a solution to 
this problem.  
In the last section 1.7., I argue for a mixed methodology containing minimal and 
maximal analogies, which I claim is more robust and has a larger scope.  Two scenarios are 
distinguished. The first one, when the next type above or a supertype is already available; and a 
second one when there is no such a type or supertype. The second case implies a meaning shift 
and a new semantic mask, and it therefore corresponds to a revolutionary stage. Mary Hesse’s 
analogy is a maximal analogy, and it therefore has better prospects in normal science. I define 
minimal analogy as an analogy with a larger negative analogy, and any analogy with a larger 
positive analogy is called a maximal analogy. Hesse did not consider the case of inferences made 
with minimal analogies; her work was exclusively concerned with cases of maximal analogy. 
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In normal science a minimal analogy is still an option chosen as the means for speeding 
up the construction of a type-hierarchy, however in revolutionary science it is necessary. A 
methodology with one rule only prescribing maximise similarity is too conservative, and in 
some cases it can be recessive and even regressive affecting scientific progress. A rule on 
minimal similarity encourages progress but implies a greater risk of failing. Therefore, a mixed 
methodology can offer both protection and progress. I illustrate this by comparing the models 
of Michael Faraday and William Thomson on magnetic fields with the models of James Maxwell 
on the electromagnetic and gravitational aethers. The latter are fully mechanical models, which 
maximised similarity with the dominant Newtonian paradigm, while the former models 
minimised similarity by introducing a new supertype, namely a field ontologically distinct from 
matter. The models from Faraday and Thomson actually anticipate important aspects of the 
revolution introduced by Albert Einstein nearly a century later.  
The ideas of minimal and maximal analogy, type hierarchies and mechanisms as a 
metaphor and as part of the Mechanical view applied to design and engineering in the social 
sciences, are presented in chapters two and three through the discussion on blueprints and the 
design of the FCC auction.  
 
 
1.1. Syntactic and semantic geometry 
Carnap distinguishes among three scientific ‘word-languages’: arithmetic, axiomatic and 
physical. He uses geometry to illustrate the differences between them.1 The use of geometry is 
particularly relevant because, if there is a place where the importance of graphics and graphic 
reasoning should be acknowledged, it is in geometry. Carnap highly praised the 
metamathematical method of arithmetisation developed by Kurt Gödel. With it, Gödel intended 
to exhibit the structure and order of mathematical propositions using natural numbers as a 
language of translation, by establishing a one-to-one correspondence between natural numbers 
                                            
1 R. Carnap (1934), p. 78-82, §25.  
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and those mathematical propositions. René Descartes proceeded in a similar fashion by using 
pairs of numbers on a Euclidian plane as an algebraic translation of any geometrical shape. In an 
important basic sense, arithmetisation is a syntactical translation—an explication in Carnap’s own 
terms—which serves as a method of logical proof when mathematical expressions can be deduced 
from the so constructed metalanguage of natural numbers.  
In the case of geometry, all shapes are arithmetised by assigning ordered triads of real 
numbers, and the linear equations constructed with them: ‘a point is interpreted in the usual way 
as a triad of real numbers, a plane as a class of such triads which satisfy a linear equation, and so 
on.’2 By doing this, all shapes in geometry disappear by being arithmetised through the 
assignment of ordered triads of real numbers, and the linear equations constructed with them: ‘a 
point is interpreted in the usual way as a triad of real numbers, a plane as a class of such triads 
which satisfy a linear equation, and so on.’3 Therefore, arithmetisation becomes an eliminative 
method, where all shapes and graphic models disappear. The graphical proof of Pythagoras 
theorem or the law of cotangents using triangles, square and circles is replaced with a syntactical 
proof produced using natural numbers as a metalanguage.4     
Physical geometry comprises the set of ‘definite synthetic sentences which state the 
empirical (namely the geometrical or graphical) properties of certain physical objects’, for 
instance, ‘these three objects A, B, C are light-rays in a vacuum each one of which intersects the 
other two at different points.’5 Carnap argues that besides producing physical descriptions, 
scientists must also axiomatise their own theories. In the case of Euclidian geometry, such 
axioms were produced by David Hilbert, i.e. axiom of parallels, axiom of continuity and so on. 
Hilbert’s axiomatic geometry contains twenty-one axioms, which any physical sentence can be 
related to by using ‘correlative definitions’. The philosophical task is again syntactic and logical, 
                                            
2 Ibid., p. 274, §71e.  
3 Ibid., p. 274, §71e.    
4 Carnap explains that unlike Wittgenstein he wanted to do more than just showing the syntax of scientific 
language; he wanted to express it using a formal language. Arithmetisation, therefore, becomes an 
explication of the syntax of in geometry; see R. Carnap (1934), p. 53, §18,; and (1962), pp. 1-18.  
5 R. Carnap, (1934) p. 81, §25.  
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which consists of explicating the order and kinds of words of physical or empirical sentences, 
equations and axioms by using a metalanguage, and proving the deductive order of sentences, 
equations, axioms, theorems, and any other scientific proposition.6 
For reasons of exactness, clarity and simplicity; axioms were selected by Carnap as the 
standard canonical way of expressing the terms and propositions contained in scientific theories. 
Following Gottlob Frege,7 he criticised the inexact and often hazardous expression of scientific 
terms and propositions published by scientists in articles and books. Hence, his aim was to 
render these concepts and propositions exact and closed under the relation of logical 
consequence, having axioms as a foundation. Inexact physical descriptions with loose ends were 
and still are common in science. In contrast, axioms are scarcely used to express the basic terms 
and propositions of scientific theories.   
The logical explication consists of making explicit the syntax of three different sets of 
scientific propositions, namely equations, axioms and definite empirical sentences by identifying 
features such as extension: existential or universal; size: atomic or molecular; composition: 
conjunctive, disjunctive or conditional as well as the sequences of reasoning performed with 
these elements, leading to normative patterns with the form of a modus tollens, a destructive 
dilemma and so on.  
By doing this, philosophy becomes concerned only with sentences and their logical 
syntax. Any geometrical shape is reduced to triads of real numbers and equations for each 
physical dimension. Geometry, a basic candidate for graphic reasoning, vanishes by being 
reduced to sentential descriptions. Inference from graphics, a cognitive activity so crucial to 
geometricians, simply disappears. The same eliminative method could, in principle, be extended to 
any model and any other graphic means used in science such as diagrams, photos, engravings 
and blueprints.  
                                            
6 Carnap explains that besides first-order predicate logic, arithmetisation is also needed in some cases, so 
it must be considered as an explication method, see R. Carnap (1934), pp. 57–58, §19.   
7 See G. Frege (1879), pp. 5–8, and (1979), pp. 12-13.  
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Bas van Fraassen offers an alternative to Carnap’s syntactic geometry. Following Alfred 
Tarski, he argues for models as the standard for expressing the content and truth-value of 
scientific theories, with the ultimate task of identifying isomorphic structural relations among 
those models and data from the world. Within the Semantic view, models comprise both set-
theoretic mathematical and graphic models such as Niels Bohr’s model of the atom. 
Accordingly, van Fraassen uses a Fano plane, also called Seven Point Geometry, as a model for 
the following four axioms:  
 
A1. For any two lines, there is at most one point that lies on both. 
A2. For any two points, there is exactly one line that lies on both. 
A3. On every line there lie at least two points. 
A4. There are only finitely many points.  
 
Van Fraassen argues that ‘logical claims, formulated in purely syntactical terms, can nevertheless 
often be demonstrated more simply by a detour via a look at models’,8 therefore the four 
axioms can be proven not by using a logical metalanguage but by reasoning from a graphic model, 
namely the Fano plane below, which consists of a geometry of the seven points A to D.  
Figure 1.1. Fano plane. 
                        C 
 
                                                    
                                                  
                                                       F                                     E 
                       G 
  
 
 
                                          A                                D                                B 
                                            
8 Van Fraassen (1980), p. 43; Seven Point Geometry in p. 42.  
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           Such a visual demonstration, however, still requires the help of the following set of 
sentences for the interpretation of the image: “In this structure only seven things are called 
‘points’, namely A, B, C, D, E, F, G. And equally, there are only seven ‘lines’, namely, the 
three sides of the triangle, the three perpendiculars, and the inscribed circle. The first four 
axioms are easily seen to be true of this structure: the line DEF (i.e. the inscribed circle) has 
exactly three points on it, namely D, E,  and F; the points F and E  have exactly one line 
lying on both, namely DEF; lines DEF and BEC have exactly one point in common, namely E; 
and so forth.”9  
Unlike Carnap’s syntax of word-languages, van Fraassen’s semantics keeps geometrical 
shapes as models for demonstrating axioms. Philosophically, this is a very important choice. 
First, because it lays out some common grounds with the Mechanical view, where graphic 
models are taken as fundamental in science. Second, because it supports graphic reasoning, that 
is, it accepts that scientific inference can be based on models and other graphics means. By 
doing this, philosophical research is not anymore constrained to word-languages. This is a very 
important step for a methodology of design and engineering, where blueprints are fundamental.  
Despite its prominence in science, inference from models has received scarce attention 
from philosophers of science and, more specifically, from logicians. Most of the philosophical 
research has been concerned with ontological and metaphysical aspects of models as well as 
their function as suppliers of truth conditions and further empirical content of scientific 
theories. Despite its interest in models, the Semantical view is not in a better position because 
virtually no further attention has been paid to inference from models. Because of the main 
interest of this thesis on blueprints, I concentrate on graphic models depicting mechanisms. 
Therefore, I do not discuss mathematical model-theory or any graphic means used in 
mathematics such as Euler or Venn diagrams or any Cartesian plane.   
                                            
9 Ibid., p. 43.  
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1.2. The Mechanical view 
Besides the Syntactic and the Semantic views there is the Mechanical view. This is a term and a 
description I am introducing covering a number of contemporary philosophers with closely 
related arguments and proposals. I place the physicist and philosopher of science Norman 
Robert Campbell as the founder of this view. Besides Campbell, the Mechanical view 
encompasses the work of Rom Harré, Mary Hesse, Nancy Cartwright, and Ronald Giere among 
others. This view emerged with a more defined shape in 1960s through the work of Mary Hesse 
and Rom Harré, who were inspired by the work of Campbell.  
Norman Campbell argued against the methodological reduction of physics to 
mathematics as it had been pursued by scientists such as Ernest March and Henry Poincaré, 
who ‘were primarily mathematicians and not experimenters.’ Campbell drew a distinction 
between ‘mechanical theories’ and ‘mathematical theories’ in physics rejecting ‘the view that 
theories of the second kind are in any manner superior in value or certainty to those of the first 
[…] it is simply asserted that such [mechanical] theories alone can attain the ultimate end of 
science and give perfect intellectual satisfaction.’10 This was his main thesis; he wanted to restore 
the value of mechanical theories in physics, which he claimed are supported on models 
depicting analogies between events from different domains.  
Currently, entries and articles on models in encyclopaedias of philosophy and edited 
volumes do not register the Mechanical view as a unifying position, and they do not use either 
any other term identifying this position in the philosophy of science. Usually, the Syntactic and 
Semantic views are discussed as the only systematic unified positions, and then a number of 
main authors and problems are listed separately and discussed as unrelated, or as weakly or 
randomly related with one another, which all belong to the Mechanical view as I present it here. 
Moreover, from those female and male philosophers belonging to the Mechanical view, there 
are comparatively fewer systematic books with a comprehensive treatment than in the Syntactic 
                                            
10 N. Campbell (1920), pp. 8, 154-155. 
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and the Semantic views. The explications and discussions in main sources of reference such 
encyclopaedias and handbooks are no doubt relevant and philosophically rigorous, but they 
become too dispersed and somehow cumbersome, when they addressed the work of 
philosophers belonging to this view. See for instance the entries on models in the Stanford and 
the Rutledge Encyclopaedias of Philosophy, the volume edited by Mary Morgan and Margaret 
Morrison, and the comprehensive survey on models written by Daniela Bailer-Jones.11  
Back in the early twentieth century, Pierre Duhem drew a methodological distinction 
between the ‘abstract mind’ of French and German scientists, and the ‘visualising mind’ of the 
English scientists. The abstract mind produces axioms and equations associated to perfect 
geometrical shapes representing real objects, and it performs all inferences through rigorous 
deductive steps.12 In contrast, the visualising mind relies on mechanical models picturing 
imperfect real objects: axioms are not required while equations often have an instrumental role 
by being epistemically less important than graphic models. Models do the ultimate and more 
fundamental epistemic job by exhibiting and demonstrating the mechanisms through which 
nature operates. Duhem points out that rigorous deduction is replaced with ‘rough analogies’, 
which are ‘a regular feature of the English treatises on physics. Here it is a book intended to 
expound the modern theories of electricity and to expound a new theory. In it there are nothing 
but strings which move around pulleys, which roll around drums, which go through pearl beads, 
which carry weights; and tubes which pump water while others swell and contract; toothed 
wheels which are geared to one another and engage hooks. We thought we were entering the 
tranquil neatly ordered abode of reason, but we find ourselves in a factory.’13  
Indeed, we enter into a factory not only by opening that book from the nineteenth 
century English physicist Oliver Lodge, but we also do by opening the books from current 
                                            
11 M. Morgan and M. Morrison (1999), D. Bailer-Jones (2009); see also R. Frigg (2006a).  
12 A representative criticism from the Mechanical view on deductive rigour and formalisation in 
economic models can be read in N. Cartwright ‘The Vanity of rigour in Economics: Theoretical models 
and Galilean experiments’, in her (2007) Hunting Causes and Using Them.  
13 P. Duhem (1906), pp. 70-71, 56-57; the book Duhem is referring to is by Oliver Lodge (1889) Modern 
Views of Electricity.  
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philosophers of science such as Rom Harré, Nancy Cartwright or Ronald Giere, where images, 
diagrams, and other graphic means play a main role.   
The introduction of the Mechanical view as a comprehensive position within the 
philosophy of science has at least three advantages. First, it unifies apparently dissimilar and 
unrelated positions economising and enhancing both analysis and understanding, as well as 
helping the reappraisal of the work done by forerunners.14  That is, it allows the reappraisal and 
unification of the early work from Norman Campbell, Mary Hesse and Rom Harré with the 
most recent one from Nancy Cartwright, Ronald Giere, Margaret Morrison, Nancy Nersessian, 
David Gooding and others. Second, it helps to correct the wrong classification of the work 
from philosophers like Ronald Giere, whose work is placed as part of the Semantic view.15 
Third, along with the Syntactic and the Semantic views, the Mechanical view exhausts virtually 
all philosophical research done on models, and in other areas in the philosophy of science.  
Among the female and male philosophers and historians just named as part of the 
Mechanical view there are of course differences. For instance, for some induction and logic play 
a crucial part, while for others reasoning from analogy and cognition are a fundamental part of 
science. In spite on these and other differences, the prominent place given by all of them to 
mechanical model is, I believe, strong enough to support this classification.  In sum, I argue that 
the addition of the Mechanical view is insightful and general enough by allowing a quick and 
comprehensive look into the current debate on models, and more generally, in the philosophy 
of science.  
Against the Syntactic view,16 the Mechanical view rejects the elimination of models and 
causal powers, and it also rejects the idea that scientific language provides a literal description of 
                                            
14 Unlike the Syntactic and the Semantic views, the Mechanical view did not have a continuous and more 
cohesive and systematic development; some aspects and authors from this view are discussed D. Bailer-
Jones (2009).  
15 See R. Frigg (2006b), p. 52; N. da Costa and S. Frech (2000), p. S119; and M. Morgan and M. 
Morrison (1999), p. 3-4.  
16 See C. Hempel (1965), pp. 433-447, and R. Carnap (1939), who  argues that when ‘Maxwell’s equations 
of electromagnetism, were proposed as new axioms, physicists endeavoured to make them “intuitive” by 
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the world. It argues instead for the use of models, especially those depicting theoretical 
mechanisms and entities, which involve the vindication of causal powers. It also highlights the 
constitutive role of analogy and metaphor in those models, and the explanations and predictions 
made with them. Its own defence of inference from analogy is supported on single cases,17 in 
contrast to a large number of cases, which is typical of induction and laws as defined by the 
Syntactic view. Because of its defence of mechanisms, causal powers and theoretical models, the 
Mechanical view is largely realist in opposition to the empiricism of the Syntactic and the 
Semantic views.  
Graphic models like the Fano Plane are a common ground for the Semantic and 
Mechanical views; this explains why the work of philosophers such as Ronald Giere is 
mistakenly placed as being part of the Semantic view. Unlike this view, models in the 
Mechanical view are not used as means for establishing isomorphic structures among models 
and data from the world, nor for the interpretation of axioms or any other formalisation in a 
scientific theory. In the Mechanical view, knowledge of mechanisms is placed at the core of 
scientific models and scientific labour, such knowledge is the ultimate aim of science. In this 
view models are graphic representations of causal mechanisms; they are the means to expose 
those mechanisms. A mechanism is a cohesive arrangement of causes regularly producing an 
effect. Within this view, models are used for at least three outstanding purposes:   
 
 As means for justifying new theories as well as for expanding and refining current ones 
 As means for rendering scientific claims true 
 As means for improving scientific and technological intervention in the world.  
 
                                                                                                                                
constructing a “model”… It is important to realize that the discovery of a model has no more than an 
aesthetic value or didactic or at best a heuristic value, but it is not at all essential for a successful 
application of the physical theory’, pp. 67-68.    
17 See N. Cartwright (1989), p. 56ff; and (1992), p. 51.  
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          With the term ‘models as mediators’ Morgan and Morrison tried to grasp and summarise 
much of the work done by philosophers working in the Mechanical view since 1980s. Such 
mediation between theories and the world is exposed mainly in two ways. The first one 
concerning the truth-value of scientific claims; the second one concerning scientific intervention 
into the world.   
In the first one, models are the real providers of any empirical content in science, that is 
to say, when laws and theories are taken at face value ‘they lie’—to use Cartwright’s phrase—
only models tell us the truth. Particularly, what she calls ‘representative models’, which contain a 
detailed description of the empirical domain of concern, often described as ‘target system’. 
Cartwright asserts that ‘theories in physics do not generally represent what happens in the 
world; only models represent in this way, and the models that do so are not already part of any 
theory.’ 18 Morgan and Morrison hold almost the same thesis by criticising the conception of 
models as mere derivations from theories, or as simplifications of them. They argue that 
‘models should no longer be treated as subordinate to theory and data in the production of 
knowledge’ but as independent and autonomous.19 Models are autonomous because they 
actually help produce new causal explanations and new measurements, which cannot be derived 
from the theory or the data themselves.20   
The centrality of models is also held by Ronald Giere, who claims that scientific theories 
comprise ‘a population of models’ and ‘various hypotheses linking those models with systems in 
the real world’.21 Such models are not set-theoretic but they are mechanical models. His 
preference for graphic mechanical models clearly places him into the mechanical tradition, and 
away from the Semantic view, which he actually criticises. He rejects isomorphism as the 
hypothesis explaining the relationship between scientific models and the world, and he argues 
instead for a relation of similarity. Also, against the Semantic view, he rejects van Fraassen’s 
                                            
18 In M. Morgan and M. Morrison (1999), p. 242.  
19 Ibid., p. 36.  
20 Ibid., pp. 13, 21; also there see article by M. Suarez in pp. 168-196.  
21 R. Giere (1988), p. 85,  
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empiricism, arguing instead for a variety of realism.22 A realist position is also shared by Harré 
and Cartwright.   
The second aspect concerning scientific and technological intervention is one of the 
most recent developments within the Mechanical view. Nancy Cartwright has produced the first 
work and analysis with a clear focus on the implementation of social and economic policies. In 
particular, she has focused on blueprints regarded as a particular type of model. Her work on 
blueprints is discussed in the next chapter.  
The pioneering work of Mary Hesse and Rom Harré on models is largely addressed to 
the production and justification of new scientific theories. Instead of using terms like ‘normal’ 
and ‘revolutionary science’, or ‘progressive’ and ‘degenerative research programmes’, Harré and 
Hesse use the term ‘theory construction’ as a description covering the creation of the new 
theories, their refinement and expansion. Such a term was a response to the distinction made by 
Logical Positivist philosophers between the contexts of discovery and justification. The term 
theory construction is also associated to the cognitive foundations of science adopted by the 
Mechanical view in contrast to the logical foundations pursued by Logical Positivism. 
Philosophers like Rom Harré and Ronald Giere explicitly state their methodological 
commitment to the cognitive approach, while others like Morgan and Morrison use the term 
‘learning’ instead.  
The Mechanical view can be summarised in the following six components:  
i. Graphic models as central to science 
ii. Vindication of causal powers and mechanisms 
iii. Key role of single case inference with and without analogy 
iv. Realism predominates 
v. Metaphorical terms as important part of scientific language  
vi. A concern with the use of models for intervention    
                                            
22 Ibid., p. 80-82, 92-106.  
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        The first four are the most widely shared aspects, while the last two are less widespread.  
In this chapter, I only discuss numbers one, three and five.  
 
1.3. What is an analogy?  
In philosophy of science, one of the easiest and common ways of making a normative 
recommendation on scientific inference consists of appealing to deduction and demanding 
complete information. Deduction is, of course, the safest inference for getting true conclusions. 
Induction can be considered as the second best option just because it can yield false 
conclusions. It is a widely spread habit in philosophy to describe as ‘heuristics’ almost any other 
type of reasoning outside deduction and induction. Such a general and indiscriminate use of the 
term heuristics actually creates negative effects preventing the work philosophers and logicians 
should do, explicating and evaluating with due care and enough detail the diversity of 
inferences. There is far more literature published and research done on deductive and inductive 
logic than in any other kind of inference, which creates a significant disadvantage for the 
remaining inferential diversity. In philosophy, the challenge persists on explaining and 
producing norms for other kinds of inference outside induction and deduction. Among others, 
psychologists such as Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel Kahneman have being doing the job 
instead.23   
Inference from analogy is an example of a non-deductive and non-inductive type of 
inference, which Carl Hempel thought could only provide ‘heurist guidance’ as part of ‘the 
pragmatic-psychological aspects of explanation’, but could not have a ‘logic-systematic role in 
scientific theorising’.24 There are a number of classical works on analogy such those of John 
                                            
23 See G. Gigerenzer (1999), and D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, A. Tversky (1982).  
24 C. Hempel (1965), pp. 441, 443.  
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Maynard Keynes, Rudolf Carnap and Mary Hesse; and some recent ones from Paul Bartha and 
those compiled by David Helman.25 In this chapter, I discuss the work of Mary Hesse.  
There are two basic philosophical questions Hesse asks about inference from analogy, 
namely what is an analogy? And, when is an argument from analogy valid? She explains that no proper 
answer has been given to these questions in modern logic. A common response given to the 
first question states that the answer is ‘obvious or unanalyzable’, while the response to the 
second one concludes that the validity of the analogy is ‘highly problematic’.26 In this section I 
discuss the answer to the first question, and in the next section I discuss the answer to the 
second one.  
First, Hesse provides a basic definition of analogy as a relation between two objects; then 
she asks us to compare the earth and the moon identifying similarities and dissimilarities. For 
instance, both are large, solid, opaque and spherical, they revolve on their own axes and 
gravitate towards other bodies. In contrast, the moon is smaller and more volcanic with no 
atmosphere and no water. She calls the first set of common properties ‘positive analogy’, and 
the second set ‘negative analogy’, and she adds that ‘there generally will be properties of the 
model about which we do not know yet if they are positive or negative analogies; these are 
interesting properties because they allow us to make new predictions’27. This last set is called 
‘neutral analogy’. A relation between the properties of two objects is a basic form of relation. 
Hence, a first definition of analogy (a) can be written as follows:  
 
(i.a) An analogy is a dyadic relation between two objects consisting of positive, negative 
and neutral properties.    
 
                                            
25 J. M. Keynes (1921), Carnap (1980), D. Helman (1988), and P. Bartha (2010). 
26 M. Hesse (1966), p. 57.  
27 Ibid., p. 8. Earlier, John Maynard Keynes (1921, pp. 217-232) had introduced the distinction between 
positive, negative and neutral analogy. 
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            After providing this definition, Hesse concludes that ‘the question of what the analogy is 
in this case is fully answered by pointing to the positive and negative analogies, and the 
discussion passes immediately to the second question.’28 While this definition of analogy as a 
dyadic relation clearly captures essential aspects, it does not capture and exploit another 
important aspect, namely, the classes or kinds being related by an analogy. In principle her 
definition does not have to exploit other aspects unless certain benefits can be expected from 
trying an alternative definition. So, before passing on to the second question as Hesse is asking, 
I will put forward a definition of analogy shifting the attention from properties to classes, that is 
to say, I will define analogy as a class, and a class will be defined as a collection of analogies.  
I use ‘class’ instead of ‘kind’ or ‘type’ because it fits  better with the logical argument that 
Hesse writes in defence of the inference from analogy. Such a choice is subject to the criticisms 
Harré makes on classes and logicism. However, Hesse did work largely within the logicist 
framework. In later years she recognised the need for a cognitive approach but she did not write 
the respective cognitive response to the questions on the nature and validity of inference from 
analogy.29  
By defining analogy as class I am trying to show at least two benefits. First, that such a 
definition can complement and simplify the answer on validity given by Hesse, in particular by 
showing how class and analogy are interdefinable. Second, it can enrich Rom Harre’s argument 
on type-hierarchies by showing the important role of intensionality. The overall discussion on 
analogy will have a third benefit to be shown in the last chapter, where design by analogy is 
discussed in relation to artefactual kinds.  
To motivate the definition of analogy as a class, I rely on the work of W. V. Quine on 
natural kinds, specifically on his discussion on similarity, which is equally fundamental for 
defining both class and analogy. Similarity is also fundamental for the type-hierarchies used by 
                                            
28 Ibid., p. 58.  
29 M. Hesse (1988), p. 317.   
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Rom Harré.  It is so essential that Quine actually claims that ‘the notion of a kind and the 
notion of similarity seem to be substantially one notion’.30 Furthermore, similarity is as basic as 
other logical notions such as identity and negation, and yet ‘there is something logically 
repugnant to it’31 due to the difficulties found trying to define it. For instance, a basic 
comparative use of similarity such as ‘a is more similar to b than to c’ fails, when it is defined 
using set theory by explaining that a and b are more similar because jointly they belong to more 
sets than a and c do. Quine explains that such a definition fails because combinations in set 
theory are ‘random’.32 That is to say, the freedom allowed for assigning properties and making 
combinations can make similarity relations almost arbitrary, and therefore inadequate for the 
natural sciences where the determination of kinds face more constraints.   
In logic a definition of similarity also fails, at least as it was attempted by Carnap, 
because his definition of a kind does not prevent the case where a collection of items cannot be 
a kind despite meeting the criteria. This occurs because Carnap’s definition states that ‘a set is a 
kind if all its members are more similar to one another than they all are to any one thing outside 
the set’.33 Quine explains that a rather disparate set containing all red round things, red wooden 
things and round wooden things meets Carnap’s definition without being a kind. This happens 
because such a set excludes plausible members. For instance, it excludes yellow rubber balls 
while it accepts yellow crocket balls and red rubber balls. More importantly for the definition of 
analogy, it allows great dissimilarity among members, for instance, by allowing one to place in 
the same class red cherries, cart-wheels and red wooden boxes.  
A solution to these problems consists of making the similarity relation more precise and 
restrictive by requiring that all members share at least one property.34 This criterion prevents 
                                            
30 .W. V. Quine (1969), p. 119.  
31 Ibid., p. 117.  
32 Ibid., p. 118.  
33 R. Carnap (1928), pp. 129–131, §80; 180-181, §111.  
34 A. Hausman (1979) and Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999) discuss the same solution to Carnap’s definition of 
a kind. Nelson Goodman first identified the problem with Carnap’s definition, which he called ‘the 
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cases of disparate sets like that one used by Quine, while it also allows a large degree of 
dissimilarity, which is important for any analogy. Such a criterion for a class (c) provides the 
grounds for a first definition:  
 
(i.c) A class is a collection of items with at least one common property.  
 
Armed with this definition of a class, let us now return to the question on what is an analogy. 
Hesse defines a positive analogy as the set of common properties between two items. Such 
common properties constitute the similarity among those two items. Taking two items in 
isolation, namely the earth and the moon, they already form a class with two objects or a 
subclass within a larger class, namely the larger class of massive rotating bodies in the solar 
systems with elliptical trajectories. In this subclass, unshared properties such as having water or 
an atmosphere are the negative analogy; they constitute the dissimilarity among the two. All 
other properties constitute the neutral analogy. Because members in any class are not identical 
to each other, they all have unshared properties or common properties with variations in 
degree, size or aspect. This provides the basis for extending the idea of positive, negative and 
neutral analogy to any class. That is to say, any collection of items organised in a class relies on 
an unacknowledged analogy. Members in a class are not identical but similar and dissimilar; they 
are analogous to each other on some properties, and disanalogous on others. From this a 
second definition of a class follows:  
 
(ii.c) A class is a collection of items with positive, negative and neutral analogies. 
 
                                                                                                                                
problem of the imperfect community’ (1977, pp. 119-126). Carnap comments on this problem can be 
found in P. A. Schilpp (1963), pp. 946-947.   
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          Because the positive analogy refers to common properties, this definition is consistent 
with the first definition (i.c.). And because this new definition uses analogy as the definiens for a 
class, the following question arises: how can a class be distinguished from an analogy? The 
number of common properties could make the difference. This is because commonly the 
number of those properties among all members in a class is presented as larger than in any pair 
of items forming an analogy. The distinction between a class and an analogy, therefore, could 
rely in the proportion of shared and unshared properties. With this consideration on the 
proportionality of properties, a third definition of a class and a new definition of an analogy can 
be advanced:  
 
(iii.c) A class is collection of items, where the positive analogy is larger than the negative 
analogy.  
(ii.a) An analogy is a class with two or more items where the negative analogy is larger 
than the positive analogy.  
 
The reference to the neutral analogy can be omitted in order to have a simpler definition, 
without affecting it because its neutral character assumes no known similarity or dissimilarity. 
The terms uniform class and analogical class can be used as short descriptions for definitions (iii.c) 
and (ii.a) respectively. From the earlier discussion, it follows that any uniform class can be 
decomposed into a number of analogical subclasses by pairing up any two individual members 
and, conversely, any number of analogical classes can be composed into one uniform class by 
conjoining each analogy with the next one. This equivalence between a class and an analogy 
shows that class and analogy are mutually definable. In other words, a class is a collection of analogies, 
and an analogy is a class. I call this property the interdefinability of class and analogy. This is 
important because it creates a continuous line between the two, which will complement the half-
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Bayesian argument Hesse makes on the validity of analogical inference. This will be shown in 
the next section.   
If the difference between analogical and uniform classes is only a matter of proportion 
between the positive and the negative analogies, a further question arises on how to establish 
the size of each. For instance, we know that the earth and the moon are both members of a 
uniform class, namely the class of massive rotating bodies in the solar system with elliptical 
trajectories. But this only happens using this description because both the earth and the moon 
can also be presented or, more precisely, they can be redescribed as forming an analogical set by 
enlarging the size of the negative analogy in order to make them look different from each other, 
i.e. one is a planet and the other is a satellite with all the differences this implies.  
There are cases where the negative analogy is initially small and yet a uniform set or class 
splits into two. Let us take the example used by Quine,35 where mice were split into two 
separate infraclasses placing the marsupial mice apart. Phenotypically, both marsupial and 
placental mice still look very similar except from the pouch and a shorter pregnancy, among 
other few differences. The genome of both marsupial and placental mice is not  available yet, 
and we don’t know if their genotypes will be specific enough in order to allow us to 
differentiate, not only any placental mammal from a marsupial one but also, and far more 
specifically, the genus Mus (mice) from the species Brown antechinus (marsupial mice). 
Furthermore, any phenotypic description in biology, or any other taxonomic description in 
science made from observable characteristics, can actually be enlarged almost indefinitely, so 
that the positive and the negative analogy can be shifted to a very small or a very large size. For 
instance, in spite of the few obvious differences observed among the ordinary mice and 
marsupial mice, the size of such differences can easily be enlarged adding eating, sleeping and 
mating habits, food preferences, life span, frequency of eye colour, variety of skin colour, degree 
of cooperation and frequency of conflict, most frequent illnesses and so on. There is no rule or 
                                            
35 Ibid., p. 128.  
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criterion that can establish one description as the unique objective or acceptable one. Any 
number of different orderings can be made all based on a causal structure, which explains the 
phenotypical features selected for the description. Let us call this descriptive elasticity the possibility 
of enlarging positive and negative analogies effecting the shape, size and number of classes and 
analogies. Intensional diversity leads to descriptive elasticity.  
The philosopher John Dupré holds similar views in his analysis of natural kinds when he 
explains that ‘what appears to be missing is not so much reality—or even existence independent 
of our classifying activity, since presumably things do have weights whether or not we know 
it—but significance.’36 My previous discussion has shown that extensional criteria of size and 
proportion applied to properties are not sufficient; and because of the scope and diversity of 
other available properties intensional criteria have to be added, for instance prioritizing some 
phenotypical features over others. But intensionality is a source of significance as Dupré is 
asking. This leads us to the last definition of class and analogy:  
 
(iv.c) A class is a collection of analogies, where the number of positive analogies is larger 
or more significant than the number of negative analogies.  
 
(iii.a) An analogy is a class with two or more members, where the number of negative 
analogy is larger or more significant than the number of positive analogy.  
 
Rom Harré also believes that extensionality as a criterion is, by itself, insufficient because two or 
more classes can have the same extension with clearly different intensional criteria and he also 
criticises intensionality. Harré sees a problem when ‘classes corresponding to the two intensions 
                                            
36 J. Dupré (1993) p. 18; in p. 94 Dupré explains how in the absence of materialist monism and success 
in reductionism, Quine’s argument on ontological commitment leads to an ontological pluralism.  
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in the hierarchy will have to be constituted by the same members’,37 which also implies 
membership to more than one higher order class or type. For instance, if the class of all things 
with shape is coextensive with the class of all things which are coloured, a red item such a red 
cherry can be a member to both classes and also to the genus Prunus, to the class of all organic 
things, and to the class of all sweet edible fruits.  
Unlike Harré, I believe multiple membership to classes or types is not a problem but a 
virtue, because it provides the grounds for the growth and diversification of knowledge, when 
different orderings and links within the same set of items are produced. This is consistent with 
Harré’s support of ‘multifarious systems of classification’; he points out ‘that there are many 
orders of natural kinds [...] what type-hierarchy we choose to work with may depend on the type 
of problem we are trying solve’; the only constraint is ‘the causal structure of the world’.38 In 
other words, different orderings are allowed as long as they are supported on causal laws and 
causal explanations. Being guided by different intensional criteria, such orderings can produce 
any partial and complete extensional overlaps. This is as another expression of the descriptive 
elasticity, which has two items related in an analogy as the foundation from which larger 
ordering and hierarchies are built.  
Causal structures actually are not a strong constraint; they allow great intensional 
diversity in the construction of any ordering of natural kinds. An almost indefinite multiplicity 
of classifications can be built upon causal structures, for instance, different orderings based on 
phenotypical criteria, aesthetic criteria, market demand and consumption can all be shown to 
have a causal base. Moreover, causal explanations in science are often contested when more 
than one cause or set of causes is presented as the true explanation, and such disagreements can 
last for a long period. Hence, intensional diversity and descriptive elasticity meet this constraint.  
                                            
37 R. Harré; J. L. Aronson, E. C. Way (1995), p. 31.  
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Unlike Hesse, Harré rejects the use of classes using types instead. I have relied on classes 
because Hesse does and furthermore I do it as means for showing the interdefinability of class 
and analogy as well as the important role intensional criteria and descriptive elasticity play in the 
creation of different orderings, which can be presented as type-hierarchies or classes. 
Descriptive elasticity has important effects on analogy, and analogy is fundamental in the 
arguments and positions Harré and Hesse hold. Any isolated item or token and any number of 
them can be placed under different types or classes by enlarging or reducing the size of the 
negative or the positive analogy. This has important effects on the shape, size, overlaps and 
multiplication of types and classes. Harre’s hierarchies of types are discussed two sections 
below.      
 
1.4. The logical problem of  analogy 
Hesse draws a distinction between formal and material analogies. Unlike material analogies, 
formal analogies such as the mathematical proportion 9:3 :: 15:5, the anatomical and physical 
relations wing:bird :: fin:fish; pitch:sounds :: colour:light, do not allow any prediction. Material 
analogies include causal relations, which provide the grounds for any prediction. We know 
correlations also enable predictions, so Hesse explains that ‘analogical argument presupposes a 
stronger causal relation than mere co-occurrence.’39 In the case of the material analogy between 
the earth and the moon, the aim is to make a prediction on the existence of life in the moon 
based on existence of life on the earth. Such an inferential leap is larger than that of 
enumerative induction, and therefore it involves a greater risk. Like induction, any inference 
from analogy is also a case of ampliative inference, and as such it faces the similar challenges on 
justification and validity. Hesse calls this challenge ‘the logical problem of analogy’, which 
consists of justifying any likelihood assigned to any prediction or explanation based on an 
analogy:  
                                            
39 M. Hesse (1966), pp. 83-84.  
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given two analogues x and y which resemble each other in a number of characters B, … 
Bm, and are dissimilar in that x also has A… An and y has not, and y has also C, ... Cl 
and x has not, we want to know whether another character D of x is likely to belong 
also to y.40 
 
She argues that the degree of similarity in the analogy can justify the likelihood of the 
prediction. The prediction will be more or less likely depending on how large the similarity is 
between x and y. That is to say, the size of the positive analogy between x and y. She claims that, 
‘we generally should have more confidence in a hypothesis based on a model very similar to the 
explicandum than a model much less similar’41 She calls this ‘a common-sense assumption’, 
which states that the larger the similarity, the greater the likelihood. I call this the rule of maximal 
similarity, which we can rewrite as follows: ‘Between two or more analogies holding a hypothesis, 
the analogy with greater similarity should be chosen’. But how can such a rule be justified? She 
revises three possible philosophical justifications, namely the logical interpretation of 
probability, the falsification method, and Bayesianism.  
She explains that this search for a justification is not concerned with methods for testing 
hypotheses but with ‘a method of hypothesis-selection’, whose aim is to help the selection of 
‘more reasonable’ hypotheses. 42 In this case the hypothesis consists of an analogy built into a 
model. Because of the concern on validity and justification, the sense of ‘more reasonable’ can 
be better understood as ‘more likely’. Testing methods such as the hypothetico-deductive 
method does not provide any means for a pre-selection of hypotheses as Hesse needs it. Such a 
pre-selection of hypotheses before any actual test is actually performed would, of course, be 
considered as part of the psychology of science and the context of discovery by positivistic 
philosophers.  
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I argue that the interest on a pre-selection of hypotheses and models before any test is 
performed is methodologically sound and justified. This stage was considered to be part of the 
context of discovery, and therefore no rules could be given. However, the search for rules or 
methods for pre-selecting hypotheses is justified, particularly where many hypotheses have been 
produced, which is not an uncommon situation in science. From the moment hypotheses are 
produced, there is a constant concern on how to select the most likely one. We can call this the 
problem of hypothesis choice. From a cognitive perspective, and even from a logical one, no prejudice 
should be imposed on any rule, routine or procedure, which could speed up the whole 
production and justification of scientific knowledge by finding a method for the discrimination 
and selection of hypotheses before any test.  
She presents the following three cases, against which those three possible justifications 
are considered:    
i. The choice between a hypothesis with a model and hypothesis without a model.  
ii. The choice between two models, where one is more similar to the event to be 
explained called explanandum.  
iii. The choice between three or more models, where the first model is more similar 
than the second one, and less similar than the third one to the event to be explained, 
which is called explanandum.43   
 
A model is ‘any system, whether buildable, picturable, imaginable, or none of these, which has 
the characteristic of making a theory predictive’.44 As an example of a model she refers to the 
use of the billiard balls in random motion as an analogy for gas molecules also moving in a 
random fashion as postulated by the new kinetic theory of gases in the nineteenth century. Her 
interest on models applies only to theoretical entities and their mechanism of operation. Against 
                                            
43 M. Hesse (1966), pp. 19, 113.   
44 Ibid., p. 19. 
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Pierre Duhem and others who hold the view that models are accessory and an aid to science, 
she claims that ‘models are logically essential for theories.’45  
Not surprisingly, Hesse finds that neither the logical interpretation nor falsification can 
help make a choice among the three cases listed. The main problem with the logical 
interpretation of probability from Carnap or Keynes46 is that ‘any group of three characters is a 
priori as likely to occur as any other […] so the evidence of the model, that the group ABD 
occurs, can have no effect on the chance of BD containing D rather than X’47, where each 
capital letter stands for a known property, and X represents an unknown property. The model is 
ABD, and the explanandum is BCD. This has a negative effect on case (i) because no choice can 
be made between models with known or unknown properties. This happens because in the 
logical interpretation equal probability distributions were common due to the principle of 
indifference, which establishes that in the absence of any reason for giving more weight to one 
event or another, all events should be considered equally probable.48 However, Carnap realised 
that some propositions can have a priori unequal probabilities. For instance, a disjunctive 
proposition is a priori more likely than a conjunctive one; he called this property the ‘logical 
width’. Specifically on analogy, he actually claims that ‘the known similarity between b and c is 
the greater the stronger the property M1 [positive analogy], hence the smaller its width’.49 That 
is to say, the larger conjunction of properties, the smaller the probability.  
Hesse does not discuss ‘logical width’, which actually has negative effects for cases (ii) 
and (iii) because in both of them if a model with greater similarity is pre-selected, its likelihood 
would always be smaller. In other words, the greater the similarity, the smaller the likelihood. 
Instead, she looked for means to make the likelihood of a model ‘stronger-than-chance’; that is 
to say, greater than any other equally probable competing model or explanation. One way of 
                                            
45 Ibid., p. 19, see P. Duhem (1906), pp. 69-75; see also C. Hempel (1965), pp. 433-447, and R. Carnap 
(1939) p. 67-68.    
46 R. Carnap (1950); J. M. Keynes (1921).   
47 M. Hesse (1966), p. 119-120.  
48 J. M. Keynes (1921), p. 42.  
49 R. Carnap (1945), p. 84, 87-88.  
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doing this within the logical interpretation consists of placing the properties B and D as an 
‘instance of a generalisation’, or a law establishing that ‘All B’s are D’, but such a law is 
introduced as a postulate, and it is therefore arbitrary. Moreover, any negative analogy must be 
considered as ‘irrelevant to the confirmation’ in order to prevent any predictive or explanatory 
failure. But this is ‘quite implausible, since it is reasonable to assume that the occurrence of 
differences […] reduces the confirmation.’50 So she concludes that the logical interpretation of 
probability does not help make a choice among (i), (ii) and (iii).  
With falsification the inference from analogy also faces serious problems. For case (i), 
Hesse constructs a scenario with the model ‘All AB are D’, and two competing hypotheses, 
namely H1: ‘All B’s are D’ and H2: ‘All C’s are X’ with an explanandum ‘BC’. As it is required 
from the method of falsification, the model and the hypotheses have a universal form. Both 
hypotheses are equally similar to the event to be explained because they share one property in 
common with it. If the model ‘All AB’s are D’ is attached to each hypotheses, H1 should be 
chosen because ‘the set of potential falsifiers of H1 includes and is larger than the set of 
potential falsifiers of H2’51 This choice is made because Hesse constructs the model ad hoc by 
making it almost the same as H1 except from the addition of property A. In this way, H1 
becomes a subset of M, and therefore, it includes the potential falsifiers of H1 plus its own 
falsifiers. This does not happen with H2.  
Hesse sees the falsificationist account of analogy as plausible and satisfactory, however 
the solution is not an interesting one.  By making the model more similar to the explanandum, 
analogical inference is at risk of becoming unchallenging and uninteresting. Case (i) is actually 
turned into case (ii). This is an important problem for Hesse’s rule of maximal similarity. Unlike 
her, I argue that unexpected and surprising analogies with less similarity can actually produce 
greater advances in science. I defend this claim in the next section.  
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For cases (ii) and (iii) Hesse follows a different strategy. She presents the explanandum 
B1, B2, C; and two models, namely model M1: A1, B1, D1, and model M2: A2, B1, B2, D2. 
Despite being more similar to the explanandum, M2 cannot be chosen because the size of 
potential falsifiers has to be defined and compared to model M1. Because of the different 
properties each model has, none of them can be a subset of the other, so the size of the set with 
the potential falsifiers for each model cannot be compared, and therefore a choice cannot be 
made, ‘we are left with hypotheses which are incomparable on both falsifiability and 
corroboration criteria.’52 Individually, each model is falsifiable but together they are 
incomparable. The problem extends to any choice with two or more analogies and their models.  
Despite these failures with the logical interpretation of probability and the method of 
falsification, Hesse still holds that ‘material analogues’, i.e. models based on material analogies 
depicting causal mechanisms are ‘strongly predictive’,53 and she claims that the choice is clear in 
cases (ii) and (iii), where models more similar to the explanandum should be chosen. Maximal 
similarity should, in principle, lead to predictive success. Inference from analogy is therefore left 
without a full justification.   
Later, Hesse turned her attention to Bayesianism, which seemed to be able to 
accommodate a pre-selection of hypotheses based on analogies and models. In subjective 
Bayesianism there is no prejudice on the sources and type of information used for assigning 
prior probabilities; this liberality looks appealing because it can provide a justification for a high 
likelihood given to the analogy and model more similar to the explanandum. Hesse believes that 
with certain modifications, ‘a unified theory of Bayesian inference’ can justify ‘three types of 
inductive inference’, namely ‘enumerative induction’, ‘theoretical inference from analogies and 
models’, and inference based by ‘simplicity’.54 The modifications she suggests emerge from the 
criticism she makes on the Bayes theorem as a transformation rule used for updating beliefs, 
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53 Ibid, p. 143-144.  
54 M. Hesse (1975), p. 91.  
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which she claims is ‘vacuous as a method of induction’, unless ‘normative constraints are put 
upon belief distribution the updating of beliefs other than coherence’.55 It is of course 
controversial to continue using the term ‘Bayesianism’ after constraints are placed on prior 
probabilities, which has given rise to objective versions of it. Hesse’s own version should 
perhaps be considered as objective. Although, she makes extensive criticisms on different 
aspects of Bayesianism, and even considers the possibility of devising a different rule of 
transformation.   
In Bayesianism any hypothesis based on an analogy with or without a model can be pre-
selected giving to it a certain degree of belief, that is, a prior probability can be given to it before 
any prediction or test. She argues that the introduction of a causal model, i.e. a material 
analogue, prevents the posterior probability from being ‘arbitrary’ or an ‘accident’. If coherence 
is the only norm, any statistical generalisation like ‘Most crows are black’ is supported by a long 
run of crows, if the prior probability of the generalisation is high enough.56 But from case (i) 
above we also want a hypothesis with a model to have a higher prior probability than a 
hypothesis without a model, and from cases (ii) and (iii) we want more similar models to have 
higher prior probabilities than less similar ones. Because Hesse is arguing for a ‘sufficient 
(though not a necessary)’ method,57 she needs to show at least one example where such values 
are obtained.  
Unfortunately, Hesse did not produce such an example showing how Bayes’s theorem 
can be applied to an inference from analogy, she only makes a generic reference to cases like 
‘prediction of the properties of a new chemical compound from knowledge of its elements and 
of other compounds; prediction of the properties of a full-sized object from experiments on a 
replica in, say, a wind tunnel; and prediction of the properties of micro-objects and events from 
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those of macroscopic models’58.  I am therefore producing an example intended only as 
illustration by relying on an example from one of her earlier papers.59 The example used there 
shows how an inference can be made from an analogy between objects belonging to different 
classes, which I apply to planets, bricks, marbles and anvils. These objects are solid, massive and 
opaque but vary in size, shape, chemical composition and so on. Galileo produced the law of 
falling bodies, Kepler produced the laws of the planetary motion, and Newton the laws of 
universal gravitation from which those of Galileo and Kepler can actually be derived.  
Hesse claims that a new prediction can be made without a law connecting any two 
different classes of objects such as bricks and marbles, by identifying the relevant similarities 
between two classes. If there is evidence from many trials on the falling speed of marbles 
dropped from the top of a tower, by analogy a new prediction can be made on a first brick on 
trial falling with the same speed. The same prediction can be made dropping an anvil. By the 
same procedure, if the force of gravitation is known from several planets attracting each other, 
by analogy a new valid prediction can be made on the earth attracting any brick, marbles, cherry 
or anvil falling from the top of a tower. Here it is a simple form of Bayes’ theorem:  
 
                                                     P(e/h) P(h) 
                                       P(h/e)= ------------------ 
                                                          P(e) 
 
With such a theorem it is possible to obtain the posterior probability of a causal hypothesis 
made with the help of analogy from the prior probability of a prediction, and the prior 
probability of that causal hypothesis with and without assuming that the prediction was 
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successful. If the falling speed of bricks is well established from many trials, by analogy a first 
new prediction can be made on an individual item belonging to dissimilar classes such as anvils, 
marbles or cherries with the following values:   
 
P(h): is the prior probability of the hypothesis. This is the probability of the causal 
mechanism described in the positive analogy being real before any prediction. That is to 
say, it is the probability of a common cause affecting in the same way the falling speed 
of bricks and anvils. Because of the risk involved in the negative and neutral analogies a 
cautious value of 0.75 can be assigned to this prior.  
 
P(e): is the prior probability of the evidence or observation. This is the probability of the 
very first anvil actually falling at the same speed to that of the bricks. Because no 
analogy is considered here, a moderate value of 0.80 can be given to this prior.   
 
P(e/h): is the likelihood, which is the probability of the evidence or observation 
assuming that the hypothesis is true. This is the probability described in the previous 
paragraph, whose value is modified by assuming that the common cause or property 
presumed in the positive analogy is real. The value of the likelihoods should be high, 
namely 0.95 
 
         With these values, the posterior probability P(h/e) can be obtained:  
 
                P(e/h) P(h)          0.95 x 0.75        0.7125 
P(h/e)= ------------------ = ------------------ = ---------- = .89 
                     P(e)    0.80            0.80  
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          As it can be appreciated, the probability of the hypothesis raises from 0.75 to 0.89, which 
is what Hesse was expecting from using Bayes’ theorem. Following the rule of maximal 
similarity, she argues ‘that the confidence we have in the prediction […] is due to the relation of 
analogy […] which is constituted by the repetition of predicates G[solid] and Q[massive]’, so we 
regard the analogy as ‘confirmed because the bodies described […] are sufficiently similar in 
some respects […] to justify the inference’60  
Having made an illustration, we can now discuss the core of her logical argument, which 
consists of a postulate and a property, namely the clustering postulate and the exchangeability of 
single-test probabilities. From the last section, I am adding the interdefinability of class and 
analogy as a property, which complements both exchangeability and the postulate:   
     Clustering postulate:  
‘If groups of properties are present together in a number of instances, in the absence of other 
evidence it is more probable than not that they will be present together or absent together in 
further instances.’61  
 
     Exchangeability:  
‘The initial probability of a given outcome of a single test of a P-object for Q-ness or for not-Q-
ness will respectively be the same for each individual P-object, that is, p(e1) = p(e2 ) = … = 
p(er) = p(~e1), and so on.’62  
 
     Interdefinability:  
A class is a collection of analogies and an analogy is a class with two or more members, where 
the size of positive analogies is larger, or more significant, than the size of negative analogies  
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          The clustering postulate is analogous to the principle of the uniformity of nature used to 
justify induction, it is an adaption of this principle for the case of analogy. Hesse actually 
explains that the postulate is a different name for the ‘assumption of homogeneity’, where ‘in 
these matters of induction it must assumed that God is not a coin-tosser’.63 Therefore, the 
postulate is crucial because it justifies the projection of the same probability value for all future 
predictions of the same class of events.  
Here and in other works, Hesse presents her argument on analogy as an inductive one, 
which I believe can be misleading. The cases she discusses actually correspond to single case 
inferences, which need to be distinguished from inferences based on many cases. For instance, 
in her discussion on the logical interpretation of probability and on falsification, single case 
probabilities are not considered. It should be noted that due to the challenges it poses, single 
case inference is treated separately from the typical enumerative induction supported on a large 
amount of instances. The literature on single case probabilities and recent works on 
experimental induction based on a few cases, offer a more suitable framework for the analysis 
and discussion of the inference from analogy.64  The interesting challenge consists of keeping 
the inference minimally inductive by relying on one or as few cases as possible making scientific 
predictions and explanations. The conception of analogy as a single case inference is crucial for 
Hesse’s general argument and, more particularly, for the exchangeability of initial probabilities.   
The exchangeability of initial probabilities is a crucial new property, which actually does 
the job the logical interpretation and falsification could not do. She drew this property from the 
work from Bruno De Finetti, where he argues for the independent subjective probabilities, 
which can be separately assigned to events of the same type or with analogous characteristics.65 
From independence and separability Hesse derived exchangeability, which crucially relies on the 
                                            
63 Ibid., p. 94.  
64 D. Gilles (2000) discusses single case probabilities under the different interpretations of probability; P. 
Galison (1987) presents historical cases of inferences in experimental physics based on single cases and 
on a few cases only; and N. Cartwright (1989) presents a compelling argument on single case causal 
explanation.  
65 De Finetti (1937), p. 120. 
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equal prior probability, which can be assigned to any member in the analogical class. Such 
conditions justify giving a high degree of confirmation to the very first member in that class, if 
the prediction is successful. That is, inductively scientists do not have to wait for a long series of 
successful tests or predictions to be justified after, say, the twentieth prediction.  A single case 
can do the job. In other words, equality and exchangeability in the analogical class allow 
bringing back to the front the confirmation value of the twentieth case. By doing this, the 
standard inductivist rationale is inverted.  
The equality of prior probabilities by itself does not allow or imply bringing back such a 
confirmation value. On the contrary, De Finetti is arguing for taking each event as separate 
from any other similar one or of the same type. Recall that in the standard account, an analogy 
is not a class of events of the same type but a relation of two dissimilar objects belonging to 
different classes. Exchangeability, therefore, remains unwarranted and arbitrary, unless an 
argument is provided where all relevant analogies are brought together into one class. The 
definition of an analogy as a class does this, thanks the property of interdefinability.  
Homogeneity, exchangeability and interdefinability complement each other; together 
they make a cohesive argument for the inference from analogy. The high prior probability given 
to such inference is justified because of the rule of maximal similarity and the related causal 
knowledge. Then, a successful prediction produces a higher posterior probability as it has been 
shown in the example above on the falling speed of dissimilar objects, namely planets, anvils, 
marbles and cherries. The idea of exchangeable events within a class, particularly of analogous 
events, is very important because it allows placing an analogy as the first event forming a class. 
This step is fundamental in Hesse’s new and stronger argument on analogy, which places 
inference from analogy not as supplementary or as a mere heuristic device, but as an inference 
which can itself be the foundation of any scientific law or theory.   
This argument completes the different views Hesse held on analogy from the early work 
she published on this topic in 1963 to the last development and position she held adopting 
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some aspects from Bayesianism. She kept a long battle with Positivism, and she was also 
dissatisfied with Falsificationism. In 1966, she was still claiming that ‘analogical argument is 
necessary only in situations where it has not been possible to observe or to produce 
experimentally a large number of instances in which sets of characters are differently associated 
[…] analogical argument is “weaker” than inductive, but on the other hand it has the advantage 
of being applicable where straightforward generalization is not.’66 Nine years later, she finally 
reached a distinct new view:   
 
‘The universality which is usually held to be an essential constituent of theories is seen in 
this view as rather a convenient method of summarizing case-by-case analogy judgments […] 
predictions of next instances of universal generalizations are elementary special cases of this 
kind in which the notion of “analogy” between a model whose behaviour is known in 
domain i1 and the predictions in domain i2, reduces to the notions of exchangeability and 
clustering of instances in the different initial conditions i1, i2.’
67 (italics added)  
 
This is the strongest argument and conclusion within the Mechanical view on analogy I am 
aware of, it is cogent and distinctive by placing single case inference from analogy at the 
foundations of laws and theories, which now take a derivative and secondary status. In contrast, 
the Syntactic and Semantic views place laws and generalisations at the foundations of any 
theory. Hesse’s argument and justification of analogical inference provides the Mechanical view 
with the new grounds needed since the time Norman Campbell advanced his views on analogy, 
models and scientific theories.   
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1.5. Metaphor  
The knowledge and postulation of mechanisms are distinctive of the Mechanical view. All 
mechanical models theoretical or observable describe a causal mechanism responsible for 
certain effects. There are two fundamental features of mechanisms as they are introduced by the 
Mechanical view. The first one requires continuous physical contact between all the entities and 
effects involved. That is to say, action at distance is avoided. Newtonian mechanics is a 
canonical example of this, where theoretical entities and mechanisms such as the luminiferous 
aether and the corpuscular theory of light were postulated. The second one is a widely shared 
realist belief in causal powers.  
The Mechanical view is itself a metaphor, which has expanded into scientific and 
philosophical domains where causes and mechanisms are used metaphorically. The work of 
Donald Davidson in the philosophy of mind and action, and that of Daniel Little in explanation 
in the social sciences are examples.68 In the social sciences, mechanism design theory, an 
important branch in game theory, constitutes another outstanding example, where the term 
‘mechanism’ has been introduced with a clear metaphorical sense. Mechanism designers devise 
specific rules, incentives and penalties, which together bring about certain behaviour. However, 
it is not entirely clear the kind of physical interaction existing between the presumed causes, the 
mind and the observed behaviour. In spite of this, the work of Davidson and mechanism design 
theory is a clear example of the success of metaphors in philosophy of mind and science.   
Other terms such as inflation, deflation, depression and boom used in economics also 
have a metaphorical meaning. Besides mechanisms, functionalism is an example of another 
successful metaphor widely used in anthropology and sociology. Evolutionary game theory 
represents another well-established twofold metaphor in the social sciences, where among 
others terms like ‘dove’ and ‘hawk’ are widely used describing the profiles of different 
individuals portrayed as players. These examples show that metaphors are not a few only having 
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an accessory character; there are many of them playing a fundamental role also in the social 
sciences.   
In contrast, in the natural sciences the use of mechanisms is often considered to be 
literal and real. It is believed that nature is composed of mechanisms, that is, of causes 
responsible for all things we see happening. This seems obvious and in principle difficult to 
challenge; the many successes of science predicting and intervening in nature seem to prove the 
reality of causes and mechanisms as well as the literality of the related descriptions. However, 
even here metaphors can be found in some of the most fundamental concepts.  
The use and the role of metaphor in science has been a very important contribution 
made by Rom Harré to the Mechanical view.  He explains that models, metaphors and analogies 
are needed when ‘we have reached the limits of discernible mechanisms’.69 While some 
analogies and models can be built using literal language, metaphorical terms are often required 
when no adequate concept or description is available. Thus metaphorical terms and analogies 
meet in a model at the borders of scientific discovery, conceptual change and scientific 
revolutions. James Maxwell’s vortex-idle wheel model of magnetic force, and the billiard balls 
model of gas molecules are examples of such models.  
In Positivism, the meaning of any theoretical terms could only be decided upon by the 
observable effects; no speculation on the specific nature and inner workings of unobservable 
mechanism and entities was otherwise acceptable. Harré demonstrates how the observational 
language accepted by Positivism actually contains metaphorical terms, whose meaning ultimately 
relies on the terms and procedures taken from another scientific branch.  For example the term 
‘current’ in electro-dynamics pictured as a flow of electrons cannot be fully defined with 
reference to the different readings observed on an ammeter from a simple circuit, ‘because as it 
is used in electro-dynamics it carries with it an accretion of meaning derived from its use in 
hydro-dynamics, where it could be effectively taught before a flowing or running stream. Hence 
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the term 'current' is metaphorical carrying with it into the description of the phenomena 
encountered in electrical circuits some of the force it had in its original p.c.p.’70  
Besides the term ‘current’ other fundamental terms in physics are also metaphorical such 
as ‘force’, ‘field’, ‘repulsion’, ‘conductor’, ‘wave’, ‘packing fraction’ and ‘strangeness’. Generally, 
the metaphorical meaning of scientific terms goes unnoticed because ‘the tradition in 
philosophy of language and science is that language is intrinsically literal in nature. Literal 
meaning is considered to be the standard and normal use of words, and it is the meaning that 
words possess independently of when and how they are used.’71 This is an important 
observation, without it the widely shared belief that science provides literal descriptions of 
nature and society would persist and remain unchallenged. In science metaphorical terms ‘are 
picture-carrying expressions. When we describe an electrical discharge ('discharge' is an M-term too) 
in a gas as the passage from a current, we are inviting ourselves to picture something flowing of 
which incandescence, for instance, is an effect.’72 Therefore, figurative language is not anymore 
exclusive to art but it also is a systematic component of science.  
The comparison view of metaphor explains figurative meaning by relating it to a primary 
literal meaning. For instance, the term ‘electrical current’ is metaphorical because it can be 
related to the literal description of clusters of molecules of a fluid like water moving along a 
canal.  Harré criticises Norman Campbell and Ronald Giere for implicitly holding this view, 
when they use analogy and similarity in their philosophical accounts of models and scientific 
theories. He argues instead for the interactive view put forward by Max Black with an application 
to language in general, that is to say, without a special focus on science. Unlike the comparative 
view, this view does not assume that literal meaning remains as the fixed foundation upon 
which metaphor is explained. The introduction of metaphors rather shakes those foundations 
                                            
70 R. Harré (1960), p.112; he explains that ‘a term has been defined with reference to a paradigm case (p.c.) 
if it could have been introduced by ostension. The paradigm case will be that to which we could have 
pointed in introducing the term, and the whole method of introduction I shall call a paradigm-case procedure 
(p.c.p.)’, p. 111. 
71 R. Harré, J. L. Aronson, E. C. Way (1995), p. 96.  
72 R. Harré (1960), p. 112.  
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by creating new meanings, which affect any related literal meaning; Black points out that ‘it 
would be more illuminating… to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it 
formulates some similarity antecedently existing.’73  
Mary Hesse also criticised the comparison view and adopted the interactive view of 
metaphor, applying it to science. She explains that the interactive view accounts for the mutual 
affectation of both literal and the metaphorical language producing a ‘shift in meaning’, and a 
‘post-metaphoric’ sense. For instance, with the metaphor ‘Man is a wolf’,  ‘men are seen to be 
more like wolves after the wolf-metaphor is used, and wolves seem to be more human.’ And 
with any mechanical metaphor ‘nature becomes more like a machine in the mechanical 
philosophy, and actual concrete machines themselves are seen as if stripped down to their 
essential qualities of mass and motion.’74  
Harré agrees with this mutual affectation and believes similarity is created by choosing to 
relate two or more objects, rather than being there preceding the metaphor. However, he holds 
that the comparative view remains ‘vague’, at least in its application to scientific language, 
because ‘it is not clear how the interaction or filtering is to occur, nor how similarity can be 
created where none was seen to exist before.’ 75 He calls this ‘the problem of principled filtering 
of positive from negative analogies.’ And he also rejects Hesse’s thesis on the logical priority of 
metaphor, which states that ‘metaphor properly understood has a logical priority over the literal, 
and hence that natural language is fundamentally metaphorical, with the “literal” occurring as a 
kind of limiting case’76 In other words, she inverts the order by placing metaphor as a more 
fundamental form of speech.  
Besides these two problems, Harré also identifies another problem with the use of bare 
similarity as the kind of relationship models hold with the world, and as the criterion to be used 
                                            
73 M. Black (1962), p. 37; see also (1993), p. 35.   
74 M. Hesse (1965), p. 254. 
75 R. Harré, J. L. Aronson, E. C. Way (1995), pp. 105, 96-97.  
76 M. Hesse (1993), p. 56.  
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for defining metaphor. Ronald Giere places bare similarity as the criterion needed for evaluating 
the empirical significance of models by claiming that ‘the notion of similarity between models 
and the real system provides a much needed resource for understanding approximation in 
science. For one thing, it eliminates the need for a bastard semantical relationship—
approximate true.’77 Giere says that such a basic notion could be refined by adding ‘degrees’ and 
‘respects’ of similarity, however he does elaborate this claim further showing how this can 
actually be done. Harré believes this notion of similarity is too basic for models because it does 
not tell us if it is a symmetric or a transitive, and also because it ‘is not rich enough to give us a 
ranking of models in terms of which are better approximations […] The notion of similarity is 
doing too much of the work in Giere’s theory; and similarity is too complex and difficult a 
notion to leave as unanalysed primitive.’78  
In sum, Harré identifies three outstanding related problems on metaphor and analogy; 
and I am adding the fourth on the list, which is the logical problem of analogy discussed in the 
previous section:  
 
1) Priority: the problem of establishing the logical priority of metaphorical or literal 
language.   
2) Salience: the problem of filtering positive from negative analogies 
3) Triviality: the problem of distinguishing trivial from non-trivial analogies 
4) Inference: the problem of justifying the likelihood of a prediction or an explanation based 
on an analogy.  
 
Harré argues that an ontology of types organised in hierarchies can provide a solution to the 
first three problems, and I am also evaluating such hierarchies against the inference from 
analogy.  
                                            
77 Giere (1988), p. 106 
78 R. Harré, J. L. Aronson, E. C. Way (1995), pp. 94-95.  
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1.6. Type-hierarchies 
A type is a representation of a natural kind and any individual member of a natural kind is a 
token in virtue of the representation created by the type.  Eileen Way, a co-author with Rom 
Harré, explains that ‘types are on the side of the mind, kinds are on the side of the world.’79 As a 
representation, a type ‘is a set of individuals each of which has certain properties which are 
numerically identical with those in other sets of higher type’. Because types have a nominal 
status, the relationship they hold with their tokens cannot be that of ‘qualitative identity’, which 
only holds ‘between the relevant concrete properties of each particular’, 80 so numerical identity 
does the job of establishing the relationship needed between tokens and the types. An individual 
whale is a token whose properties are numerically related to those contained in the type 
mammal, which is a nominal representation. Types are ordered according to their level of 
generality, so for instance mammals are more general or higher up in the hierarchy than 
placental mammals, and the family Felidae is below these two. 
Types do not mirror the world. This is because more than one type-hierarchy can be 
built upon any natural kind, but this does not mean types are a mere construction built solely 
upon convention. Linguistic conventions are accepted as part of types and hierarchies but they 
cannot fully account for their formation because ‘real structures of natural kinds’81 set 
constraints on them. Natural kinds therefore have a metaphysical status. Harré argues for a 
realism of natural kinds and their causal structures upon which a representational pluralism is 
built using types hierarchically organised.  
Type-hierarchies are graphic representations; they are not presented using sentential 
descriptions. This is consistent with Harré’s defence of graphic models, which he calls ‘iconic 
models’, in opposition to the ‘statement view’ of theories and scientific knowledge held by the 
                                            
79 Ibid, p. 27 
80 Ibid, pp. 15-16. More details on Harre’s argument on nominalism can be found in Harré and R. H. 
Madden (1975), pp. 16ff.   
81 R. Harré, J. L. Aronson, E. C. Way (1995), p. 17.  
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Syntactic view. An interest in the development of artificial intelligence programmes also 
motivates a graphic representation and the actual choice for types, which help simplify 
inferences under computational constraints.82 Their shape and operation of type-hierarchies is 
analogous to Truth Trees in logic.  
The figure below is an adaptation of the graphic model of type-hierarchies used by 
Eileen Way.83 Because of their increasing level of generality of types the model  has a pyramidal 
shape. Literal and metaphorical descriptions are called semantic masks.   
 
    Figure 1. 3. General model of type-hierarchies  
 Ψ                                                         TΨ          TΩ            
                              Tλ                                                           Tλ         Tµ  
                                                                                                                             
                      tα            tβ                                             tα           tβ            tγ 
                                                                                                             
 
                           a             b                                                 a           b             c 
 
Literal mask                 Metaphorical mask 
 
Where TΨ and TΩ are called supertypes; Tλ and Tµ are called types; tα, tβ and tγ are subtypes; 
and a, b and c are tokens. Supertype TΩ, type Tµ, subtype tγ and token c only emerge with the 
metaphorical mask. So, for instance, a and b are tokens of subtype tα in the literal mask, c 
becomes a token of tα and b a token tγ only under the metaphorical mask, while tβ becomes a 
subtype of Tµ, and TΩ becomes a supertype for all also under the metaphorical mask.  
                                            
82 S. E. Fahlman (1979) uses type-hierarchies in artificial intelligence programming; he explains that it is 
not enough to retrieve ‘isolated facts with no deduction’ from a knowledge base, while the other hand 
‘we cannot expect to deduce quickly everything that could be deduced’, so the inheritance of properties 
through type-hierarchies offers ‘an intermediate level of deductive ability’, p. 15.   
83 R. Harré, J. L. Aronson, E. C. Way (1995), p. 102.  
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1. Logical priority. Neither metaphoric nor literal language can be established as 
logically prior because the distinction between the two is highly dependent on the wider 
semantic context, and also because such a distinction is subject to fundamental meaning shifts. 
Eileen Way describes these wider semantic contexts as masks because they can hide or expose 
certain properties from any natural kind, as well as certain vertical and horizontal relationships 
in the hierarchy. Each semantic mask contains different literal terms and different metaphoric 
ones, which can reveal or hide new relationships among kinds along the transverse, horizontal 
and vertical axes in the hierarchy. The introduction of a new metaphorical term leads to a 
meaning shift in the literal terms, causing the reshaping of the hierarchy. Hence, literal does not 
mean a definitive true description; it only ‘denotes the presently accepted classification of 
natural kinds and species’.84  
The successive theories of gases between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries are 
an example of this shift in meaning and reshaping of hierarchies: From the Newtonian theory 
postulating particles surrounded by an elastic fluid called ‘caloric’ to the kinetic theory, which 
rejects caloric and repulsion relying only on the random motion of particles colliding with each 
other. Each theory functions as a semantic mask. The caloric theory of gases was developed by 
Pierre-Simon Laplace in analogy with Newtonian physics, where forces of attraction and 
repulsion carry the explanatory power. Because the small particles from gases would be too far 
from each other to be able to exert any attraction, the fluid caloric was introduced in order to 
hold them together. It was also assumed that the gas molecules attracted the caloric. Latent 
caloric formed a material core from which free caloric was released filling in the space between 
the molecules.85   
The caloric theory actually retained part of its explanatory power on some observable 
effects on temperature and volume. Nonetheless, it became an outmoded metaphor after the 
kinetic theory was accepted as the new literal description. As a semantic mask, the caloric theory 
                                            
84 Ibid., p. 102.  
85 See R. Fox (1971), pp. 68ff; and H. Chang (2004), pp. 69-75.    
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exposed gas molecules as a natural kind, while it hid the possibility of accounting for their 
movement without any fluid. A fundamental meaning shift occurred with the emergence of the 
kinetic theory, which explained the same events and regularities observed between volume and 
temperature by replacing ‘attraction’ and ‘repulsion’ with ‘collision’ and ‘random motion’. No 
fluid like caloric or any other was needed. The effects of this meaning shift were not only local 
because at the time caloric was also used in other theories, so structural changes were forced 
into all related natural kinds and the type hierarchies built upon them. A vast number of 
observable events had to be explained and re-described using the new theory.  
The same conclusions can be extended to Hesse’s example discussed in section 1.4. A 
shift in meaning and the reshaping of types also occurred when the literal terms ‘free falling’ and 
‘constant speed’ from the Galilean semantic mask, were replaced with ‘attraction’ and 
‘gravitational force’ under the Newtonian mask.   
The argument on meaning shifts and the reshaping of type hierarchies relies on a 
normative judgement, which accepts the postulation of unobservable entities and mechanisms 
for scientific explanation. Strict empiricist normative standards reject such postulation of 
theoretical entities and mechanisms, while realist standards accept it. Against Ernest Mach and 
the Copenhagen interpretation in physics, Harré argues for the following principle, which he 
calls P1: ‘If you don't know why certain things happen then invent a mechanism (in accordance 
with the view you take of how the world works)–but it is better still if you find out how nature 
really works.’86 This principle actually provides Campbell and Hesse’s work of theoretical 
models with a systematic foundation, and it also anticipates the defence of the inference to the 
best explanation as normative principle. For instance, Gilbert Harman writes, ‘the inference to 
the best explanation corresponds approximately to what others have called “abduction”, “the 
method of hypothesis”, “hypothetic inference” […] and “theoretical inference” […] In making 
this inference one infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the evidence, to 
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the truth of that hypothesis.’87 The next step would be to reduce inference to the best 
explanation to a case of inference from analogy in order to obtain a fully Campbellian view of 
theories. Unlike Campbell though, Eileen Way makes analogy to depend upon type-hierarchies, 
which in her view provides the ultimate systematic and methodological grounds for scientific 
models and scientific inference.  
2. & 3.Salience and Triviality. On a one-to-one basis, an analogy relies on bare 
similarity and ad hoc criteria, which can lead to trivial relations of both similarity and 
dissimilarity. Bare similarity as a criterion for building analogies is insufficient because many 
trivial or scientifically uninteresting relations of similarity can easily be established. For instance, 
similarity relations between layers of bricks on a wall and layers of cells on a human tissue, or 
between racing cars running on an elliptical race and planets rotating around the sun. As Eileen 
Way points out, ‘clearly some properties are more important or salient than others for the model; 
how are these determined? Why don’t we consider that electrons may have an analogy with the 
moons craters or an atmosphere; or that the nucleus may have a gaseous and turbulent 
structure?’88  Lack of salience leads to triviality, criteria on salience could be created ad hoc on 
one-by-one basis but this is not good enough when a few general criteria can be produced 
reducing normative requirements and increasing scope.  
Way explains that triviality is a fundamental problem for the Semantic view, while ad hoc 
similarity is a fundamental problem for Hesse and Giere’s view on models. This happens 
because structural isomorphism between models ‘is not a powerful enough relation’, since ‘there 
will be an endless number of systems that exhibit the requisite mapping’. 89 While bare similarity 
remains on the ‘bottom most-layer’ of any ontology by relating only one token to another. In 
other words, in the Mechanical view as developed by Hesse and Giere, similarity does too little 
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88 R. Harré, J. L. Aronson, E. C. Way (1995), p. 91.  
89 Ibid., p. 92.  
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by relating two or a few tokens only, while in the Semantic view similarity relations among those 
tokens can be trivial.     
Eileen Way argues that a hierarchy of types can provide a solution to these two 
problems. She claims that types are not static but dynamic representations of different 
relationships among objects all belonging to natural kinds, so ‘the type-hierarchy generates 
salience and similarity through inheritance and the empirically determined ordering of these 
kinds.’90 The knowledge of causal and non-causal properties of types, and the inheritance of 
these properties from one type to another constitute the solution to the problems of salience 
and triviality.  
Supertypes at the top of hierarchy denoted by TΨ and TΩ, and types Tλ and Tµ as well 
as subtypes tα, tβ, tγ at the lower levels can provide such a solution through relations of 
inheritance reaching any token. Any successful analogy following the logical standards 
established by Hesse is actually laying a bridge between two types through one or more 
common properties, it has not just been guided by a type or a supertype as suggested by Way 
but by ad hoc criteria. For instance, the case in section 1.4., where gravitation is a property 
common to dissimilar tokens such as a marble, an anvil, and a planet is an example of how 
properties in different types and subtypes are inherited through a supertype. Such a Newtonian 
supertype, TΩ in Figure 1.3., consisted of all massive, solid and opaque objects regardless of 
their location, size, shape, chemical composition and other dissimilarities constituting a negative 
analogy. TΨ can be described as a Galilean supertype consisting of all massive and solid 
terrestrial objects regardless of their location, size, shape, chemical composition and many other 
elements comprising the negative analogy. The semantic shift from the Galiliean mask to the 
Newtonian one implied the reshaping of types and hierarchies of all terrestrial and celestial 
objects 
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Besides providing similarity with systematic grounds, inheritance relations from 
supertypes and types also prevent triviality by guiding the exclusion of some common 
properties from any positive analogy, just because they can be irrelevant from the natural kinds 
perspective. The isomorphism of the elliptical paths followed by a planet, a racing car and a 
termite flying around a light bulb can be therefore excluded as grounds for a natural kind. While 
the isomorphism found in the paths of planets and electrons can be retained as part of the 
positive analogy because it is an inherited property from a supertype, namely the central force 
field. Therefore, Way explains that ‘there is no need to rule out the negative analogies ad hoc, 
because the common supertypes will generate only positive analogies with the systems.’ 91 Here 
is the type-hierarchy for the atom and the solar system:  
 
Figure 1.4. A partial type-hierarchy for the atom and the solar system:92 
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                          Electron           Living system      Central force field    Eco-system  
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     Gravitational field            Electrical field 
 
                                                             Solar system   Atom 
 
In this way, type-hierarchies organise knowledge of properties and relationships, which 
otherwise would remain separate and unrelated, and it also economises on such knowledge 
because properties are gathered into one supertype from which they are inherited by types, 
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subtypes and tokens. A scientific ontology of types organised in hierarchies becomes a powerful 
methodological tool, which could also solve the logical problem of analogy as stated by Hesse 
and discussed in section 1.4. Inheritance of properties is important not only ontologically but it 
also has an impact in logic. For instance, the uncertainty involved in the inferential leap taken 
from one token to another may disappear because any new property can be inferred with the 
support provided by the supertype.  
4. Inference. How can a type-hierarchy help solve the logical problem of analogy? As 
we saw earlier, this problem consists of justifying any likelihood given to a prediction or 
explanation based on an analogy, which is a single case inference. Way argues that any new 
property in a token, such as ‘having wings’ for an animal, can be deduced from a supertype. 
This is because ‘the hierarchy makes it easy to deduce these facts by a form of modus ponens: 
Bob is a canary, canaries are birds, and therefore, Bob is a bird. This is called an inheritance 
hierarchy, or sometimes an isa-hierarchy […] Thus, in order to determine if Bob has a certain 
property, just trace up the isa-hierarchy and assume that any of the meta-properties asserted 
about higher nodes can be considered assertions about lower nodes as well.’93 Indeed, if the type 
hierarchy is large enough and if most or all of its properties and relationships have been 
empirically determined, then any inference on properties can be deductive.   
Because the inference on properties is deductive, true conclusion are warranted, and 
therefore any prediction on new properties is certain a priori, which solves the logical problem of 
analogy. For instance, a few phenotypical features could be identified in an animal or a plant, 
from which a positive analogy can be made. Once the right positive analogy is established, the 
inference on properties follows in the fashion of a Hempelian covering-law model of prediction 
and explanation but based on supertypes, so it works as a ‘covering-type model’. Way actually 
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calls it ‘subsumption’, he explains that it is an inductive inference that ‘involves the subsumption 
of the entity in question under a type in the type-hierarchy’94   
From the discussion on Mary Hesse’s work we have learnt that the alternative to 
covering laws is a single case inference. If Hesse’s half-Bayesian argument on single case 
inferences is used for type-hierarchies, two important problems arise:  
1) The role of the maximal similarity rule when a type is available.  
2) The role of the maximal similarity rule when a type is not available.  
 
As we know from Mary Hesse, any analogy must be supported on causal knowledge and a 
positive and negative analogy. The rule of maximal similarity prescribes the selection of the 
model with the larger positive analogy, that is to say, similarity must be maximised in order to 
protect the inference from the risk involved in the negative analogy. Is this rule still adequate 
adding a type-hierarchy? It is not adequate anymore for it can delay, and even prevent the 
progress of scientific knowledge. I argue instead that a combined strategy using also the 
opposite rule prescribing the selection of models and analogies with a larger negative analogy is 
methodologically more robust and more adequate. This rule can be called the rule of minimal 
similarity.  
In a type-hierarchy, similarity increases horizontally and decreases vertically, the closer 
types are to each other the larger the similarity and the positive analogy are, the farer they are 
the larger the dissimilarity and the negative analogy. Therefore, proximity and position in 
horizontal and vertical axes of the hierarchy are logically relevant properties. If natural kinds are 
a jigsaw puzzle whose final shape is unknown, inferences relating distant pieces can speed up 
the final solution. That is to say, inferences guided by the rule of minimal similarity, i.e. based 
on larger negative analogies, can relate tokens from distant types as well as discover new types 
accelerating in this way the construction and expansion of type-hierarchies. Like what happens 
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with the rule of maximal similarity, for the rule of minimal similarity there are also two cases: (1) 
when the next type above or a supertype is already available; or (2) when there is no such type 
or supertype. The second case implies a meaning shift and a new semantic mask. The two cases 
can also be described as cases of normal science and revolutionary science, particularly when a 
new supertype is introduced displacing an old one.   
A methodology with one rule only prescribing to maximise similarity is too conservative, 
and in some cases it can be detrimental both methodologically and epistemically because it can 
undermine the growth of scientific knowledge. By maximising similarity we are reducing 
dissimilarity, and therefore the construction of any type-hierarchy slows down. Hence, a 
successful inference with a larger negative analogy has both greater epistemic and 
methodological value but it also carries greater risk. The success of an inference based on a 
larger negative analogy depends on how much causal knowledge is available, how many 
accumulated anomalies there are in the present type-hierarchy, and how sharp and well-
endowed is the mind of scientists for creating new supertypes.  
I call an analogy with a larger negative analogy a minimal analogy, and any analogy with a 
larger positive analogy maximal analogy. Mary Hesse did not consider the case of inferences made 
with minimal analogies; her work was exclusively concerned with cases of maximal analogy. In 
normal science a minimal analogy is still an option chosen as the means for speeding up the 
construction of a type-hierarchy, however in revolutionary science it is necessary.   
To illustrate how a minimal analogy works, in the next section I discuss the introduction 
of the new supertype ‘force field’ in the nineteenth century through the work  Michael Faraday 
and James Maxwell did on magnetism, which eventually lead to a scientific revolution in the 
early twentieth century.  
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1.7. Minimal analogy 
On one side, there can be almost fully built type-hierarchies from which many properties can be 
deduced on new tokens, on the other side there are cases where no supertype or type is 
available for a certain new token, and therefore no properties can be deduced. In this case, 
single case inferences are needed in order to establish any new property. In the middle of these 
two cases, there are half-built type-hierarchies with different degrees of development. Harré 
takes the first case with a largely built hierarchy as the basis for his argument.  
The inference of properties based on a large and highly defined type-hierarchy is subject 
to the old problem of induction just because any empirical universal proposition can be 
falsified. For instance, inferences made on any new token, say a mouse, which were based on 
the supertype placental mammal were reliable for a long time until the new properties of a token 
challenge the hierarchy. When the first marsupial mice were found, a new type had to be 
introduced splitting the class into two infraclasses.  
In the process of building up and updating a type-hierarchy, Harré accepts a certain 
degree of ad hoc-ness, he explains that ‘when attempting to explain an unknown system in 
terms of a known system, we may try many different locations in our ontological scheme (or 
type-hierarchy). At one time it was suggested that the structure of the atom might best resemble 
that of plum pudding—a sponge-like solid with denser matter (raising) scattered throughout 
[…] Whether a particular model is a good one or not depends on how well the unknown system 
can inherit the laws and properties of the relevant supertypes.’95 The problem with this idea is 
that in many cases no type or supertype is available, and therefore no property can be inferred 
as an inherited feature. In these cases, scientists face a significant epistemological and 
methodological challenge trying to establish a new supertype, which is likely to produce a shift 
in meaning and a new semantic mask.  The research pursued by Michael Faraday on the 
magnetic lines of force during the nineteenth century is an example of this kind of challenge 
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and shift in meaning. In these cases, the process of establishing a new supertype is largely ad hoc, 
and it is not deductive or inductive either; the challenge lies mainly in the interpretation of 
experimental results rather than on their replication.   
I argue that the opposition between the supertypes ‘mechanical aether’ and ‘force field’ in 
nineteenth century physics, illustrate the contrast between minimal and maximal analogies as 
rules guiding scientific research. I claim that minimal analogies represent a necessary and 
progressive method needed for building up type-hierarchies, and I also hold the view that 
maximal analogies are conservative, and that they can even have recessive or regressive effects 
in scientific progress. The differences between maximal and minimal analogies and their effects, 
are illustrated with the models of James Maxwell and Michael Faraday on the magnetic lines of 
force.    
In 1852, Michael Faraday published his strongest defence of the separate ontological 
status of the magnetic lines of force as continuous physical entities distinct from matter.96 His 
argument challenged the idea of action at distance by arguing instead for a non-mechanical and 
physical continuum as the explanation for the magnetic forces of attraction and repulsion. 
Following the Newtonian paradigm, James Maxwell wanted instead to produce a mechanical 
explanation of such an unobservable physical continuum: ‘I propose now to examine magnetic 
phenomena from a mechanical point of view, and to determine what tensions in, or motions of, 
a medium are capable of producing the mechanical phenomena observed.’97 The leading idea 
for such an explanation was that of long vortices parallel to each other created by small particles 
revolving on their axes. The position and direction of such vortices coincided with those of the 
lines of force observed around a magnet. Hence, the lines of magnetic force observed on the 
iron powder scattered around a magnet, were explained as the observable effect of such 
vortices.  
                                            
96 M. Faraday (1852) ‘On the physical character of the lines of magnetic force’; the same year Faraday 
published a second article complementing this one with the title, ‘On the Lines of Magnetic Force: Their 
definite character; and their distribution within a magnet and through space’. 
97 J. C. Maxwell (1861-1862), p. 162.  
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The creation of a full mechanical model was not an easy task. An important problem 
was to think of a mechanism which could allow all vortices to move in the same direction when 
an electrical current is induced. If we imagine vortices as pipes placed next to each other, they 
all would get stuck and stop if each of them moves in the same direction. This is how Maxwell 
explains the solution to this important problem:   
 
‘I have found great difficulty in conceiving of the existence of vortices in a medium, side 
by side, revolving in the same direction about parallel axes. The contiguous portions of 
consecutive vortices must be moving in opposite directions; and it is difficult to 
understand how the motion of one part of the medium can coexist with, and even 
produce, an opposite motion of a part in contact with it.  The only conception which has 
at all aided me in conceiving of this kind of motion is that of the vortices separated by a 
layer of particles, revolving each on its own axis in the opposite direction to that of the 
vortices, so that the contiguous surfaces of the particles and of the vortices have the 
same motion. In mechanism, when two wheels are intended to revolve in the same 
direction, a wheel is placed between them so as to be in gear with both, and this wheel is 
called an “idle wheel”.’ 98 
 
The postulation of some kind of particle functioning as an idle wheel was a clever mechanical 
solution to the problem of how to make both electricity and magnetism work together. It 
combines mechanics of fluids and the mechanics of solids with an analogy and a metaphor 
taken from natural phenomena, like cyclones or tornados and metallic wheels as they operate in 
a machine. Maxwell’s model relies on a mechanical analogy from the action of natural 
phenomena and the mechanics of a machine creating a full mechanical explanation, which turns 
into a maximal analogy within the dominant Newtonian view. This is the graphic model he 
produced of such a mixed mechanism:  
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Figure 1.5. Maxwell’s vortex-idle wheel model:99   
 
‘Let the current from left to right commence in AB. 
The row of vortices kl still at rest, then the layer of 
particles between these rows will be acted on by the 
row gh on their lower sides and will be at rest above. 
If they are free to move, they will rotate in the 
negative direction, and will at the same time move 
from right to left, or in the opposite direction from 
the current, and also form and induced electric 
current.’ 100 
 
The model actually resembles the schematic diagram of a mechanism inside a machine. If we 
magnified the image, or if we relate it to an actual physical macroscopic model, we can actually 
appreciate the metaphor in its full dimension. By magnifying it, we can obtain an even more 
mechanical impression similar to that of tornadoes in an electrical storm, or an image of a 
hybrid machine such as a hydroelectric power plant, which combines technology with the 
mechanical force of a natural phenomenon such as a river. This was the kind of model Duhem 
criticised as distinctive of the English mind, in which one feels like entering into a factory with 
‘tubes which pump water while others swell and contract; toothed wheels which are geared to 
one another and engage hooks’.101 This model almost works as a form of figurative language. 
Maxwell created this model following the method of physical analogy, which anticipates the 
work Norman Campbell and Mary Hesse did on the topic. Maxwell borrowed this method from 
the physicist William Thomson, who had produced successful analogies between different 
                                            
99 For more on the explicit use on this analogy see also M. Hesse (1961), pp. 206-212; and N. Nersessian 
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100 J. C. Maxwell (1861-62), p, 291. 
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observable phenomena and their theoretical explanations, for the purpose of developing 
common mathematical solutions. For instance, he drew a fruitful analogy between the electric 
and magnetic forces by arguing that both were ‘distortions’ caused by ‘the absolute 
displacement’ and ‘the angular displacement’ of a particle.102  
Maxwell explains that ‘by a physical analogy I mean the partial similarity between the 
laws of one science and those of another which makes each of them illustrate the other […] [a] 
method of investigation which allows the mind at every step to lay hold at a clear physical 
conception, without being committed to any theory founded on the physical science from 
which that conception is borrowed, so that it is neither drawn aside from the object in pursuit 
of analytical subtleties, nor carried beyond the truth by a favourite hypothesis.’ 103 Note that a 
physical analogy is not necessarily false; there is just no definite answer yet on its truth-value.  
Instead of using only the terms ‘force’ or ‘energy’ in his analogy, Maxwell used the term 
‘aether’ as a description for the unobservable magnetic fluid depicted in his model. The aether 
was still matter just of a subtle kind. Over two centuries the aether was a well-established 
natural kind in physics, which can be described as a supertype with several types and subtypes 
such as the luminiferous aether introduced by Newton, the stationary and gravitational aether 
postulated by Christian Huygens, the elastic and solid aether suggested by George Stokes, and 
the electromagnetic aether depicted in Maxwell’s model. By maximising similarity with the 
predominant supertype, the electromagnetic aether simply became another subtype in the 
Newtonian semantic mask, where all types of aether were mechanical. Once a new subtype is 
added, properties are just inferred as inherited traits. There is no meaning shift; the mask 
virtually covers all aspects inheriting properties from a supertype to different types and 
subtypes. The main scientific task consists only of figuring out how a new mechanism would 
look like and how it would operate, which is what Maxwell did following the rule of maximal 
similarity.   
                                            
102 W. Thomson (1847), p. 62. 
103 J.C. Maxwell (1855-1856), p. 156.  
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Because of this, Maxwell’s model was methodologically conservative, and it later became 
recessive and regressive. Ontologically there was no big leap, no significant gain for nearly a 
century, until Albert Einstein in 1905 and 1920 rejected the need for an aether and established 
the concept of a field.104 In contrast, Faraday throughout his investigations and in his exchange 
with Thomson was reluctant to accept a mechanical explanation of the lines of force; he 
explicitly wanted to de-mechanise them.   
For more than three decades, Faraday tried different analogies and theoretical 
explanations of magnetism and electricity, which finally led him in 1855 to the postulation of a 
magnetic force field distinct from matter.105 This ontological distinction anticipated the current 
distinction we draw between the two supertypes energy and matter. The whole discovery was an 
ad hoc process, during which different hypotheses were entertained by Faraday, who increasingly 
became aware of the limitations of the dominant Newtonian paradigm. His research and 
findings show he was working at the semantic boundaries of the Newtonian paradigm trying to 
make sense of phenomena such as diamagnetism, which remained anomalous within the 
mechanical view.  
Faraday’s search for an explanation of the magnetic lines of force started in 1820, when 
he rejected André Marie Ampère’s hypothesis of an undulating fluid with two electric effluvia as 
the explanation of magnetism. Ampère believed magnetism was not a new phenomenon but 
mere electricity in motion.  In 1830, Faraday studied Augustin-Jean Fresnel’s undulatory theory 
of light, which didn’t need Ampere’s electric effluvia, and rested instead on an analogy between 
the vibrations of the sound and the waves of light. Fresnel rejected the idea of aether as a fluid, 
and postulated instead an elastic solid aether able to transport both longitudinal and transverse 
waves. Faraday used this idea of an elastic solid aether, and he placed  the locus of magnetic 
                                            
104 A. Einstein (1905), p. 2; (1920), pp. 13, 16; see P. M. Brown (2002) for the differences between 
Einstein’s concept of a field and current views, which Brown claims are closer to those of Faraday than 
Einstein’s 
105 Historical accounts with different explanations of Faraday’s creation of the concept of a magnetic 
force field can be found in B. G. Doran (1975), and D. Gooding (1980).  
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action in the ‘inductive lines of force’. Then in 1845 he met William Thomson; the exchange 
between the two gave rise to the non-Newtonian concept of a magnetic field.  
Thomson’s main interest was to produce a mathematical theory of magnetism with a 
method based on metaphors and analogies that he created by relating different phenomena. He 
first suggested an analogy between heat and magnetism assuming that the inductive lines of 
force acted like heat waves. Faraday had rejected action at distance as an explanation of 
magnetism, so his main challenge was to find a satisfactory explanation of the continuity of 
magnetism in space. The analogy with the waves provided a model for such continuous action. 
A constant problem Faraday saw with this and other analogies and models, was the need for a 
surrounding substance—an aether—which would serve as the medium allowing the travel and 
action of magnetic forces. This implied an ontology with three elements: magnetism, matter and 
aether. The alternative hypothesis consisted of eliminating the aether by assuming an empty 
space, but he just could not make full sense of the lines of magnetic force acting in a vacuum. 
This was a problem that persisted for a century in the theories of James Maxwell, Hendrik 
Lorentz and Albert Einstein.106  
Stimulated by Thomson’s analogy, Faraday developed in 1846 a new model where forces 
form a plenum filling up all space such that no aether was needed. This plenum was made up by 
atoms acting as the centres of forces around them; he explains that ‘the point intended to be set 
forth for consideration of the hearers was whether it was not possible that the vibrations, which 
in a certain theory are assumed to account for radiation and radiant phenomena, may not occur 
in the lines of force which connect particles, and consequently masses of matter together; a 
notion which as far as it is admitted, will dispense with the aether, which, in another view is 
                                            
106 Further historical details of this problem from Faraday and Einstein can be found in N. Nersessian 
(1984).  
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supposed to be the medium in which these vibrations take place.’107 A model with atoms and 
forces was only closer to the current conception of fields derived from the work of Einstein.   
But there was no lineal progress in Faraday’s search for the best model and hypothesis 
explaining the nature and operation of the magnetism. By 1850 he abandoned the dualism 
atoms-forces by reconsidering again aether as a medium. This time as a fluid whose action was 
described with the analogy of a stretched spring transmitting the magnetic forces. He 
acknowledges that the idea of the lines of force acting in an empty space without a medium ‘is 
difficult to comprehend according to the Ampere theory […] or with any other generally 
acknowledged, or even any proposed view or even any trial speculation that I am aware of.’108 
One year later he goes back to an explanation with no aether: ‘we have to consider the true 
character and relation of space free from any material substance. Though one cannot procure a 
space perfectly free from matter, one can make a close approximation to it in a carefully 
prepared Torricellian vacuum […] Mere space cannot act as matter acts, even though the 
utmost latitude be allowed to the hypothesis of an ether; and admitting that hypothesis, it would 
be a large additional assumption to suppose that the lines of magnetic force are vibrations 
carried on by it.’109  
By 1851 new doubts and hesitation appeared, when he writes that ‘how the magnetic 
forces is transferred through bodies or through space we know not; whether the result is merely 
action at a distance, as in the case of gravity; or by some intermediate agency, as in the case of 
light, heat, the electric current, and (as I believe) electric static action.’110 In 1852, he finally 
converted to the field concept Thomson had originally suggested it to him. Faraday explains 
that ‘I conceive that when a magnet is in free space, there is such a medium (magnetically 
speaking) around it. That a vacuum has its own magnetic relations of attraction and repulsion is 
                                            
107 Faraday (1846) ‘Thoughts on ray-vibrations’; the idea of centre-atoms and forces is similar to that of 
R. J. Boscovich, whose work was known to Faraday, although it is controversial the extent to which 
Faraday took this idea from him; see B. G. Doran (1975), p. 166.    
108 In Martin, T. (1932-1936), Vol. V, #10834; see also B. G. Doran (1975), p. 174.  
109 M. Faraday (1851), p. 194; #2787. 
110 M. Faraday (1852), p. 330; #3075.  
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manifest from former experimental results; and these place the vacuum in relation to material 
bodies, not at either extremity of the list, but in the midst of them […] What that surrounding 
magnetic medium, deprived of all material substance, may be, I cannot tell, perhaps the 
aether.’111 In his last statement from 1855, he fully abandons the hypothesis of an aether, which 
he now considers to be inadequate and old:  
My physico-hypothetical notion […] views these lines as physical lines of power […] 
Those who entertain in any degree the aether notion might consider these lines as currents, or 
progressive vibrations, or as stationary undulations, or as a state of tension […]It was always my 
intention to avoid substituting anything in place of these fluids or currents, that the mind might 
be delivered from the bondage of preconceived notions; but for those who desire an idea to rest 
upon, there is the old principle of the aethers.112 
As we know, a few years later Maxwell would go back to the ‘old principle of the 
aethers’ with his vortex-idle wheel model.  Jointly Faraday and Thomson produced the concept 
of a force field after ten years of collaboration. Like Faraday, Thomson also thought that 
magnetism was distinct from matter by claiming that ‘this imaginary substance possesses none 
of the primary qualities of ordinary matter, and it would be wrong to call it either a solid, or the 
“magnetic fluid”, or “fluids”’113 Although, he was more interested in developing a mathematical 
theory than investigating the ‘physical nature of magnetism’, he nonetheless produced the idea 
of a ‘field of force’ supported on a basic graphic model, which he communicated to Faraday for 
the first time in a letter from 19th June 1849: 
    
 
                                            
111 Ibid., p. 425; #3277.  
112 M. Faraday (1855), pp. 529-530; #3301-3302.  
113 W. Thomson (1851), p. 251.  
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   Figure 1.6. First basic model of a magnetic field:114  
 
 
 
Thomson represented the magnetic field as naturally uniform affected by a ball of diamagnetic 
matter. In his later work he refined this basic model showing the different effects different 
spherical bodies produced, namely a ball with no intrinsic magnetism, and a ball inductively 
magnetised. Such models were the support of the sophisticated mathematics he developed with 
a number of equations, values and descriptions of regular effects. Some of those values and 
graphic sophistication can be appreciated in the following three models:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
114 S. P. Thompson (1910), p. 215; see also B. G.  Doran (1975), p. 175.   
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Figure 1.7. Model of a magnetic field ‘with an inductively magnetized globe’115  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.8. Model of a magnetic field representing ‘the lines of magnetic force in the 
neighbourhood of a solid globe of any ferromagnetic or diamagnetic homogeneous material 
destitute of intrinsic magnetism, put into a uniform magnetic field’:116 
 
 
                                            
115 W. Thomson (1872), p. 493.  
116 Ibid., p. 491.  
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Figure 1.9. Model of a magnetic field representing ‘the lines of magnetic force in the 
neighbourhood of a globe of soft iron in a uniform magnetic field’117  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 1850, Faraday was using the same graphic model for representing similar magnetic 
phenomena, namely the opposite effects diamagnetic and iron balls have on a magnetic field as 
it can be appreciated in the figure below.   
 
     
 
 
                                            
117 Ibid., p. 491.  
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Figure 1.10. Model of a magnetic field affected by iron and diamagnetic ball118  
 
 
By comparing Maxwell’s vortex-idle wheel model (Figure 1.5.) to the magnetic field models of 
Faraday and Thomson, it is possible to appreciate a sharp and clear meaning shift from a 
semantics of contiguous action based on the mechanical action of subtle matter, to a semantics 
of contiguous action based on the non-mechanical action of force fields. Faraday was aware of 
this for he expressed how difficult it was to make sense of distinct nature of the lines of force, 
and how they would act without a medium.  
Faraday and Thomson’s models are examples of minimal analogies, where the similarities 
with the Newtonian mask are minor; they relied on a minimal mechanical analogy represented 
mainly by presence of balls of different kind affecting the field. The remaining part of the 
models is non-mechanical, and therefore it constitutes a disanalogy. The minimal analogy was a 
road to scientific progress in the construction of a new supertype and its respective hierarchy 
with types and subtypes. In contrast, Maxwell’s model is mechanical it all its details, and 
                                            
118 M. Faraday (1851), pp. 211-212; #2831; see also p. 208; #2831; p.204; #2807 for more examples of 
the same kind of model.  
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therefore it exemplifies a maximal analogy.  In spite of the mathematical progress Maxwell made 
using the vortex-idle wheel model, it was ontologically regressive because it relied on an 
ontology of aethers already superseded by Faraday. Maxwell knew Faraday’s work but he 
decided to continue working within the Newtonian paradigm, and he actually tried to reconcile 
the magnetic lines of force with the action of a gravitational aether.   
On 9th November 1857, Maxwell wrote a letter to Faraday, where he put forward a 
definition of gravitational force as a ‘pushing force’ stemming from the sun and from each 
planet. The crucial difference between the two was the status of force fields as extended non-
mechanical separate entities, where massive bodies are placed into versus extended non-separate 
mechanical entities being emitted by those bodies. In his letter, Maxwell drafted the following 
basic graphic model:  
     Figure 1.11. Lines of force of gravitational aether:119  
The lines of Force from the Sun spread out from him, and when they come near a planet curve out 
from it, so that every planet diverts a number depending on its mass from their course, and substitutes 
a system of its own so as to become something like a comet, if lines of force were visible. 
 
The lines of the planet are separated from those of the Sun by the dotted line. Now conceive every 
one of these lines (which never interfere but proceed from sun and planet to infinity) to have a 
pushing force instead of a pulling one, and then sun and planet will be pushed together with a force 
which comes out as it ought, proportional to the product of the masses and the inverse square of the 
distance. 
The difference between this case and that of the dipolar forces is, that instead of each body catching 
the lines of force from the rest, all the lines keep as clear of other bodies as they can, and go off to 
the infinite sphere against which I have supposed then to push. 
                                            
119 P. M. Harman (1990), pp. 548-552.  In Queries 21 and 22 (Opticks, 1717, pp. 325-327), Isaac Newton 
had speculated on the composition and operation of the gravitational aether, which he thought was 
made of small particles; the impulses of a stream of these particles bombarding the planets would cause 
gravitation. This gravitational aether would be denser in empty space than in the vicinity of planets or 
any other massive body. Hence, the Earth moves towards the Sun under the pressure of the aether, like a 
cork rising from the depths of the sea.  
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Compare this model to Faraday’s model above (Figure 1.10). The lines of force in both 
act in a similar fashion by expanding and contracting, but the explanation of such effects and 
the nature of those lines, makes the difference between a Newtonian model and Faraday’s 
model. Faraday responded rapidly to Maxwell, first in a letter written on 13th November, and 
later in an addendum he published in June 1858, where he criticised him for turning magnetism 
into a ‘mechanical force’.120 He makes a clear statement writing that ‘I do not use the word 
“force” as you define it, “the tendency of a body to pass from one place to another” […] such a 
thought, if accepted, pledged them [experimental physicists] to a very limited and probably 
erroneous view of the cause of the force, and to ask them to consider whether they should not 
look (for a time, at least), to a source in part external to the particles.’121  
Maxwell’s model of the lines of gravitational force and his vortex idle-wheel model 
actually complement each other. The first model makes the lines of gravitational force visible by 
zooming into the actual shape and pathways followed by those lines, the second model zooms 
in even further to make the actual micro-composition and operation of the lines of magnetic 
force visible. In both cases mechanisms described with different degrees of detail are offered as 
explanations of gravitational and magnetic forces.  We can assume that a Maxwellian 
microscopic model of the gravitational aether would be similar to the vortex idle-wheel model, 
perhaps also with wheels and vortices or similar mechanical parts.  
The contrast shown between the models of Faraday and Thomson, and those of 
Maxwell demonstrates the need for a mixed methodology with both kinds of analogy, namely 
minimal and maximal analogies. Hesse’s inference from analogy is a case of maximal analogy 
because it prescribes a choice for models with greater similarity; this type of inference can 
therefore be renamed as inference from maximal analogy. I am arguing for a second type, which can 
be called inference from minimal analogy. The same half-Bayesian justification Hesse produced for 
the inference from maximal analogy could be used for the inference from minimal analogy, 
                                            
120 M. Faraday (1858), p. 460.   
121 B. Jones (1870), pp. 390-391; letter from Faraday to Maxell from 13th November 1857.  
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which is best represented here by the Faraday’s models of force fields and the ontology 
underpinning them.  
I argue that mixed methodology responds better to the demands from type-hierarchies 
and meaning shifts as they are advanced by Eileen Way. On the one hand, a methodology 
relying on maximal analogies like that of Hesse is at risk of becoming not only conservative but 
also regressive, or at least recessive, like Maxwell’s models of the electromagnetic and 
gravitational aether show. A methodology that also includes inference from minimal analogies 
provides the grounds for scientific progress as it has shown with Faraday and Thomson’s 
models.  
On the other hand, there is a greater risk of failing with any inference from a minimal 
analogy; progressive rules often carry greater risk. Conservative inferences from maximal 
analogies are less risky. Hence, only the use of both analogies along different scientific 
communities or individuals provides both protection against failure building up a type-hierarchy 
and protection against ontological regression, where new semantic masks and new supertypes 
are not developed further and more rapidly. The exclusive use of one kind of analogy would be 
a methodological mistake just as it would also be a mistake to use both undermining the 
advance of one of them; the right science policy should ensure opportunities of equal progress.    
For nearly a century, the scientific labour and the theories produced by Faraday, 
Thomson and Maxwell show how de facto scientists on the whole were following a mixed 
methodology pursuing minimal and maximal analogies. This thesis can be extended to the work 
of Lorentz and Einstein. A philosophical justification provides such labour and its products 
with de jure grounds, not only to episodes from the past but also to current scientific research.  It 
meets the needs for the construction of type-hierarchies both in normal and revolutionary 
science. Only the justification of a mixed strategy can provide both protection and progress as 
well as guidance on science policy. 
          —O— 
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Chapter 2 
Social Machines 
 
2.0. Introduction  
Currently, there is only a thin bridge connecting the Mechanical view with the social sciences, 
and there is no comprehensive account either on how this view can be applied to those 
sciences. The main aim of this chapter is to enlarge the bridge and lay some initial grounds for 
such an account. I do this in two steps. The first step covers sections 2.1., 2.2. and 2.3, where I 
introduce the machine metaphor and discuss five methodological principles of blueprint-making 
as well as other philosophical aspects of design and engineering in the social sciences. The 
second step includes sections 2.4., 2.5., and 2.6., where I do a selective review of some of the 
main features of the three branches in the social sciences concerned with design, engineering 
and social mechanisms, namely mechanism theory, institutional design and analytical sociology.  
Along the discussion in all sections, I identify a number of relevant problems which set up an 
agenda for further research, such as the underdetermination of theories and the iteration of 
metaphor both relevant for the explanation by social mechanisms.  
       In this chapter, I argue for the following four theses. Blueprints from game theory 
are Galilean blueprints that must necessarily be completed by the engineering methods and 
knowledge from experimental economics.  Holistic engineering is feasible and successful, while 
piecemeal engineering can fail and can also be unfeasible; a choice between the two must rely on 
the amount and reliability of social technological knowledge. A wider methodology of design 
and engineering can be produced by detaching piecemeal engineering from its association with 
liberal capitalist societies, and by detaching holistic engineering from its association with 
socialism. Operant conditioning from behaviourist psychology is consistent with the design and 
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engineering institutions and policies in representative democracies. These four theses are put 
forward through the discussion organised in the following six sections. 
In section 2.1., I introduce the machine metaphor by relying on the work from Nancy 
Cartwright on socioeconomic machines. I use the term ‘social machines’ instead of 
‘socioeconomic machines’ for referring to any state institution, firm or farm. I show how the 
machine metaphor is an escalation from a mechanical metaphor based on natural forces to a 
mechanical metaphor based on artefacts, which implies an ontology of artefactual institutions 
and artefactual behaviour brought about by design and engineering. This is in contrast to an 
ontology of traditional institutions and traditional or customary behaviour. Besides this 
distinction, three methodological principles of blueprint making are discussed as well as two 
related ontological theses on realism of capacities and individualism. Such principles and theses 
belong to the work from Cartwright on socioeconomic machines; they are illustrated with a 
game theory model on debt contracts produced by the economists Oliver Hart and John 
Moore. The main aim of this section is to introduce and build up an insightful and fruitful 
discussion of the machine metaphor to be used as the foundation for a methodology of design 
and engineering in the social sciences.  
In section 2.2., I discuss two further principles of blueprint-making, which are 
concerned with the shielding of social machines, and with how to get these machines running. 
All together these two principles and the three principles discussed section in 2.1. constitute the 
method for blueprint-making advanced by her. A relation is established between these five 
principles and those on policy-making also advanced by Cartwright. The analysis of the model 
from Hart and Moore shows that blueprints from game theory offer poor information on 
shielding, and no information on how to get social machines running. I argue that this occurs 
because the blueprints produced by game theorists are Galilean blueprints, which despite 
creating novel mechanisms for solving important problems, they remain highly idealised, leaving 
important gaps on crucial aspects about shielding, construction and operation. The 
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identification of these gaps in the design of social machines prepares the discussion for chapter 
three, where the work of experimental economists is discussed showing how it fills those gaps.  
In section 2.3., three important distinctions are made relevant to design and engineering 
in social machines. The first one is an ontological distinction between artefactual institutions 
and traditional institutions related to the constructivist and evolutionary views in the social 
sciences; the International Monetary Fund and the International Gold Standard are used as 
examples of each view. The second one is a methodological distinction between two types of 
design, namely dirigiste and libertarian; the blueprints from John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich 
Hayek on a new international monetary system are used as examples of these two types.  I show 
how the final design of the International Monetary Fund was the product of a hybrid blueprint 
that combines dirigiste and libertarian aspects.  
The third one is a distinction between two types of social engineering, namely holistic 
and piecemeal. Against Popper, I argue that holistic engineering is feasible and that piecemeal 
engineering, by itself, does not offer a safe method for it can also fail.  I hold that a choice 
between holistic and piecemeal engineering depends on the amount and reliability of the social 
technological knowledge available. Piecemeal engineering is generally associated with liberal 
capitalist societies, while holistic engineering is generally associated with socialist ones. Against 
this association, I also argue for a methodology of design and engineering, which can be 
detached from ideological and historical biases. I do all this by referring to the cases of 
successful holistic engineering in Russia, East Europe and Chile. I also make reference to the 
failures of piecemeal engineering implementing new education and nutrition policies in 
California and Bangladesh, and the successful cases of piecemeal engineering in China and 
Vietnam, implementing special economic zones, and in the United Kingdom with the design 
and implementation of the internal markets in the National Health Service. 
In section 2.4., I present analytical sociology as the social science that more 
comprehensively adopts the machine metaphor and the realist views from Rom Harré and 
 
 
85
Nancy Cartwright with a strong focus on social mechanisms and methodological individualism. 
Analytical sociology illustrates how the Mechanical view is used in social explanation by making 
a clear contrast between the positivistic covering-law model of explanation and the explanation 
by mechanisms, and also between grand theories and middle-range theories. Social mechanisms 
are explained by individual decisions based on beliefs, intentions and desires, so consistently 
with the realist view on unobservables and causality that intentional explanations become cases 
of causal explanation. 
 Because a material view of the mind is also adopted, I identify two challenges for the 
explanation by mechanisms. The first one is the underdetermination problem, which arises 
because of the different neurological theories about the localisation of brain functions, and the 
connection and communication among nerve cells. The second one consists of the constant  
iteration of metaphor,  where terms referring to macroscopic observable  events such as 
‘currents’, ‘force’, ‘field’, ‘repulsion’, ‘conductor’ and ‘wave’ are metaphorically used for 
describing microscopic unobservable events.  
In section 2.5., I discuss institutional design in political science, which emerged as a 
reaction to the methodological individualism from behaviouralism in political science and 
rational choice theory. Methodologically, institutional design lies between mechanism design 
theory, where new mechanisms are created, and analytical sociology where actual mechanisms 
are studied.  Such a method consists of comparative studies on the positive and negative effects 
that different sets of rules, incentives and penalties can have from current and past institutions.  
The results of these comparative studies are used for assisting the choice over alternative 
institutional structures to be implemented with some adaptations in a new domain, expecting 
the same or similar effects. It is also described as political engineering concerned mainly with 
designs on different forms of government, electoral systems and constitutions.  
Like analytical sociology and mechanism design theory, institutional design also relies on 
the machine metaphor by describing political institutions as machines moved by the ‘engines of 
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Bentham’, which shape political behaviour through ‘punishment’ and ‘reward’, that is to say, by 
using incentives and penalties. I argue that operant conditioning from behaviouristic psychology 
is the updated scientific version of the engines of Bentham, which shapes behaviour through 
the regulation of reinforcement and control over contingencies. B.F. Skinner extended these 
ideas for a technology of behaviour and cultural design, which are consistent with the dirigiste, 
piecemeal and holistic engineering performed in representative democracies with free markets 
and welfare state. Only alternative libertarian designs, which also foster economic equality, can 
produce a more substantive reduction of control and dirigisme. 
The last section 2.6., consists of an analysis and discussion of mechanism design theory, 
it further illustrates and supports the discussion and conclusions from sections 2.1. and 2.2. on 
the limits of Galilean blueprints from game theory. I discuss the work from Leonid Hurwicz, 
one of the founders of mechanism design theory, who discovered an inconsistency in the design 
of free markets, which requires true information on preferences and other aspects, while at the 
same time it creates incentives for lying on those preferences. This is a very important problem 
because it leads to an inefficient allocation of resources with suboptimal equilibria, and a 
potential for large social losses. This discovery gave rise to a principle of design called ‘incentive 
compatibility’. I illustrate the work on design produced by mechanism design theorists, with the 
‘multiple auction by sealed bids’ devised by William Vickrey. The design of this new auction 
shows both the design power of game theory and the significant shortcomings it shows on how 
to shield the auction, and how to get it running. These conclusions show that knowledge of 
design necessarily requires knowledge of engineering from experimental economics. Together 
both kinds of knowledge constitute the social technological knowledge available from the 
science of economics. Decisions on feasible and unfeasible blueprints for new social machines 
are also necessarily subject to the advancement of such technological knowledge.   
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2.1. The machine metaphor 
James Maxwell produced a fully mechanical model of magnetic force mainly based on natural 
forces adding one component only from a machine, namely an idle wheel. Nancy Cartwright 
extends this view creating a machine metaphor of both nature and society. Nature and society are 
seen as an array of steady machines producing regular outcomes, and each of these machines 
consists of an array of separate parts assembled into mechanisms under the guidance of a 
blueprint.   
Maxwell described the solar system as fully mechanical with no fields but with 
gravitation conceived as a pushing force, whose microscopic model would have contained parts 
similar to the wheels and vortices of the electromagnetic aether. Natural mechanical forces 
largely define his models and, in spite of having an important role, artefactual mechanical effects 
are small in proportion. Cartwright also sees the solar system as mechanical but she escalates the 
Mechanical view by creating a metaphor entirely based on artefacts, that is to say, on machines, 
which she calls nomological machines. A nomological machines is ‘a fixed (enough) arrangement of 
components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable (enough) 
environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular behaviour that we 
represent in our scientific laws.’122 Using the laws of Kepler, she explains how the nomological 
machine metaphor works.  
Based on the astronomical data on Mars gathered by Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler 
established the following three laws of planetary motion: i.) The orbit of every planet is 
an ellipse with the Sun at one of the two foci, ii.) The line joining a planet and the Sun sweeps 
out equal areas during equal intervals of time, and iii.) The square of the orbital period of a 
planet is proportional to the cube of the semimajor axis of its orbit. Later, Isaac Newton 
postulated a gravitational force and established the magnitude of such force required to keep a 
planet in such elliptical orbit with a constant speed. Generally, the laws of Kepler and Newton 
are presented as examples of regularities with no further explanation on how they arise. The 
                                            
122 N. Cartwright (1999), p. 50. 
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machine metaphor provides an answer to this question by postulating capacities. This is done by 
figuring out ‘the nomological machine that is responsible for Kepler’s laws—with the added 
assumption that the operation of the machine depends entirely on the mechanical features and 
their capacities. This means that we have to establish the arrangement and capacities of 
mechanical elements, and the right shielding conditions that keep the machines running 
properly, so that it gives rise to the Kepler regularities.’123    
Hence, the machines that give rise to natural laws like those of Kepler consist of three 
main parts, namely capacities, the specific assembling of them, and the provision of a shield for 
protection. More specifically, this means a realist belief in  gravitational force as a capacity or 
causal power existing in each planet and other massive bodies in the solar system; knowledge of 
the joint effects of this capacity from massive bodies of different size placed in different 
positions; and knowledge of events which can affect or prevent isolated or joint effects of the 
gravitational forces in operation. The philosophical choice for capacities constitutes a radical 
departure from empiricist standards, which ultimately relies on the cogency of a realist 
argument.124  
The joint effects of gravitation for any set of known planets and massive bodies can be 
calculated reliably by using Newton’s laws and equations. Knowledge of the presence of new 
planets or potential colliding objects such as asteroids and comets, which can affect the running 
of the solar system as a machine, can only be obtained gradually and normally a posteriori when a 
distortion has already been observed. This affects the scope and power of the shielding 
conditions. Cartwright accepts this limitation explaining how the discovery of a new planet as an 
‘observed irregularity points to a failure of description of the specific circumstances that 
characterise the Newtonian planetary machine. The discovery of Neptune results from a 
                                            
123 Ibid., p. 50.  
124 In Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement (1989), Nancy Cartwright has produced such a realist 
argument for capacities.   
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revision of the shielding conditions that are necessary to ensure the stability of the original 
Newtonian machine.’125   
In this way, the nomological machine metaphor is employed also for philosophical 
purposes. It works as a mask, exhibiting new features of scientific theories and scientific 
explanation, which remain hidden under the Syntactic view. Under this technological metaphor, 
any scientific laws only holds relative to the operation of a nomological machine, which 
comprises a number of parts assembled under the right plan or blueprint as well as a protective 
shield, and further ceteris paribus conditions. All these elements remain unnoticed under the 
regularity view of scientific laws. With the Mechanical view, Kepler’s laws and any other natural 
law arise as the product of different nomological machines. Scientific explanation ceases to be 
guided by the covering-law model, and theories become collections of models of nomological 
machines. Nature consists of a big array of nomological machines.  
The metaphor also extends to the state, markets and society. Economic and political 
institutions as well as contracts among individuals are also seeing as technological artefacts. 
Society as a whole becomes an array of nomological machines, which Cartwright calls 
socioeconomic machines, while theories in the social sciences become collections of models on those 
socioeconomic machines. This is the Mechanical view escalated from natural mechanical forces 
to artefactual ones now being extended to society and theories in the social sciences.  
As Nancy Cartwright advances it, the Mechanical view applied to the social sciences 
consists of five explicit methodological principles, and three ontological theses. In this section, 
only the first three principles and the first two theses are discussed, the remaining two principles 
and single thesis are discussed in the next section. The first three principles establish that any 
model of a socioeconomic machine must show:126    
 
                                            
125 N. Cartwright (1999), pp. 52-53.  
126 Ibid., p. 146.   
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i) The parts that make up the machine, their properties and the separate capacities. 
ii) How the parts are to be assembled.  
iii) The rules for calculating the outcome from the joint operation of the assembled 
parts.    
 
To illustrate these methodological principles, Cartwright uses an example from game theory 
applied to long-term debt contracts. In particular, the model of a ‘repudiation-proof contract’ 
produced by the economists Oliver Hart and John Moore. 127 Seen as socioeconomic machines, 
investment contacts must function steadily by producing regular outcomes, which depend on 
the knowledge game theorists have on the individual players and their capacities as well as 
knowledge of the different expected outcomes from their mutual interaction. In this case, the 
regular expected outcome consists of a timely delivery of credits from the investor, and the 
accomplishment of business targets by the entrepreneur until the full completion of the project.  
In the model, Hart and Moore describe the parts of the machine and the capacities of 
those parts, namely two individual players an investor and an entrepreneur, both displaying 
specific psychological capacities. These consists of self-interest, greed, perfect and costless 
calculation, and full rationality.  It is also assumed that the entrepreneur has a special capacity 
consisting of particular skills relevant to the project, which are not easily and costlessly 
replaceable. Because of this, he enjoys greater bargaining power. Other parts are structural or 
external to both players such as identical discount rates, certainty in all operations, rules for 
renegotiation, and the existence of a frictionless second-hand market for the physical assets of 
the project.128 The structural parts and the players are assembled in one game in two main 
stages, one with an initial negotiation and agreement on a certain distribution of the surplus, and 
a second one when repudiation of the contract occurs and the surplus is now divided in equal 
parts of 50% each.   
                                            
127 O. Hart and J. Moore (1994); the analysis from Cartwright is based on an earlier version of this article 
published in 1991 as Discussion Paper No. 129 by the LSE Financial Markets Group.  
128 O. Hart and J. Moore (1994) p. 861.  
 
 
91
Long-term debt contracts pose particular challenges. One of these challenges arises from 
the opposite repayment preferences between the investor, who prefers a fast repayment, and the 
entrepreneur, who prefers a slow repayment. This tension increases when opportunities for 
outside investment of capital or skills exceed the returns of the current project. This leads to 
greed, self-interest and defection from each player a real possibility.  From a social perspective, 
Hart and Moore wanted to prevent these contracts from failing because of the social losses and 
inefficiencies that failure creates. The challenge consisted of reversing the repudiation of the 
contract by devising a set of new rules, which would create opportunities for negotiations 
available to both players, so that the project is not abandoned but completed.  Easy and costless 
defection must be prevented, while the conditions for renegotiation must keep returns attractive 
to both players.  
They devised a mechanism by relying on the assumptions of certainty and a continuum 
of optimal points during the renegotiation period, they explain that ‘the assumption of perfect 
certainty, combined with that of renegotiation, implies that there is a continuum of optimal debt 
contracts’, which implies that ‘ the parties can write a succession of short-term contracts that are 
renegotiated, or a long-term contract that is never renegotiated along the equilibrium path’, and 
therefore ‘a debt contract can be agreed to such that in equilibrium D [debtor/ entrepreneur] 
never repudiates.129 Recall that in the model the entrepreneur enjoys greater bargaining power. 
With those two assumptions, the calculation of the joint effects after repudiation is made by 
using equilibrium theory using specific rules for renegotiation, and by relaxing the assumption 
of a common discount rate, while the capacities of self-interest, greed and rationality remain the 
same for each player.  In this way, Hart and Moore’s repudiation-proof contact illustrates the 
three methodological principles any model of a socioeconomic machine should follow.  
Besides those three principles, Cartwright adds two important ontological theses on 
socioeconomic machines:  
                                            
129 Ibid., pp. 842, 849.  
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i) Realism of capacities. 
ii) Ontology of individuals. 
 
Against empiricist standards, Cartwright argues for a realist belief in unobservable capacities, 
which she also called ‘natures’ following Aristotle. Natures or capacities of individuals cannot be 
reduced to the constant conjunction of two or more episodes of observable behaviour. We 
should also add that they should not either be considered as having the instrumental status of 
convenient fictions used only for explaining observable behaviour, nor should they be 
considered as the product of an inference to the best explanation of observable behaviour in the 
absence of alternative better explanation. The realist thesis is stronger than instrumentalism and 
the inference to the best explanation because it holds ‘natures as primary and behaviours, even 
very regular behaviours, as derivative. ’130  
         Although, the realism of capacities or natures enjoys better prospects in experimental and 
behavioural economics, Cartwright argues for it using models and examples from game theory. 
The contrast between realist and antirealist standards in the social sciences can be clearly 
observed in the controversy between cognitive psychology and behaviouristic psychology, and 
between utility theory and preference revealed theory in economics. Adopted as a thesis for 
socioeconomic machines, the realism of capacities justifies and prescribes the use of 
psychological capacities as the ultimate explanation for any expected or any observed behaviour.   
Against a holism of social facts or social structures, Cartwright argues for individuals and 
their capacities as the ultimate grounds for explanation in the social sciences. Using the science 
of economics as an example, she explains that this thesis ‘is based on the hope that we can 
understand aspects of the economy separately and then piece the lessons together at a second 
                                            
130 N. Cartwright (1999), p. 149; earlier (1989, p. 9) she chose the term ‘capacities’ over ‘causal powers’, 
currently she believes ‘natures’ is a better term: ‘most of my arguments about capacities could have been 
put in terms of natures had I recognised soon enough how similar capacities, as I see them, are to 
Aristotelian natures.’ (1999, p. 85); see also N. Cartwright and J. Pemberton (2013).  
 
 
93
stage.’131 This thesis is both ontological and methodological for she explains that ‘the analytic 
method works in physics: to understand what happens in the world, we take things apart into 
their fundamental pieces, to control a situation we reassemble the pieces, we reorder them so 
they will work together to make things happen as we will.’132   
Ontologically and methodologically, individualism is widely accepted, and used in 
economics and all branches of game theory including mechanism design theory.  In contrast, 
individualism has been abandoned in political science, particularly in institutional design, while it 
has been strongly vindicated in analytical sociology. Mechanism design theory, institutional 
design and analytical sociology are discussed in the last three sections of this chapter.  
The machine metaphor helps to meet two important scientific tasks, namely the 
explanation of actual states of the world and the design of new ones. The work of Cartwright 
addresses both: first through the ontological description of the components of actual 
socioeconomic machines, and second through the establishment of methodological principles 
for the blueprints of those machines. The machine metaphor implies a transition from natural 
systems, natural laws and traditional institutions to constructed laws, systems and institutions. 
Thus, the solar system, the Roman Senate and the International Monetary Fund become 
machines just like a bulldozer, a microprocessor or a blender. Natural laws like those of Kepler 
and economic relations of trade are seen as artefactual just as the flow of electrical currents in a 
microprocessor. Cartwright writes, ‘here it is my strong claim: look at any case where there is a 
regularity in the world (whether natural or constructed) that we judge to be highly reliable and 
which we feel that we understand […] what you fill find is a nomological machine.’133 
 Therefore, the three principles and the two ontological theses, which have just been 
discussed, apply to both traditional and constructed institutions as well as traditional and 
constructed social relations. Game theory models can be models of any traditional institution or 
                                            
131 N. Cartwright (1999), pp. 149-150.  
132 Ibid., p. 83.  
133 Ibid., p. 58.  
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social relationship but they can also be models of constructed institutions and social 
interactions. Unlike Cartwright, I use the term ‘constructed’ exclusively for artefacts produced 
with the help from scientific designers and engineers, and I use the term ‘traditional’ instead of 
the term ‘natural’ for any institution or social relation, where no scientific design or engineering 
has be used.  Unlike the term ‘natural’, the term ‘traditional’ in the social sciences seems to be 
accurate, and it also creates a sharper contrast with ‘constructed’ or ‘designed’.  
The model from Hart and Moore belongs to those models describing a constructed 
regularity, that is to say, the model is a blueprint for replacing a traditional or customary type of 
behaviour, namely the repudiation of debt contacts with a new constructed or artefactual 
behaviour, namely the ability to renegotiate contracts until the completion of a project. In this 
way the metaphor of the socioeconomic machine, and the related principles and ontological 
theses, apply to constructed or designed contracts and institutions. In contrast, debt contracts 
with no design rely on trade traditions inherited through generations of bankers and traders, so 
the rules of those contracts are the product of learning across generations without the help from 
game theorists or social scientists in general.  
The repudiation of contracts certainly is an important social problem, and a lasting 
efficient solution that can benefit all parties involved without creating social losses is not easy to 
find. Traders and bankers can continue relying of their own means and experience for solving 
the problem but they can also seek help from social scientists. The use of science is what 
distinguishes tradition from construction, traditional from designed and natural from 
artefactual. More precisely, the science to be used is a science of design, whose main task is the 
production of blueprints.  
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2.2. Blueprints for social machines  
Blueprints are a fundamental and distinctive part of any science of design just like models are 
also fundamental to the natural and the social sciences. An important distinction must be made 
between models describing parts of the actual world, and blueprints projecting parts of possible 
worlds. Because of this basic ontological difference, a science of design should be distinguished 
from what can be described as a science of facts. Such a distinction has also been made using terms 
like basic science in contrast to applied science, and natural and social science as distinct from 
engineering and technology. The economist Herbert Simon distinguishes natural sciences such 
as physics and biology from sciences of the artificial; he explains that ‘the engineer, and more 
generally the designer, is concerned with how things ought to be—how they ought to be in 
order to attain goals and to function. Hence a science of the artificial will be closely akin to a 
science of engineering’, while ‘natural sciences are concerned with how things are.’134  
      In economics, Leonid Hurwicz makes a similar distinction, when he writes that 
‘traditionally, economic analysis treats the economics system as one of the givens. The term 
“design” in the title [of the article] is meant to stress that the structure of the economic system 
is to be regarded as an unknown. An unknown of what problem? Typically, that of finding a 
system that would be […] superior to the exiting one.’135 The distinction between positive and 
normative economics serves the same purpose as he also explains that ‘the study of economic 
systems can be approached either in the spirit of “positive” science (“what is”) or “normative” 
science (“What should be”)’.136  
In economics, blueprints are actually also called ‘models’, which is generically used 
without making a distinction between models of the actual social world and models of possible 
social worlds, or parts of them. In spite of being useful and important, modal distinctions 
between actual and possible worlds are nonetheless insufficient and partly inadequate for a 
                                            
134 H. Simon (1996), pp. 4-5, 114-115.  
135 L Hurwickz (1973), p. 1.  
136 L Hurwickz (1972), p. 425.  
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science of design.137 This is because possible worlds in philosophy have been treated mostly 
formally, and with no interest in how they are part of engineering and design. As a consequence 
virtually no attention has been paid in philosophy to how the work and products of engineering 
and design affect the content and normative standards currently used in the possible worlds 
literature.  A further distinction is, therefore, needed between possible and feasible worlds. The 
latter are the subject matter of a philosophy of the science of design and the blueprints it 
produces.  
Ontologically, feasible worlds are a subset of possible worlds, which can initially be 
distinguished by criteria obtained from the advancement of technological knowledge. That is to say, 
feasible worlds are a function of the scope, power and reliability of technological knowledge. In 
a basic sense, technological knowledge consists of justified practices and propositions 
concerning the design, construction, operation and functioning of social and physical 
artefacts.138 Engineering and design produce and preserve this kind of knowledge, so the science 
of design complements the science of engineering. The success of any new socioeconomic 
machine and any new policy rely on both knowledge of design and knowledge of engineering. 
Designers produce blueprints, engineers build the machines, and only technologically feasible 
blueprints must be selected for building social machines.  
In spite of their central role and impact on nature and society, blueprints have received 
scarce attention from philosophers of science. Among the few works available, there are those 
from Nancy Cartwright and Francesco Guala.139 With the Syntactic and the Semantic views, 
theories became the fundamental units of analysis in the philosophy of science. For the 
semantic view set-theoretical and physical models became essential as the means for providing 
                                            
137 See D. Lewis (1986); S. Kripke (1980). 
138 On technological knowledge see M. De Vries, S. Hansson, A. Meijers  (2012), pp. 55-64; J. Pitt (2001), 
and E. Layton (1987); a body of literature on ‘knowledge-how’ has been produced in epistemology, 
which requires a separate research to establish the relationship between both discussions with an interest 
in design and engineering, see G. Ryle (1946), J. Stanley and T. Williamson (2001), J. Stanley (2011), K. 
Hawley (2003), and J. Bengson and M. Moffett (2011).  
139 F. Guala (2005), pp. 161-183.   
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scientific theories with an interpretation, which is crucial for understanding the claims the 
theory is making as well as for giving minimal empirical content to it. Idealised models such as 
that of a pendulum with a massless bob, a body in motion on a frictionless plain, and a perfectly 
rational individual partly fulfilled that purpose. Among others, the work of Nancy Cartwright on 
realistic models, also called representative models as opposed to interpretative models,140 
represents a shift in the philosophy of physics and the natural sciences towards the Mechanical 
view. Her more recent interest and work on the social sciences represent the same view; it is the 
extension of the Mechanical view to blueprint-making and policy-making methods.  
Both blueprint-making methods and policy-making methods rely on the use of social 
mechanisms, while they differ on the scale of the projected changes. Policy changes are 
considered to be comparative smaller than those considering large state institutions or bigger 
markets. Cartwright discusses blueprints and policy-making separately, although the 
methodological principles and ontology she argues for are the same, namely capacities, 
mechanisms and causal models.  
With the model from Hart and Moore, the three methodological principles (i), (ii), (iii), 
and two ontological theses (i) and (ii) were illustrated and discussed. Two more principles are 
discussed in this section, while the third ontological thesis is discussed in the next one. They all 
make a total of five principles and three theses, which all together constitute the Mechanical 
view from Nancy Cartwright on blueprints and socioeconomic machines:   
      •  Five principles for blueprint-making:  
i) The parts that make up the machine, their properties and the separate capacities. 
ii) How the parts are to be assembled.  
iii) The rules for calculating the outcome from the joint operation of the assembled 
parts.    
iv) What counts as shielding. 
v) How the machine is set to run.  
                                            
140In M. Morgan and M. Morrison (1999), p. 242.    
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     •  Three ontological theses on socioeconomic machines: 
i)  Realism of capacities. 
ii) Ontology of individuals.  
iii) Rejection of evolutionary change. 
 
From being prescriptive on how to build models of actual socioeconomic machines, these 
principles and theses now become prescriptive on how to build blueprints for feasible 
socioeconomic machines. That is to say, models describe actual machines; blueprints project 
feasible ones. These principles represent two complementary sides of the machine metaphor, 
and the methodological argument derived from it. The principles listed are therefore described 
now as principles for blueprint-making.  
Game theory models like that of Hart and Moore and others devised for fixing problems 
such defection, imperfect equilibria or free riding can all be categorised as blueprints. More 
precisely, these models belong to mechanism design theory. As we saw earlier, Cartwright is 
fairly optimistic about how informative Hart and Moore’s blueprint on long-term debt contracts 
regarding the first three principles is. In particular, this blueprint defines the individual and the 
structural parts of the socioeconomic machine, namely the type of individuals participating and 
their capacities as well as the same discount rates for both, certainty in all operations, rules for 
renegotiation, and the existence of a frictionless second-hand market for the physical assets of 
the project. With the help of equilibrium theory outcomes can be calculated from the 
interaction between investor and entrepreneur. In contrast, she is sceptical on how informative 
the blueprint is regarding the last two principles, namely how to shield the machine, and how it 
should get running.  
To make the contract enforceable for both entrepreneur and investor, Hart and Moore 
establish a number of shielding conditions such as no initial sunk costs, expected initial returns 
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larger than those offered by any alternative project, and some penalties. If the entrepreneur 
repudiates the contract, he loses control over the project's physical assets, so the investor can 
liquidate them. Furthermore, grounds for continuous renegotiation are also considered, which 
can lead to expected returns larger than those from liquidation. This happens because in the 
model the entrepreneur has special skills required for the execution of the project, so the 
investor has a strong incentive for renegotiating despite his initial wish to defect.  
These shielding conditions constitute an important theoretical progress, which become 
severely limited when the prospects for real application are considered. As Cartwright points 
out, ‘what counts as shielding conditions will heavily depend on what the specific material 
instantiation is. This is especially true of game-theoretic models, where few clues are given 
about what real institutional arrangements can be taken to constitute any specific game.’141 
Limitations on shielding are certainly a problem because game theory is not a strong empirical 
science. Furthermore, it does not have a proper specialised branch of scientists trained with the 
knowledge and skills required for building, shielding and operating the games it designs, that is 
to say, the socioeconomic machines it creates blueprints for. Due to the increasing need and 
pressure for better designs, game theorists working on the design of mechanisms have been 
adding, in a piecemeal fashion, important internal shielding conditions as it is prescribed here in 
principle (iv). Among others, they have designed mechanisms against the suppression of norms 
by the players and against false revelation of preferences.  
The demands posed by principle (v) on how to build and get the machine running 
represent a far more severe problem not only for game theory, but for all branches in the social 
sciences concerned with the design of institutions and policies. The model from Hart and 
Moore provides no information on how get the machine running; it only states the game will 
                                            
141 N. Cartwright (1999), p. 147.  
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function optimally as a ‘sub-game of perfect equilibrium. Repeated running imply means playing 
the game again and again.’142  
The problem extends to all blueprints from game theory, where mechanisms for 
improvement, reform or new institutions are projected. However, this is not a surprise because 
these blueprints are Galilean blueprints produced by theoretical scientists. The term comes from 
the models produced by Galileo with some highly idealised objects and conditions such as 
frictionless inclined planes, and massless cords holding bobs in a pendulum. Similarly, Hart and 
Moore’s blueprint and all game theory blueprints contain different idealisations such as perfect 
rationality, costless calculations and perfect certainty in all operations. Cartwright explains that 
this kind of idealisation ‘eliminates all other possible causes to learn the effect of one operating 
on its own’; despite being unrealistic, these models and blueprints are empirically relevant for 
design because they can establish ‘facts about stable tendencies’143  
Hence, the problems of how to improve shielding for socioeconomic machines and how 
to get them running remain unsolved. Cartwright argues that detailed causal models of the 
target population could help improve the shielding conditions for new policies; her 
methodological view on policy-making consists of the three following principles:144  
 
 Principle 1. A good way to evaluate whether a policy will be effective for a targeted 
outcome is to employ a causal model comprising of:  
a) A list of causes of the targeted outcome that will be at work when the policy is 
implemented. 
b) A rule for calculating the resultant effect when these causes operate together. 
 
 Principle 2: Causes are INUS conditions. 
 
 Principle 3: Mechanisms matter 
                                            
142 Ibid., p. 147.  
143 N. Cartwright (2007), pp.221, 225.  
144 N. Cartwright and J. Stegenga (2011), pp. 308, 313.  
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The first principle restates principles (i) to (iii) listed above for blueprint-making, while 
the second is a refinement within the Mechanical view stressing the complexity of causes due to 
their combined and separate effects. The third principle deserves special attention because it is 
fundamental in design, it highlights the distinctive task of designers and the main component of 
blueprints, namely the creation of new mechanisms for solving problems such as free riding, 
contract repudiation and inefficient allocation of economic resources. Cartwright quotes 
motherly love, fear of punishment and desire to conform as examples of social mechanisms.145 
Social mechanisms have become a major topic in sociology and political science. Jon Elster has 
been one of the main contributors to this topic. His work and the different applications of 
mechanisms are discussed in sections 2.4. and 2.6.   
Cartwright explains that causal models in policy-making only help ‘to estimate, if only 
roughly, whether, were a proposed policy to be actually implemented, a specific, identified 
outcome would be produced.’146 Therefore, the questions of how to implement and operate a 
policy and how to get a socioeconomic machine running still need answer, which is already 
available from the work experimental economists have been doing testing designs and getting 
new social machines running.  
Over the last two decades, a spontaneous division of scientific labour has emerged, so 
that scientists with the closest set of skills to the those required for the job of an engineer have 
assumed the challenge, they are the experimental economists. Their skills originally learned and 
developed for the purposes of testing theories and hypotheses as well as for producing new 
experimental findings, have been adapted for testing the rules and mechanisms projected in the 
blueprints produced by game theorists. An outstanding example of this is the job of the 
experimental economist Charles Plott, who gets new socioeconomic machines running, namely 
the new multiple-round ascending auction designed for the allocation of segments in the 
airwave spectrum to telecommunication firms in The United States. This case is discussed in 
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chapter three. There the discussion will show how the Galilean blueprints produced by game 
theorists remain largely undefined not only on how to get any machine running but also on all 
four remaining principles advanced by Cartwright.   
 
2.3. The engineering of social machines 
The final aspect from Cartwright’s Mechanical view on design and blueprints is the ontological 
thesis (iii), where she rejects the evolutionary change of social machines. This is a very 
important and fundamental thesis of design, which deserves special attention. In the philosophy 
of the social sciences, this thesis has produced a strong division between those supporting 
design and those standing against it. Although the debate about social design is an old one, the 
contemporary expression of it emerged in the 1920s and 1930s with the debate over central 
planning through the work of economists such as Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Oskar 
Lange and Abba P. Lerner, and the philosophers, Karl Popper, Michael Oakeshott and Michael 
Polanyi.  
Ontologically, the thesis of a designed order in society opposes the thesis of a 
spontaneous social order. Spontaneous order is defined as a stage of relative equilibrium within 
an evolutionary process, where there is no leading agency. The rejection of evolutionary change 
and the support for designed institutions stands against the thesis of a spontaneous social order, 
and institutions exclusively based on tradition. Cartwright explains that ‘the third thesis is one 
about which evidence is divided. Ordinary machines do not evolve. They have to be assembled 
and the assembly has to be carefully engineered […] one of the most clear-cut examples of a 
designed institution in economics is the International Monetary Fund.’147 In contrast, she places 
the International Gold Standard as ‘an institution which was not designed, but which evolved 
gradually over the nineteenth century.’148 The International Gold Standard is considered as an 
                                            
147 N. Cartwright (1999), p. 150.  
148 Ibid., p. 150. 
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example of spontaneous international order formed through the decisions of individual traders 
in the marketplace with no agent leading the process.  
The economist Carl Menger explains how money originated through a spontaneous 
process, driven by the increasing need for making trade operations more efficient. Commodities 
of greater saleability arise as the means of exchange mainly because they are available in large 
quantities, so by choosing them as currency the bad effects of scarcity are prevented. Other 
properties such as easy transportation and fitness for preservation also play a part in the 
selection of the commodity to be used as money. Thus, cowrie shells, cocoa beans, salt bars and 
some metals have all been used as currencies in different periods of human history. Later, the 
development of metallurgy set the conditions for a widespread use of metals as the currency 
across large geographical areas. Menger explains that ‘the origin of money (as distinct from coin, 
which is only one variety of money) is entirely natural […] Money is not an invention of the 
state. It is not the product of a legislative act’. Instead, the creation of money is the result of the 
unconcerted behaviour of each individual ‘led by [his economic] interest, without any 
agreement, without legislative compulsion, and even without regard to public interest, to give 
his commodities in exchange for other, more saleable, commodities’.149   
In contrast, one crucial aspect of many designed institutions is the inclusion of a leading 
agent in charge of overseeing and regulating the actions of the participating individuals, in order 
to ensure the accomplishment of certain aims and goals as they have been defined in a 
blueprint. In game theory this implies the inclusion of an agent regulating the game by 
sanctioning the actions of the players. The regulating agent can be a representative of the state, a 
representative of the proprietor of a firm, or a representative of a landowner.  A second crucial 
aspect of design is the participation of social scientists as designers, that is to say, as blueprint 
makers whose job is to use the best scientific knowledge available designing any new institution 
or policy.  
                                            
149 C. Menger (1871), pp. 260, 261. 
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Note that the history of traditional institutions such as commodity money going from 
cocoa beans and salt bars to silver or gold, shows the need for change and adaptation when 
faced with challenges. Individuals and institutions then face a choice between responding with 
the best of their accumulated traditional knowledge, means and custom, or they can respond by 
getting help from social scientists, which implies the development of artefactual means and 
artefactual behaviour. This is the crux of the dilemma between design and a spontaneous order.  
The challenges and problems experienced by the International Gold Standard after the 
First World War called into question the use of gold as commodity money. One of the main 
benefits of the gold standard was the positive effect it had in keeping the exchange rates stable, 
which provided certainty to trade operations and jobs. However, it had an important flaw for it 
lacked the means for a prompt response to large fluctuations in the gold stocks, and its 
availability in the markets. Gold stocks and reserves are subject to the discovery and 
exploitation of gold mines, which can cause shortages as well as an oversupply leading to 
inflation, deflation and trade imbalances with the loss of jobs. The gold standard offered no 
mechanism for restabilising stability within a short period, so by the time stability was regained 
through the transfer of capitals, high social costs had been paid. These include drastic falls in 
trade, large unemployment and loss of purchasing power in large parts of society.  
Between the two War Worlds a number of alternatives were produced by economists, 
which attempted to solve the problems created by the Gold Standard.150 In 1923 the economist 
John Maynard Keynes made important criticisms of the Gold Standard exposing the different 
negative effects it had produced over the past decades.151 He advanced a monetary plan, which 
would become one of two blueprints discussed at the Bretton Woods Conference, where the 
foundations for the International Monetary Fund were laid out. The two main components of 
Keynes’s blueprint consisted of the creation of a supranational agency endowed with regulation 
powers, namely a Clearing Union; and the use of fiat money by both the Clearing Union and 
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national central banks. The blueprint also included the creation of an international currency to 
be called ‘unitas’ or ‘bancor’. Both the Union and central banks were required to be technical 
and not political, they would intervene to solve two main problems created by the Gold 
Standard, namely the instability of international prices created by the scarcity of gold as 
commodity money, and the large unemployment created by employers who react against the 
natural tendency of wages to rise beyond the limits set by the volume of money attached to 
gold. This is how Keynes describes the mechanism and the leading role of the supranational 
currency:152   
The peculiar merit of the Clearing Union as a means of remedying a chronic shortage of 
international money is that it operates through the velocity, rather than through the 
volume, of circulation […] If hoarding is discouraged and if reserves against 
contingencies are provided by facultative overdrafts, a very small amount of actually 
outstanding credit might be sufficient for clearing between well-organised Central Banks 
[…] The primary aim of an international currency scheme should be, therefore, to 
prevent not only those evils which result from a chronic shortage of international money 
due to the draining of gold into creditor countries but also those which follow from 
countries failing to maintain stability of domestic efficiency-costs and moving out of step 
with one another in their national wage policies without having at their disposal any 
means of orderly adjustment. 
 
The alternative plan put forward by the economist Harry Dexter White still relied on the gold 
standard; it rejected the creation of an international currency and a supranational agency. It 
confined any change in exchange rates only to special circumstances with a fundamental 
disequilibrium, which were left unspecific.153 The United States held a good part of the gold 
reserves and a strong power position, so White’s plan was largely adopted at the Bretton Woods 
conference setting up a world-wide system of currencies attached to the US dollar, while the US 
dollar was itself attached to gold reserves.  
                                            
152 J. M. Keynes (1943), pp. 185-186.  
153 See F. Cesarano (2006), p. 133-145.  
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The basic rationale underpinning White’s blueprint is explained by the economist 
Friedrich Hayek, who criticised Keynes’s plan because while it ‘might, indeed, be superior […] it 
is ‘not a practical proposition’ for it requires ‘a wisely and impartially controlled system of 
managed currency for the whole world’154 led by a supranational agency. To solve the problems 
of the scarcity of gold and the resulting instability with trade imbalances, inflation and deflation, 
Hayek suggested replacing gold with various storable raw commodities such as wheat, sugar, 
copper and rubber; his own blueprint considered the coordination of national policies, the use 
of private specialist brokers, and a minimal and almost mechanical role for a monetary agency, 
which would have very little or no discretionary powers. These are the basics of the blueprint 
for the new system:155   
With this system in operation an increase in the demand for liquid assets would lead to 
the accumulation of stocks of raw commodities of the most general usefulness. The 
hoarding of money, instead of causing resources to run to waste, would act as if it were 
an order to keep raw commodities for the hoarder's account. And as the hoarded money 
was again returned to circulation and demand for commodities increased, these stocks 
would be released to satisfy the new demand […] There would, in particular, be no need 
for the monetary authorities or the Government in any way directly to handle the many 
commodities of which the commodity unit is composed. Both the bringing together of 
the required assortment of warrants and the actual storing of the commodities could be 
safely left to private initiative. Specialist brokers would soon take care of the collecting 
and tendering of warrants […] In this respect the business of the monetary authority 
would be as mechanical as the buying and selling of gold under the gold standard […] 
the monetary authority shall be empowered in precisely defined circumstances to accept 
in place of (or substitute for) warrants for stored commodities contracts for future 
delivery of any commodity.  
 
                                            
154 F. Hayek (1943), p. 176. 
155 Ibid., pp. 179-180, 182-183. 
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         There are two important differences between the blueprints from Hayek and Keynes. The 
first one on the moral psychology used for design, the second one on the methodology and 
ontology of design.  
The moral psychology adopted in design affects the scope and prospects of success for 
each blueprint. Hayek did not believe that government agencies, national or supranational, 
could be trusted with power and control over commodity money, while Keynes does not 
believe that proprietors of firms or landowners can be trusted to provide rapid and coordinated 
action for stabilising prices,  or the availability of commodity money without depressing wages 
or creating unemployment. They both cared about efficiency and stability of capitalist societies 
but disagreed on the means needed for achieving those two aims. 
 Just as Hayek criticises Keynes’s plan for being impractical by relying on technocrats, 
who are assumed to be wise and impartial, Hayek’s own plan can be criticised for being also 
impractical. As much as the success of Keynes’s blueprint depends on the wisdom and the 
principled and impartial behaviour of technocrats, the blueprint from Hayek requires, for its 
success, enlightened self-interested proprietors and landowners, who are willing to act in 
coordination and rapidly neglecting their most immediate interests and relatively safe trade 
options, for the risky prospects of balancing back their returns from future trade operations. 
These assumptions imply the absence of slow, short-sighted, reckless and fraudulent behaviour.  
         These are crucial components of the moral psychology assumed in the design; the truth 
and reliability of such assumptions define the scope and prospects of success for any blueprint.  
In Keynes’s case, if the assumptions are true, technocrats can be trusted on the use of wide 
discretionary powers and full control over fiat money. Equally, in Hayek’s case if the 
assumptions from the opposite blueprint are true, proprietors and landowners can be trusted 
over the full control of commodity money and enlightened, coordinated and rapid action.  Each 
blueprint would then compete almost exclusively on the stability of prices, low inflation and low 
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unemployment within capitalist societies. Further aspects on the moral psychology of design are 
discussed in chapters three and four.    
Methodologically, a blueprint that relies on an agency leading the process is called 
dirigiste, while a blueprint relying on a minimal or no leading agency is called libertarian.  
Ontologically, a blueprint relying on traditional knowledge, traditional means and custom is 
called evolutionary. In contrast, a blueprint relying on science, artefactual means and artefactual 
behaviour is called constructivist. So, a blueprint based on science and artefactual behaviour is 
described as constructivist and artificial, while a blueprint based on traditional knowledge and 
custom is called evolutionary and natural.  
Hayek introduced some of these descriptive terms making a contrast between the two 
methods, which I have been describing as blueprint-making methods. The term ‘blueprint’ may 
seem to be exclusive of design, however I argue that whenever scientific knowledge is used, as 
Hayek does producing a new plan, the term can be applied to both cases. That is to say, the 
extension of the term ‘blueprint’ covers all cases when science is used for creating any new 
blueprint, where the new behaviour is considered to be an adaptation from custom or an 
artefact from construction.  
The blueprint from Keynes is both dirigiste and constructivist. It is dirigiste because it 
relies on supranational and national monetary agencies regulating the behaviour of the 
participants, and leading the process towards the stability of prices, low inflation and low 
unemployment. It is constructivist because it intentionally attains all this by creating artefacts 
such the International Clearing Union, a new design for Central Banks as well as international 
and national fiat money. The blueprint from Hayek is libertarian because it rejects the creation 
of any supranational monetary agency, allowing only a minimal intervention from national 
monetary agencies with constrained, and almost fully defined powers. It is evolutionary because 
the stability of prices, low inflation and low unemployment are attained as the product of 
individual actions relying on traditional rules, and knowledge accumulated across generations.  
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The final design of the International Monetary Fund included features from both Hayek 
and Keynes’s blueprints. It retained gold as a reserve and adopted dollar as the international 
currency instead of artefactual fiat money, and it did not provide any means for preventing the 
US Treasury from printing money, which effectively meant a discretionary power for creating 
reserves. Amounts of gold and national currencies were transferred from the country members 
to the coffers of the IMF, and it was agreed that countries would lose control over 75% of 
those transfers. Technocrats at the IMF would have full control over those funds to be used for 
lending to other countries, and they would also have the power to survey national economies as 
a condition for lending as well as make recommendations on domestic policies.  
Impartiality was compromised because most of the IMF staff positions were filled with 
US economists and technocrats. Exchange rates and other national monetary policies were also 
subject to the approval and regulation of the new supranational bureaucracy. The new discipline 
in policies recommended by the IMF, and other new behavioural changes required from 
national monetary authorities and local politicians were more than adaptions from custom, they 
had to be constructed from training and maintained through regular supervision, incentives and 
penalties which were all decided by the IMF bureaucracy and technocrats.  
Because of the Keynesian aspects of the International Monetary Fund, and because her 
methodological advice is addressed to state agencies in charge of designing, building and 
implementing policies and institutions,156the Mechanical view from Nancy Cartwright on 
blueprint-making and policy-making falls into the dirigiste methods considered as a part of 
social engineering. Of course, the size of the intervention from leading agencies varies from 
holistic central planning in socialist societies to piecemeal decentralised planning and 
intervention in largely capitalist societies, with different sizes in the provision of welfare 
institutions and state-owned enterprises. Her principles on policy-making require piecemeal 
                                            
156 See N. Cartwright (2009), N. Cartwright and J. Stegenga (2011), and N. Cartwright and J. Hardie 
(2012).  Other examples she uses are from education and nutrition policies implemented in 1990s, 
namely the new policy on class-size reduction in primary schools in California, and the child nutrition 
programme implemented in Tamil Nadu and Bangladesh.  
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intervention, they demand the identification of social mechanisms, and the production of 
comprehensive causal models, which if they are used ‘in applied science and engineering, why 
should we expect it to be substantially different—and substantially easier—in social 
engineering?’157  
Like Cartwright, Karl Popper also advocated the use of piecemeal social engineering; 
and like her he also used the machine metaphor, which he described as the ‘technological 
approach’. He points out that ‘just as the main task of the physical engineering is to design 
machines and to remodel and service them, the tasks of the piecemeal social engineer is to 
design social institutions, and to reconstruct and run those already in existence.’158  Popper was 
critical of holistic social engineering as socialist and national socialist government practised it, so 
he placed piecemeal engineering as part of liberal capitalist societies and their governments.  
The views from Popper and Cartwright on social engineering actually correspond with 
policy reforms and institutional design as they are practiced today in capitalist societies with 
provision of welfare institutions. For instance, Popper explains that unlike those blueprints for 
holistic engineering, ‘blueprints for piecemeal engineering are comparatively simple. There are 
blueprints for single institutions, for health and unemployment insurance, for instance, or 
arbitration courts, or anti-depression budgeting, or educational reform.’159   
The association of piecemeal engineering with liberal capitalist societies and Keynesian 
policies, and the association of holistic engineering with socialist societies have both become a 
common place. It has also become a common place to associate libertarian capitalism with anti-
design views grounded on evolutionary arguments similar to those held by Hayek.160 At the 
same time, libertarian egalitarianism has been largely ignored in design; no holistic or piecemeal 
engineering, and no evolutionary argument exist on how to attain economic equality and wealth 
                                            
157 N. Cartwright and J. Stegenga (2011), p. 296.  
158 K. Popper (1961), p. 59.  
159 K. Popper (1966), p. 172.  
160 M. Oakeshott (1947) and M. Polanyi  (1940) held views similar to those from F. Hayek.  
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with a minimal state. Such neglect and associations could be explained by the origin of the 
respective scientific views and the circumstances surrounding them, and also because of the 
values and biases leading scientific research.  
In opposition to those commonly held views, I argue that the application of piecemeal 
and holistic engineering depend on the amount and reliability of the existing social technological 
knowledge irrespective of economic and political beliefs. I do this by showing how piecemeal 
and holistic engineering methods have been applied to economic and political programmes of 
different size and ideology. The ultimate product of this argument and position should be a 
methodology of design and engineering in the social sciences, which can be detached from their 
current ideological and historical biases, and can therefore be made available to all and be used 
for making blueprints from political and economic standpoints with low or no records of 
design.  
Whenever modern science is used for a new policy, institution or constitution design and 
engineering are present, including plans for reducing the state from right and left libertarianism. 
In contrast, design and engineering are excluded from those societies exclusively relying on 
accumulated traditional knowledge with no use of social modern science. Piecemeal and holistic 
engineering are the two extremes within a continuous line, so there is a large variation on the 
size of the changes considered in any design. Whatever the size and challenges, any decision of 
design and engineering must rely on the amount and reliability of the existing knowledge. A 
small reform in the electoral system or in the public health services can fail just because social 
scientists do not have the required knowledge, while large economic reforms can succeed just 
because the required knowledge is available.  
The recent capitalist engineering with successful mass privatisation performed in 
Russia161within a short period of three years, and in East Europe162 in less than a decade, proved 
                                            
161 See Boycko, Maxim et al. (1995),  
162 See J. Elster, C. Offe, U.Preuss (1998); J. Zielonka (2001); and C. Bjørnskov and N. Potrafke (2011).  
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the success of holistic engineering. The behavioural changes in the population did not emerge 
from custom as Hayek would argue but from the new rules, incentives, penalties and other 
enforcement means embodied in the new socioeconomic machines being built, namely private 
firms. In factories, the officials from the communist parties were replaced with representatives 
from the new proprietors of firms. The application of incentives, penalties and supervision on 
female and male Russian workers remained, just the size, content and structure changed. More 
significantly for the anti-design libertarian views held by Hayek was his practical support and 
theoretical justification of a military dictatorship that decided upon and safeguarded capitalist 
holistic engineering, as it occurred in Chile. 163 This case proved not that only successful free-
market holistic engineering is possible, but also that it can also take place under military control 
and protection.  
The amount of accumulated scientific knowledge on the design, construction and 
operation of firms and free markets is so vast that many of the positive and negative 
consequences can be anticipated. All this makes the design and engineering of free markets 
comparatively more reliable.  Similarly, the positive and negative consequences of a central 
planning from the state are also well known. Some of these consequences can currently be 
observed in Venezuela, where large-scale social engineering has been taking over the last few 
years, expanding the control and power from the central government.164   
By itself, piecemeal engineering is not any more reliable than holistic engineering. 
Piecemeal engineering of small reforms and policies can also fail, even in cases where scientific 
knowledge has been made available. Nancy Cartwright demonstrates this point using cases 
where government education and nutrition programmes have failed. In 1996, elected politicians 
from the House of Representative in California decided on a new education policy for reducing 
                                            
163 See Hayek (1982), Vol. 3, pp. 124-126. Friedrich Hayek, Milton Freedman and other right-libertarian 
economists from the Mont Pelerin Society supported the holistic capitalist reforms in Chile, they met 
and advised General Augusto Pinochet and the economists in charge of the reforms, see J. G. Valdés 
(1995).  
164 See M. Weisbrot and J. Johnston (2012). 
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the class size in primary schools, the new policy was motivated by the poor performance of 
students in previous years. The decision on the new policy was based on experimental evidence 
from randomised control trials performed in primary schools in Tennessee over a period of 
four years, where a reduction from 25 to 13 students produced a significant improvement in 
reading and mathematics.  
In spite of the evidence the implementation in California failed, which also represented a 
loss of one billion dollars that was allocated for the policy. The failure was explained by 
identifying differences in the demographic profiles of pupils, which likely created an unequal 
distribution of confounding factors contained in the different populations, while problems of 
implementation were also found such as the hiring of teachers with low qualifications, and a 
structural change in the thresholds for class reduction defined in each state.165  
Cartwright criticises randomised control trials for their inability to discriminate 
confounding factors and some structural ones, which also affect implementation. By using 
causal models instead, she explains that her own ‘solution of capacities to underwrite the 
inference ticket from efficacy to effectiveness solves the problem of the relevance of Tennessee 
to California […] The logic of capacities—when applicable—thus solves all three problems in 
one fell swoop. Regarding problems of confounding and implementation, it accounts for the 
fact that we would not normally expect the same outcome outside the experimental setting as 
inside.’166 She holds similar conclusions for the failure of the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition 
Project inspired by the success of the Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Project both funded by 
the World Bank.167    
A successful case of piecemeal engineering can be found in the design, implementation 
and current operation of internal markets in the National Health Service (NHS) in the United 
Kingdom. Initial ideas on a blueprint for implementing competition within the health care 
                                            
165 See G. W. Borhnstedt and B. M. Stecher (eds.) (2002), pp. 7-9. 
166 N. Cartwright (2009), p. 132.  
167 N. Cartwright and J. Hardie (2012), pp. 76-90. 
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system in The United States had been advanced by the economist Alain Enthoven in the early 
1980s; internal competition for budget allocation was presented as a solution to the continuous 
rising costs and high inefficiency of health care publicly funded. The NHS was experiencing the 
same problems, which prevented bringing the least well-off districts up to the level of the best-
off districts as it was originally planned in 1948 under the labour government.  
Planning and administration in the NHS was centralised in London and the six other 
regions with only a small number of decisions made by local districts. Enthoven presented the 
basic components of a decentralised blueprint by transferring the decisions on budget spending, 
control over assets and other important aspects to the districts, he explained that ‘districts are 
now subject to many controls that are intended to satisfy the needs of central government, the 
Region, the medical profession, national unions, etc. but are not focussed on efficient service at 
the point of delivery.’168   
His blueprint consisted of six basic rules such as full freedom for each district authority 
to decide upon the allocation for resources for its own patients, and the payment for emergency 
and non-emergency services to patients outside each district. Decisions on wages, working 
conditions and firing decisions would also be made locally; consultants and general practitioners 
would make contracts with the district authorities, and each district could buy or sell services 
and assets to other districts and the private sector as well as borrow money at government 
interest rates.  
Enthoven realised that control over budget and assets as well as freedom to buy, sell, 
borrow and sign contracts may be themselves be insufficient, and they can actually lead to the 
opposite outcomes unless they were supported by a behavioural and cultural change, so he 
added six prerequisites such as the provision of incentives to make cost-effective decisions in 
the design, appointment of suitably trained managers, good cost information available, a 
commitment to suppress vested interests, and the development of a new culture of buying and 
                                            
168 A. Enthoven (1985), p. 38.  
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selling health services, which he noted did not exist, so the behavioural changes needed would 
therefore be artefactual.169  
The British economist Alan Maynard put forward similar ideas on a blueprint suggesting 
that general practices could become fund-holders with powers similar to those of the district 
health authorities.170 Besides the changes in district authorities and general practices, the final 
blueprint for the NHS internal markets introduced similar changes for hospitals, which would 
change their status, becoming trusts. The new health trusts, district authorities and general 
practices would have equal decision power over the allocations of funds, buying, selling and 
signing contracts.  A successful implementation required behavioural and cultural changes; each 
health trust, district, and general practices would now act as private firms; committees and 
managers in each of them would behave like proprietors of a firm, and competition would take 
place among trusts, district authorities and general practices for attracting and retaining as many 
patients as possible, who should now behave as consumers.  
The new NHS internal markets would not be completely free markets but managed 
markets because those trusts, districts and general practices losing in the competition would be 
saved by the central government ensuring that patients would not be affected. Regular universal 
health care would remain for all residents and legal immigrants, and emergency services would 
remain available to any person. With some minor reforms and improvements, internal markets 
remain as the main operational principle of the NHS, both the Labour Party and the 
Conservative Party have supported this design. The NHS internal market is a good example of a 
socioeconomic machine. More precisely, it is a welfare state liberal socioeconomic machine 
combining aspects of a right-libertarian design with some socialist ones.  
While working on their own blueprints, Enthoven and Maynard rejected a right- 
libertarian design for the NHS, while they have also rejected the existing central planning. 
                                            
169 Ibid., pp. 39-41.  
170 A. Maynard (1986).  
 
 
116
Maynard argued that ‘as in all other markets, capitalists become the enemies of capitalism. By 
this we mean that general practitioners would be likely to use their market power to stabilise and 
maximise their income and employment. Such behaviour, although it might benefit the 
members of the profession, would be unlikely to lead to greater efficiency or patient 
satisfaction.’171 While Enthoven argued that ‘markets do not protect the weak, the 
disadvantaged, or the unlucky. Social protections are needed and generally present in modern 
democratic market economies […] The challenge is to find something in the middle that 
captures some of the best of both central planning and market forces.’172  
As a socioeconomic machine, the NHS has been working reliably and more efficiently 
than it did under central planning.173 One of its unintended consequences was to save the 
Labour Party from its own centralised policies, and just as it helped Labour it could have helped 
state socialism. Because internal markets are a hybrid design with socialist components without 
privatisation, it could have used in the ex-USSR, East Germany and East Europe by extending 
it to all social and economic domains where central planning was used, and it could also be used 
now in Cuba or North Korea following the kind of piecemeal engineering successfully 
performed in China and Vietnam just not for internal markets but for free markets instead, 
implemented in the so called ‘special economic zones’.174  
The successful engineering of the special economic zones is particularly relevant because 
of their right-libertarian design. There is no government intervention, no minimum wages, no 
taxes and virtually no other barrier; capital investors and entrepreneurs almost enjoy full 
freedom. Female and male workers are still under the control of the entrepreneur 
                                            
171 A. Maynard, M. Marinker and D. Pereira (1986), p. 1439.  
172 A. Enthoven (1999), pp. 11, 13.  
173 See J. Le Grand, N. Mays and J. Mulligan (1998), pp. 117-143; A. Enthoven (1999), pp. 24-32; see 
also A. Enthoven (2002); C. Spoor and J. Munro (2003); and M. Dusheiko et. al. (2007) Due to the lack 
of information on some years, and the control of available information by the government, the 
measurement and comparison of efficiency rates and other aspects like quality, equity, accountability and 
choice are not comprehensive, and in some cases they are not fully accurate.  
174 See D. Z. Zeng (ed.) (2010); Y. Tao and L. Zhiguo (ed.) (2012); O. Weggel (2007); and M. Than and J. 
L. H. Tan (ed.) (1993). China implemented the first special economic zone in 1979, while Vietnam 
implemented the first one in 1991.  
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representatives but free from the control of the communist party representatives, and they earn 
wages that are comparatively larger at the local level, while they may remain significantly low 
compared with international standards. Also, working conditions can be poor and detrimental 
to the workers in the special economic zones. Nonetheless, all this is consistent with a right-
libertarian design.175   
The success of the internal markets in the United Kingdom, and the success of the 
special economic zones in China and Vietnam show that each of these socioeconomic machines 
can be implemented in socialist and capitalist countries following the method of piecemeal 
engineering, precisely as it was suggested by Karl Popper. He argued in favour of a social 
engineering ‘confined to a factory, or to a village, or even to a district’ because ‘only in this way 
we can learn how to fit institutions into the framework of other institutions, and how to adjust 
them, so that they work according to our intentions. And only in this way can we make 
mistakes, and learn from our mistakes, without risking repercussions of a gravity that must 
endanger the will to future reforms.’176 The precautionary principle implicit in his position led 
him to reject holistic engineering using socialism as an example. He claimed that ‘of the two 
methods, I hold that one is possible, while the other one simply does not exist: it is 
impossible.’177   
In contrast, the cases discussed above show that large scale engineering on free 
decentralised markets has been successfully performed because of the vast social technological 
knowledge available on how to build them, and because of its comparative advantages over 
socialist central planning. It is not so much the size of the changes as the knowledge on how to 
produce them. Successful holistic engineering is feasible and therefore possible just as piecemeal 
engineering can be unfeasible and therefore impossible, at least until the relevant knowledge is 
produced. No piecemeal engineering should be performed just because the size of grave 
                                            
175 See M. Zwolinski (2007).  
176 K. Popper (1966), p. 176.  
177 K. Popper (1961), p. 69; see also K. Popper (1966), p. 175.  
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repercussions is small, and no holistic engineering should be rejected just because it represents a 
large-scale change. The amount and reliability of the social technological knowledge available 
should be used as criteria for deciding between piecemeal and holistic engineering. These are 
criteria freed from some of their ideological and historical biases, namely the association of 
piecemeal engineering to liberal capitalist societies and Keynesian policies, and holistic 
engineering from state socialism. A science of design should be made available to all and, more 
importantly, it should be performed on designs from political standpoints with no or few cases 
of design, which can offer solutions to current social problems.  
 
2.4. Analytical sociology   
The machine metaphor has proven to be methodologically fruitful.  Through different sources 
and influences, this metaphor has spread across the social sciences mainly in the search for 
social mechanisms to be used in explanation and design. There are three outstanding examples 
of this metaphor in the social sciences, namely analytical sociology, mechanism design theory 
and institutional design. Analytical sociology is mainly concerned with explanation, while 
mechanism design theory and institutional design are concerned with design. The 
methodologically conscious choice for mechanisms and the close attention paid to them in 
analytical sociology provide the grounds for an initial comparison between these three branches, 
and the identification of some challenges related to the use of mechanisms such as the material 
nature of the mind and the scope of causes external to the mind in the design and engineering 
of artefactual behaviour.   
Analytical sociology constitutes the best example in the social sciences of the Mechanical 
view advanced by Nancy Cartwright and Rom Harré. It rejects empiricist standards such as the 
need for laws and universal theories. It places social mechanisms at the centre of research in 
sociology and some related extensions to economics, and it explicitly adopts causal realism and 
realism of unobservable entities such as beliefs, intentions and desires. The use of mechanisms 
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was inspired by the work of Jon Elster, while the realist argument for causes and unobservable 
entities came through the influence of Rom Harré. It adopts methodological individualism, 
which is also part of the analytical method followed by Cartwright.178  
Within analytical sociology, the work from the economist Thomas Shelling179and that 
from the sociologist Raymond Boudon180can be considered as foundational in the conscious 
attempt for using individual mechanisms for the explanation of large-scale social effects. More 
recently, the sociologists Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg181 have made important 
advances in establishing the methodological foundations of this research programme.  
The standards of empiricism prescribe the use of laws, while it criticises the realist 
conception of causes and mechanisms and its use in scientific explanation. The deduction or 
induction of the event to be explained must be supported by laws, while any reference to causes 
or mechanisms must be replaced with a set of observable initial and boundary conditions, which 
are constantly conjoined to the observable effect.182  Hedström and Swedberg criticise the 
covering-law explanations for being ‘black-box explanations’; this is because ‘they do not 
attempt to reveal any mechanisms that might have generated the observed relationships’183. The 
same view on the covering-law model is held by Cartwright, who uses the term ‘vending 
machine’ instead184. Following Jon Elster,185 Hedström and Swedberg claimed that social 
mechanisms provide real explanatory power, and therefore any true explanation must be causal.  
Elster has also been critical of the covering-law model of explanation; he put forward an 
alternative model of explanation by mechanisms in the social sciences. He places mechanisms as 
‘intermediate between laws and descriptions’, and defines them as ‘causal patterns that are 
                                            
178 N. Cartwright (1999), pp. 83. 149-150.   
179 T. Shelling (1978).    
180 R. Boudon (1974) and R. Boudon (1981). 
181 P. Hedström and R. Swedberg (ed.) (1998), P. Hedström (2005); see also P. Demeulenaere (ed.) 
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182 C. Hempel (1965), pp. 351-352.  
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triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences.’186 Elster’s 
explanation by mechanisms holds important similarities with the explanation by causal models 
advanced earlier by Nancy Cartwright, so the work from both consistently underpins the 
research programme in analytical sociology.187  
Individual psychological mechanisms are fundamental for any explanation in analytical 
sociology. These mechanisms are mainly taken from rational choice theory and cognitive 
psychology; some examples of them are cognitive dissonance, wishful thinking, self-fulfilling 
prophecy, the endowment effects and utility maximisation. Recall that Cartwright also considers 
some cognitive mechanisms for explanation such as motherly love, fear of punishment and 
desire to conform.  
Analytical sociology emerged not only as a reaction to the methodological standards of 
empiricism but also against the holism of some sociological theories, also called ‘grand theories’. 
Theories such as structural functionalism hold a prominent focus on social structures as the 
theoretical entities with major explanatory power, which are also framed as functional 
explanations. Social structures are sets of relationships established among individuals, and a set 
of such structures constitutes a social system; kinship, caste and social class relations are 
examples of those structures. In these theories, individual  behaviour meets the ‘exigencies’ 
demanded for ‘the production, maintenance and development of cultural systems’, so 
psychological ‘motivational mechanisms of the personality must be understood and formulated 
relative to the functional problems of this unit.’188 Hedström and Swedberg criticise structural 
functionalism as ‘empty theorising’ for ‘it ignores the principle of individual action’189. In 
contrast, they argue that ‘a focus on explanatory mechanisms helps sociology to avoid the trap 
                                            
186 J. Elster (1999), p. 1; see D. Bailer-Jones (2009, pp. 35-41) for a detailed discussion on mechanisms; 
see J. Dupré (2001) for an argument against mechanisms in economics.   
187Jon Elster (1999, p. 2) explains that the work from Nancy Cartwright on explanation by causal models 
in physics anticipated his work on explanation by mechanisms in the social sciences. 
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of mindless empiricism on the one hand, and conventional and empty theorising on the 
other.’190  
The philosophers Mario Bunge and Daniel Little hold similar views; they have also 
produced arguments in defence of social mechanisms as the micro-foundations of theories in 
the social sciences. Little, for instance, holds that ‘social causation depends on regularities that 
derive from the properties of individual agents: their intentionality, their rationality, and various 
features of individuals motivational psychology’; and he adds that  ‘causal mechanisms are more 
fundamental than regularities of association between causal variables.’191 Bunge argues that 
‘grand theories’ such as ‘Parsonianism’ must be avoided and considered with suspicion, while 
knowledge of social mechanisms should be prioritised.192   Such mechanisms should be the main 
components of theories with limited scope called ‘middle-range theories’. The following two 
examples illustrate the explanation by social mechanisms, which belong to middle-range 
theories.  
To illustrate how such mechanisms work, Raymond Boudon quotes the explanation for 
the lack of support socialism received within the US American working classes during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is a contrastive explanation originally produced by 
the sociologist Werner Sombart, which Boudon breaks down into thirteen premises; here it is in 
a condensed form of six premises:193   
 
1) The US American society is a stratified society. In a stratified society, people  consider 
upward social mobility to be something desirable. 
2) Upward social mobility requires an investment from each individual with varying costs 
and uncertain returns. 
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3) If, on average, the costs and risks do not exceed certain individual thresholds, individual 
strategies of upward social mobility will be chosen. If such individual costs and risks 
exceed the threshold, individual strategies will be dismissed, and collective strategies of 
upward social mobility will instead be considered. Collective strategies also carry costs 
and risks.  
4) The costs of individual upward social mobility are greater in societies with pronounced 
class differences, so collective strategies reducing individual costs and risk will be 
chosen.     
5) A socialist programme legitimises and coordinates a choice for collective strategies of 
upwards mobility.  A collective socialist strategy will be chosen if rival collective 
strategies of upward mobility have greater costs and risks with fewer returns, and if a 
large enough number of individuals share the same belief on such greater costs and 
risks. 
6) Class barriers are more visible in The USA than in Europe, therefore the belief in a 
greater upward social mobility within capitalism is more widely shared in The USA than 
in Europe. The individual costs and risks of upward social mobility within US American 
capitalism are perceived to be less than those involved in socialist collective action.   
_________________________________________________________________ 
Therefore, socialism is less appealing in The USA than in Europe. 
 
The question regarding the lack of support of a socialist programme was puzzling and the 
explanation was challenging because there was evidence of the low rate of upward social 
mobility in The USA; poverty and unemployment were also large in American society. 
Therefore, an explanation would not be trivial but revealing. Boudon explains that there are two 
key elements in the explanatory mechanism proposed by Sombart, namely ‘the weaker the 
visibility of social barriers, the greater the belief in the possibility of crossing them’, and ‘the 
lower the cost of a strategy, the greater the chance that it will be adopted’.194 The belief in a 
greater and easier upward social mobility can actually be false, that is to say, it is enough that a 
large enough number of individuals believe it to be true; ‘ it is only necessary […] a low visibility 
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of symbolic barriers between classes’.195 This was the case in the The USA, where social mobility 
was actually far lower than it was perceived, and lower than in some European countries. 
Hence, the crux of the explanation is the false, shared belief in a greater upward mobility within 
the US American workers both employed and unemployed. In addition, political and economic 
decentralisation in The USA also hampered a wider communication and coordination within the 
working classes at a national level.  
        The second example uses a game theory model to illustrate the surprising effects small 
variations in individual thresholds have for collective action such as riots, strikes, voting and 
migration.  The sociologist Mark Granovetter criticises sociological explanations of collective 
action based on institutionalised norms, individual preferences and motives because they are 
insufficient for the explanation of individual decisions with effects on collective outcomes. He 
argues that explanation by social norms assumes ‘a simple relation between collective results 
and individual motives’, therefore a model with a mechanism explaining ‘how these individual 
preferences interact and aggregate’ is needed.196 He found such mechanism in the variation of 
individual thresholds for decision making on the participation in collective actions.  In his 
model, Granovetter assumes a crowd with one hundred individuals randomly taken from a 
population with different quantitative values on the number of people needed for them to join a 
riot: ‘a distribution of riot thresholds equals to the uniform distribution: 1% has threshold 0%, 
1% of the population has threshold 1%, 1% has threshold 2% … 1% of the population has 
threshold 99%’.197  
        Initially only the person with a threshold of 0% will participate, and her participation will 
activate the person with a threshold of 1%, this action will activate the person with a threshold 
of 2%, and so on until the person with a threshold of 99% joins completing the set. If the 
distribution of thresholds changes slightly, for instance, if the person with a threshold of 3% is 
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replaced with a person with a threshold of 4%, the collective outcome would dramatically 
change. There will be no riot; the collective action will end with three people only. Other 
changes can be modelled with the same population showing how small changes can have 
dramatic collective outcomes. Hence, variation in individual thresholds is a simple mechanism 
with surprising explanatory power, unexpected large-scale effects and large scope because of the 
many cases of collective action it can explained.  
Threshold models and the explanation of the low appeal for socialism within the US 
American working classes follow the three methodological principles suggested by Hedström 
and Swedberg,198namely the principle of direct causality by identifying individual decision 
making and interaction among individuals, the principle of limited scope by building models, 
which are part of middle-range theories, and the principle of methodological individualism by 
explaining collective action and its aggregate effects by individual decision-making. The first two 
principles ask for a finer causal description with a limited scope, which is not explicitly 
requested in the five principles put forward by Cartwright, so in this sense these principles are a 
refinement within the Mechanical view. The third principle on methodological individualism is 
already part of this view.   
Besides these three principles, analytical sociology also postulates the existence of 
unobserved explanatory mechanisms. Assumptions of intentions, discounting, and preferences 
have proven extremely useful for the analysis of individual action even though they never can 
be observed.’199 Hedström and Swedberg refer to the work from Rom Harré in support of the 
postulation of theoretical entities such as beliefs, intentions and desires and their causal powers, 
particularly when they form a psychological mechanism for individual action, which on the 
aggregate level constitutes a social mechanism.  
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Such mechanisms have generative causal power to be distinguished from a Humean 
sucessionist explanation of causation, Harré explains that ‘in the generative theory the cause is 
supposed to have the power to generate the effect and it is connected to it […] the world being 
what it is, replete with generative mechanisms located in the many things and materials that 
exist in nature, not every possible outcome is equally likely.’200 This realist view on the causal 
power of mental states is also shared by Nancy Cartwright, with the adscription of capacities or 
natures discussed above in section 2.1. The influence of Harré’s realist argument extends across 
other sociologists within analytical sociology, for instance Mohamed Cherkaoui writes that 
‘realist philosophy, which is mainly British, clearly bears the stamp of Harré, notwithstanding 
the contributions of [Roy] Bhaskar, and [Andrew] Sayer among others.’201  
Following the work of Jon Elster, Hedström and Swedberg describe mechanisms as the 
‘cogs and wheels’ of social explanation; Elster writes that ‘mechanisms [are] –nuts and bolts, 
cogs and wheels–that can be used to explain quite complex social phenomena.’202 Semantically, 
the machine metaphor is part of the core of the research programme in analytical sociology. 
One of the strongest ontological views on this metaphor is held by Elster, who argues that ‘all 
explanation is causal’. He accepts intentional and functional explanations, however he claims 
that ‘at the most fundamental level, though, all explanation is causal.’203 He follows Donald 
Davidson’s argument,204 which turns intentions and other unobservable mental entities into 
causes just as they are used in physical sciences, so that intentional explanation becomes a case 
of causal explanation. This claim is important because the mechanical metaphor may turn into a 
literal description if it is accepted that intentions and other mental entities relevant for the 
explanation of behaviour are physical or material entities. There are two positions on this 
ontological thesis.   
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Elster aligns with the anomalous materialism from Davidson, while Mario Bunge argues 
for full materialism. Bunge argues that ‘an explanation by reasons is just a particular case of 
causal explanation’, ‘the internal causes of overt behaviour are mental events such as decisions 
motivated in turn by intentions (which are in turn processes in the frontal lobes of primates and 
perhaps of other higher vertebrates as well).’205 Either version of materialism faces at least two 
problems. The first one is the existence of mutually inconsistent theories of unobservable 
entities and processes, which is a problem already discussed in chapter one with the case of the 
eather and field theories of electromagnetism. In neuroscience too there are mutually 
inconsistent theories competing for the explanation of unobservables such as the localization of 
brain functions versus theories of distributed brain functions, electrical versus chemical theories 
of synaptic transmission, and theories of nerve cell connections by cytoplasmic continuity 
versus connections by surface contacts.206 This is just the problem of underdetermination of theories 
for which the rules of minimal and maximal analogy were discussed also in chapter one.   
The second problem consists of the iteration of metaphor. As it was shown in chapter one, 
central terms in the vocabulary from microphysics rely on metaphors taken from macroscopic 
events such as ‘currents’, ‘force’, ‘field’, ‘repulsion’, ‘conductor’, ‘wave’,  and ‘strangeness’. This 
shows the large scope of metaphor importantly illustrated by Rom Harré.207 The ubiquity and 
constant iteration of metaphor in science under different semantic masks justifies and 
strengthens the use of mechanical and technological metaphors such as that of social 
mechanisms in analytical sociology. This makes the possibility of having a scientific semantics 
made up by literal terms and descriptions unlikely. For it will be shown that not only in 
analytical sociology but also in mechanism design theory and institutional design the scope, 
explanatory power and methodological fruitfulness of the machine metaphor remain strong.  
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2.5. Institutional design 
Institutional design is a branch within political science concerned with the design of institutions 
such as forms of government, electoral systems and constitutions. It relies on the machine 
metaphor and on comparative methods of research, and it emerged from New Institutionalism. 
The publication of the book Rediscovering Institutions in 1989 by the economist James March and 
the political scientist Johan Olsen marked the return to the study of institutions in political 
science, this new trend was described as New Institutionalism in contrast to the Old 
Institutionalism, which predominantly had normative and legal concerns.208 New 
Institutionalism came into political science as a reaction to the methodological individualism of 
behaviouralism in political science and rational choice theory. The focus of New 
Institutionalism on the study of actual institutions, and the constant need for reforming and 
creating new ones, led almost naturally to the use of this knowledge for the design of political 
reforms as well as new institutions.  
        The method used in institutional design consists of comparative studies of the positive and 
negative effects of different sets of rules, incentives and penalties from current and past 
institution.  The results of these comparative studies are used for assisting the choice over 
alternative institutional structures to be implemented in a new domain expecting the same or 
similar effects. The degree of resemblance between the known domain of operation and the 
new domain plays a crucial in the choice; it is assumed that by maximising similarity the 
likelihood of getting the desired effects are comparatively larger. Because this method only 
provides a choice from actual designs past or present, further work and information are still 
required in order to adapt the design to any new domain. Therefore, this method lies in the 
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128
middle of a science of design such a mechanism design theory, and a science of facts such as 
analytical sociology.   
        Within institutional design, electoral systems have received special attention because ‘they 
are the most manipulative instrument of politics’ producing one of the largest effects on the 
distribution of political representation and political power.209 Extensive empirical studies have 
been published on the transformation of Russia and Eastern European counties into 
representative democracies.210 Comparative studies on electoral engineering have also been 
extensively produced covering data from Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Estonia, Mexico, Denmark, 
Iceland, Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom and many other countries, which have been 
published by the political scientists such as Benjamin Reilly, Pippa Norris and Amel Ahmed.211 
New branches such as constitutional design have also emerged with an interest in supranational 
constitutions such as the constitution for the European Union.212    
        The political scientist Giovanni Sartori was one of the early initiators of this method of 
comparative design, which he applied to constitutions and party systems. He introduced the 
term ‘political engineering’ pointing out the effects it has shaping the behaviour of politicians 
and society, he argues that electoral engineering should be a main target because political parties 
are the political channels of mass societies, that is to say, the place where ‘the pace and the path 
of mass behaviour are set’ and power distributed by ‘the regulation and timing of 
enfranchisement, districting, and the translation of votes into seats.213  For instance, by 
comparing the majoritarian electoral system and proportional representation, he argues that the 
double ballot system is better because it is ‘highly flexible’ by allowing ‘for both majoritarian and 
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proportional arrangements’, it ‘is majoritarian where there are single-member constituencies, 
and proportional in multiple-member constituencies.’214  
        Sartori also compares presidential and parliamentary systems, holding a similar argument 
by suggesting a system with intermittent presidentialism, which can come into play when a  
parliamentary system is failing, so that by alternating one and the other, incentives are created 
for a better performance from each during his time in power. He argues that ‘presidentialism 
and parliamentarism are single-engine mechanisms’, and ‘far more often than not the 
presidential engine falters in its downward parliamentary crossings, while the parliamentary 
engine impairs, in its upward ascent, the governing function.’215 The machine metaphor 
description can be fully appreciated, where each form of government becomes a machine, an 
engine producing reliable outcomes each with different effects, and such effects are produced 
by shaping individual and collective behaviour with the right set of rules, incentives and 
penalties. This is consistent with Cartwright’s own metaphor of socioeconomic machines, which 
regularly and reliably produced certain outcomes.  
       Sartori further explains that by “putting the metaphor and an etymology together I come 
up with ‘constitutional engineering’”; constitutions, electoral systems and other political 
institutions “are like (somewhat like) ‘engines’, i.e. mechanisms that must ‘work’ and that must 
have an output of sorts”, they are ‘unlikely to work as intended unless they employ the engines 
of Bentham, i.e., punishments and rewards.’216 Jeremy Bentham wrote on the distribution and 
effects of punishments and rewards for the enforcement of laws, he argued that ‘the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number ought to be the object of every legislator: for accomplishing 
his purposes respecting this object, he possesses two instruments—Punishment and Reward [...] 
the springs of that mechanism developed, whence those laws arise to which the power is 
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attributed of executing themselves’217 The ‘engines of Bentham’ are a fundamental part of 
comparative institutional design and mechanism design theory; I argue that they are a 
mechanical metaphor of operant conditioning, which is a scientifically updated version of those 
engines.  
          The psychologist B. F. Skinner defines operant behaviour as the behaviour conditioned 
‘upon the posterior reinforcing stimulus.’218 It is brought about using a prompting device and a 
reward after the performance; both the device and the reward are designed and decided by the 
experimenter. Because ‘reward suggests compensation for behaving in a given way, often in 
some sort of contractual arrangement’, behaviourists use the term ‘reinforcer’ instead, which 
‘designates simply the strengthening of a response’.219  
        The experiments performed by Skinner with rats and pigeons were highly successful, not 
only shaping behaviour but also making important discoveries.220 He worked on the extension 
of his findings and method to human behaviour, particularly on social matters such as 
education, industrial relations and politics. With behaviourism, the social world ‘may be 
regarded as an extraordinarily complex set of positive and negative reinforcing contingencies’221, 
and the aim is to increase the control over those contingencies using operant conditioning. On a 
large scale, operant conditioning should ultimately lead to a comprehensive technology of 
behaviour to be applied to cultural design. Skinner argued that ‘a program of cultural design in 
the broadest sense is now within reach’222, an ‘industrialist may design a wage system that 
maximizes his profits, or works for the good of his employees […] A party in power may act 
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primarily to keep its power, or to reinforce those it governs (who in return keep it in power), or 
to promote the state, as by instituting a programme of austerity.’223 
        He further argued that ‘what we need is a technology of behaviour. We could solve our 
problems quickly enough if we could adjust the growth of the world's population as precisely as 
we adjust the course of a spaceship, or improve agriculture and industry with some of the 
confidence with which we accelerate high-energy particles, or move towards a peaceful 
world.’224 This is consistent with the way many policies and institutions are currently designed, 
implemented and built by many democratic governments from the left, right and centre in 
politics. Furthermore, the evolutionary role of operant conditioning described by Skinner is 
consistent with evolutionary game theory; they both shared common grounds with evolutionary 
theory.225   
        Ontologically and methodologically, operant conditioning has been criticised for neglecting 
the mind and individual agency by reducing human behaviour to a mere response prompted by 
a specific stimuli. This was put into contrast with cognitive psychology, which has gained a solid 
and well-justified consensus exposing the active role of the mind. Skinner replied to his critics 
explaining that ‘I should not want to try to prove that there are no innate rules of grammar or 
internal problem-solving strategies or inner record-keeping processes’;226 he rejected the 
existence of a human mind and accepted only the existence of the brain and the associated 
genetics, whose constitution and causal power generating human behaviour ‘eventually 
neurology will tell us all we need to know’.227  
          Rom Harré criticises Skinner because he ‘embraces more tightly than anyone the other 
two ideas that make up the basis of modern psychology, the mechanistic model of human 
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action, and the Humean conception of cause.’228 He argues that this mechanistic model neglects 
human agency by turning any person into an automaton, and he proposes instead a metaphysics 
of natures and powers as the source of human agency. In contrast, Jon Elster argues that 
individual psychological mechanisms can be explained by consequences and natural selection 
just like B. F. Skinner also argues.229 Elster explains that the consequences of recurrent 
behaviour ‘can enter into the causes that make its occurrence on a later occasion more likely. 
There are two main ways in which this can happen: by reinforcement and by selection.’230 He is 
concerned with how incentives and penalties shape behaviour causing the selection of some 
types of behaviour and the extinction of others.  
         Notwithstanding the continuing debate on the nature of the mind and the brain, and the 
scope of their causal powers and those from the environment, the causal power of stimuli 
supplied by the environment is widely accepted; human behaviour can largely be conditioned by 
the particular constitution of the environment and the consequences from past behaviour. The 
existing consensus on this claim constitutes the common ground the claim I make by holding 
that operant conditioning is a modern and scientific version of the engines of Bentham. In 
other words, it provides the grounds for the discussion on the use of incentives and penalties in 
design in the social sciences, whose precise scope may remain indeterminate but it certainly is 
not small or negligible.  
       Politically, the ideas of Skinner on cultural design and behavioural technology have been 
criticised as carrying potential support for full dirigisme and full social control. Nonetheless, 
Skinner explicitly constrained his views on social design to representative democracies with a 
welfare state and free markets,231which is consistent with the way institutions and policies are 
currently designed, engineered and implemented in countries of this type. Indeed, the basics of 
operant conditioning such as positive and negative reinforcement, as well as the strategic 
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distribution of them using time schedules and changes in quantity; are currently used with some 
modifications and with different names in institutional design and mechanism design theory.  
        This occurs because in representative democracies, individual voters give their 
representatives the power to decide for them using the scientific and legal means necessary to 
ensure the accomplishment of specific established objectives and goals. A similar analysis and 
conclusion apply to the relationships female and male workers hold with their trade union 
representatives, and the representatives from the proprietors of firms and landowners. The 
state, the firm and the farm are social machines, whose efficient functioning depends on the 
quality of the design, which commonly relies on the engines of Bentham, that is to say, on some 
form of operant conditioning. Such design is consistent with the piecemeal social engineering 
advocated by Karl Popper, and the blueprint-making and policy-making methods advanced by 
Nancy Cartwright.  
         In contrast, a right-libertarian design offers an alternative where dirigisme and control 
from the state is reduced, while it preserves economic inequality. A property-owing democratic 
design offers a substantive reduction in both economic inequality and dirigisme and control 
from the state. A left-libertarian design is more comprehensive for it offers a more substantive 
reduction in the control and dirigisme not only from the state but also from the firm and the 
farm, while it fosters economic equality.232 The expansion of freedom and equality rely on the 
knowledge of reliable methods of design detached from their ideological and historical biases.  
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2.6. Mechanism design theory 
Whereas in analytical sociology, mechanisms are studied as they are found already existing and 
operating in society, in mechanism design theory, they are designed and built. Mechanism 
design theory is a branch in game theory, which emerged from the debate over efficiency and 
problems of resource allocation between socialism and capitalism, that is, between centralised 
economic planning and decentralised free markets. One of its main founders, the economist 
Leonid Hurwicz explains that ‘we can think of an economic system as defined by a set of 
institutional or behavioural rules that enable us to distinguish, for example, capitalism from 
socialism, pure laissez-faire from mixed economy, or perhaps perfect competition from 
oligopoly […] The totality of these behaviour patterns (as distinguished from environment and 
state descriptions) may be called the economy mechanism.’233 This metaphor presents the whole 
economy as a grand mechanism, as a big social machine with different parts and small 
mechanisms assembled to produce a specific outcome.  
         Social machines vary in size and aims, an indefinitely large amount of mechanisms 
constitute a national economy, while firms and farms require a smaller number of mechanisms 
to function as machines. The need to solve economic and other social problems creates a 
constant demand from new designs including large designs such as new rules for international 
trade in the European Union or the NAFTA in North America, and medium and small designs 
such as the NHS internal markets in the United Kingdom, the new multi-round ascending 
auction designed for allocation of licences to telecommunication firms in The USA and Europe, 
and the repudiation-proof contract devised by Oliver Hart and John Moore.  
         The design of mechanisms for the allocation of resources within any given society to 
those who can make the best use of them has been one of the main challenges in economics. 
Private competition in the market and central planning are two well-known mechanisms for 
resource allocation. Hurwicz observed that private market competition as devised and used in 
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all major economic theories actually creates incentives for cheating on preferences and prices, 
which severely undermines the possibility of reaching an efficient allocation with equilibrium 
closest to the optimal. The further equilibrium is from the optimal, the grater social losses are.  
He explains that this problem is due to ‘a fundamental conflict among such mechanism 
attributes, [namely] the optimality of equilibria, incentive-compatibility of the rules, and the 
requirements of informational decentralization.’234 In other words, parts of the design are 
inconsistent with the incentives it creates.  
          This was an important discovery in economic design, which is called the ‘incentive-
compatibility problem’. It gave rise to a design principle now widely followed in economics, 
Hurwicz explains that the ‘concept of incentive-compatibility merely required that no one 
should find it profitable to “cheat”, where cheating is defined as behaviour that can be made to 
look “legal”.’235 The problem is not exclusive of free markets but it also extends to central 
planning.  
   Targets and norms are set in all economies. In capitalism and socialism, ‘there is a 
“superior” and a “subordinate”, and the latter has an incentive to depress the norms when the 
penalty for failure to reach a target is severe.’236 This situation applies to any two individuals 
involved in a market transaction or in the allocation of public goods, ‘participants would 
“cheat” without openly violating the rules. A participant could try to “cheat” by doing what the 
rules would have required him to do had his characteristics been different from what they are, 
i.e., he could “pretend” to be poorer than he is, or less efficient, or less eager for certain goods. 
(It is important to understand that he would not be doing this directly by uttering false 
statements, but indirectly by behaving inappropriately according to the rules for his true 
characteristics.)’237 After identifying the problem, Hurwicz briefly explores some of the possible 
solutions such as the creation of teams, which eliminates competition and creates incentives for 
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truthful revelation of preferences; or an increase in the share of the total output given to the 
workers, who then would have an incentive for work, maximising the utility of the firm or the 
farm.  
Decentralisation, revelation of true preferences and information efficiency are some of 
the main areas of interest in mechanism design theory.  For instance, important mechanisms for 
the revelation of true preferences have been designed, which can be applied to important 
problems such as the demand for public goods. This is the case of the sealed-bid auction 
designed by the economist William Vickrey.  
One of the causes of market failure is imperfect competition, which can lead to 
undersupply and oversupply of commodities in the market. Imperfect competition may occur 
when buyers or sellers are too few in number to ignore the effects of their actions on the 
market price. It can also happen when buyers or sellers are too many, too naive or too isolated 
from each other to engage in any overtly or tacitly concerted action. Vickrey considers how a 
government agency called ‘marketing agency’ could intervene in the market, so that competitive 
equilibrium prices are attained. One of the possible solutions he contemplates is a monopolistic 
marketing agency to which all sales of the commodity must be made, and from which all 
supplies must be bought.  
In principle, this could allow the agency to determine the competitive equilibrium price, 
however, Vickrey observes that the agency would need information coming from ‘reports and 
actions of buyers and sellers, who would have an incentive to understate prospective demands 
and supplies, or to curtail their actual sales and purchases in the hope of inducing the marketing 
agency to change the price in their favour.’238 Besides being expensive, this solution could lead 
to large inefficient outcomes because the revelation of true preferences is clearly compromised. 
Note that this situation is the same for any state institution holding a monopoly, such as the 
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NHS in The United Kingdom before the implementation of the internal markets as it was 
discussed above in section 2.3.   
Another solution considered by Vickrey is a Dutch auction, performed by the marketing 
agency, where the auctioneer announces prices in descending sequence; in this case the auction 
ends with the first and only bid. In spite of being fast and therefore inexpensive, this auction 
creates prices with uncertain values with respect to an efficient equilibrium, which are likely to 
lead to an inefficient allocation. This occurs because as soon as the price comes down to the full 
value of the commodity given by the most eager bidder, the price paid implies a zero gain for 
him, that is to say, ‘as the announced price is progressively lowered, the possibility of a gain 
emerges, but as the gain thus sought increases with the lowering of the point at which a bid is to 
be made, the probability of securing this gain diminishes.’239  
The final design suggested by Vickrey consisted of a multiple auction by sealed bids, 
where multiple identical commodities are put on sale and each bidder submits a bid in a sealed 
envelope.  In sealed bids the usual practice is to accept a certain number of bids starting from 
those offering the highest price, where the effective price is that one established in each 
individual bid. An alternative method pointed out by Vickey consists of setting the effective 
price at the level of the last bid accepted, which allows all successful bidders to benefit from a 
uniform price. This prevents discrimination in the final price available to all bidders. Vickrey 
introduces a final variation of this method by making the uniform price to be charged to the 
successful bidders equal to the first bid rejected rather than the last bid accepted, he explains 
that ‘only in this way is it possible to insure that each bidder will be motivated to put in a bid at 
the full value of the article to himself, thus assuring an optimum allocation of resources […] 
avoiding any incentive for wasteful individual expenditure on general market research.’240 
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240 Ibid., p. 26.  
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Comparatively, the design with a multiple auction by sealed bids offers the most efficient 
method for attaining competitive equilibrium prices of commodities put on sale by a 
government agency. The analysis and design produced by Vickrey was highly praised by other 
economists such as Edward H. Clarke and Theodore Groves,241who added some refinements by 
introducing a two-part tariff. Roger Myerson and Eric Maskin242 also developed further auction 
mechanisms, general bargaining problems and bilateral trade; and they have also expanded 
design to problems of environmental economics. In 1990s the design of the multiple auctions 
attained extraordinary success with the design of the new simultaneous ascending auction used 
for the allocation of exploitation rights of the wave space in The USA, and in Europe a few 
years later, raising staggeringly large revenues for the government. The design of this auction is 
discussed in chapter three.  
Methodologically, the same virtues and shortcomings found in the repudiation-proof 
contract designed by Oliver Hart and John Moore discussed above in section 2.1. also apply to 
the multiple auction by sealed bids designed by Vikrey, and in general to all designs from 
mechanism design theory. Vickrey’s design tells us (i) the parts of the machine and the 
capacities of those parts, namely the bidders with specific psychological capacities such as self-
interest and greed and an impartial marketing agency with reliable knowledge on equilibrium 
competitive prices. It also tells us (ii) how the parts are to be assembled by establishing the basic 
rules for bidding, and the procedures to be followed by the marketing agency; (iii) the rules for 
calculating the outcome, that is, equilibrium competitive prices are calculated using equilibrium 
theory with relevant information on each bidder. In the design, (iv) some information is 
available on shielding, for instance, on how to prevent collusion among bidders, side payment 
and communication or signalling.   
                                            
241 E. H. Clarke (1971); and T. Groves (1973). 
242 R. Myerson (1981) and (1979); R. Myerson and M. Satterthwaite (1983); E. Maskin and J. J. Laffont 
(1979); and E. Maskin and S. Baliga (2003). 
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Finally, (v) no information is made available on how to get the multiple auction by sealed 
bids running. As it was pointed out earlier, such information and knowledge is provided by 
experimental economists; who have developed the skills of social engineers. The knowledge of 
design from mechanism design theorists necessarily requires the knowledge of engineering 
experimental economists have. Together both kinds of knowledge constitute the technological 
knowledge available from the science of economics. Decisions on feasible and unfeasible social 
machines are necessarily subject to the advancement of social technological knowledge.   
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Chapter 3 
The FCC Auction Machine  
 
5.0. Introduction  
The FCC auction was a new kind of auction used for the allocation of licences for the use and 
exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in The United States. This auction set a 
methodological standard of design and engineering in economics; its design adopted some 
properties from the traditional English and Dutch auctions and also add new innovative 
properties, such as multiple rounds where bidders can return unwanted items. Unlike the 
English and the Dutch auctions, the FCC auction was designed and built by social scientists. 
The large revenue it raised was hailed as a proof of success of mechanism design theory. This 
success led some European governments to hire mechanism designers for the design and 
implementation of similar auctions for the allocation of licences on the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  
The success was not only due to the knowledge available from mechanism design theory 
but also from the practical knowledge experimental economists have, they performed the 
experiments testing the rules and mechanisms, which produced data crucial for the design and 
the implementation of the new auction. In this chapter, I present a methodological account of 
the FCC auction design discussing two main components of it, namely the blueprint produced 
by mechanism designers and the experiments performed for producing the data missing in the 
blueprint. I also evaluate this blueprint using the types of design and principles discussed in 
chapter two, and minimal analogy and type-hierarchies from chapter one.  
I characterise the method used by experimental economists as the experimental parameter 
variation, which I take from aeronautical engineering. The introduction of the method of 
experimental parameter variation allows philosophers to pay attention to practical knowledge, 
or knowledge of practices, as opposed to propositional knowledge. Practical knowledge has 
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been largely ignored in epistemology and in the philosophy of science. Science is not only the 
knowledge of theories, laws and inferences; there is a vast array of practices, some of them 
highly successful and sophisticated. Engineering and experimental methods have been mostly 
developed in the natural sciences, where they have been growing in size and sophistication. In 
economics and other social sciences these methods have been developed only recently, and 
there seems to be an increasing demand for more experimental and engineering knowledge in 
these sciences.  
In section 5.1., I describe and discuss the FCC auction blueprint, which is a multiple-
round simultaneous ascending auction. This blueprint was produced by three mechanism design 
theorists, Paul Milgrom, Robert Wilson and Preston McAfee.  Using the types of design and 
principles discussed in chapter two, I characterise this blueprint as partly dirigiste and 
oligopolistic, and explain why on four of the five principles of design advanced by Nancy 
Cartwright, this blueprint falls below the standard by leaving some gaps in the design. Using the 
rules on minimal and maximal analogy and type-hierarchies discussed in chapter one, I argue 
that this blueprint is a case of minimal analogy, and therefore it is a progressive design within 
the type-hierarchy of auctions.  
In section 5.2., I introduce and describe the method of experimental parameter variation 
from aeronautical engineering. I rely on the work from Walter Vincenti, who illustrates this 
method using the experimental work the mechanical engineers William F. Durand and Everett 
P. Lesley did in the 1920s, when they tested a large number of new air propeller prototypes 
using a wind tunnel. The data obtained were crucial for the manufacturing of propellers ready to 
be assembled in a new model of aircrafts superior to those available at the time.   
In section 5.3., I show how the method of experimental parameter variation can be 
extended to experimental economics, and in particular to the experiments performed by Charles 
Plott and his team searching for data crucial for the successful implementation of the FCC 
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auction. The experimental work done by Plott and the data obtained filled the gap left in the 
blueprint submitted by Paul Milgrom, Robert Wilson and Preston McAfee.  
 
5.1. The FCC blueprint  
Multiple-round simultaneous auctions are a new kind of auction designed and implemented by 
the mechanism design theorists and experimental economists. The creation of this new kind of 
auction came as a product of a call made by the US Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) in 1993 for a new more efficient mechanism to be used for the allocation of licences to 
telecommunication firms for the use and exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum.  
A multiple-round simultaneous auction is a social machine consisting of three main 
mechanisms, namely a simultaneous market, ascending biding and multiple rounds. In a 
multiple-round simultaneous auction, several markets are open at the same time, so any bidder 
can place any number of bids in different markets.  The markets run in rounds and remain open 
until the bidders have accomplished the best purchase by selling back some items and buying 
new ones. These properties of the auction allow a highly efficient allocation of licences and the 
maximisation of revenue for the auctioneer, which in this case was a government institution. 
The design of this new auction relied on the pioneering work of William Vickrey discussed in 
chapter two, section 2.6. Vickrey designed an auction of multiple items with a sealed bid where 
the auctioneer is also a government agency just like the case of the FCC where multiples 
licences are auctioned. With this design, Vickrey was trying to solve the problem of imperfect 
competition in free markets, which can lead to undersupply and oversupply of commodities. An 
auction of multiple items with a sealed bid provides the blueprint of a social machine, whose 
mechanisms could attain competitive equilibrium prices of commodities.  
The design and successful implementation of the first multiple-round simultaneous was 
hailed as an outstanding achievement almost exclusively due to game theory, which clouded the 
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important and distinctive engineering work done by experimental economics. The philosopher 
Francesco Guala made a significant advancement showing the crucial contribution made by 
experimental economists; he presents the case mainly as a problem of logic, where inferences 
made in the laboratory have to be extended to the outside world.243  Unlike Guala, I present the 
case as a methodological problem concerned with design and blueprint-making methods.  In 
particular, I argue that the method of experimental parameter variation was used by 
experimental economists in order to produce data essential for the design and implementation 
of the FCC auction.  
As part of the decentralising trend of public assets and services in 1980s, the US 
Congress decided to look for a new and more efficient mechanism for the allocation of licences 
for the use and exploitation of the airwave space, which would lead to the provision of mobile 
communication with cellular telephones and radio systems, and the transmission of data with 
fax machines. Until 1982 these licences were allocated using an administrative hearing process 
known as the ‘beauty contest’, in which each applicant had to persuade the FCC of the benefits 
of adjudicating a licence to them. This allocation procedure was slow, opaque and highly 
bureaucratic. A first attempt at replacing the beauty contest was made by introducing a lottery 
where licences were randomly allocated to the applicants.  This new mechanism was fast, 
transparent and simpler; however it created strong inefficiencies by allocating licences to 
applicants who have no real interest in exploiting the licence. This created a secondary market 
where licences were sold and resold creating large profits for private individuals, and a loss in 
revenue for the government.   
The US Congress was aware of the disastrous experience in New Zealand and Australia 
in the early 1990s, where licences were allocated using first-price and second-price sealed-bid 
auctions. These auctions were chosen without asking for scientific advice; they produced large 
losses in the government’s revenue, and they also prompted strong criticism from the public 
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and rival political parties.244 The US government looked for scientific advice issuing in 1993 a 
‘Notice of Proposed Rule Making’, where the FCC advanced an initial design of an auction in 
two stages, expecting replies and comments mainly from economists and game theorists. In 
order to prevent an oligopolistic distribution and promote economic equality, the original policy 
set by the Congress considered a distribution of licences to minority-owned and women-owned 
companies, small businesses, and rural telephone companies. However, the final design 
excluded these groups by allocating the licences to those bidders holding the highest bids, which 
led to an oligopolistic distribution with an increase of inequality.  
 Game theorists model auctions as non-cooperative games played by self-interested 
utility-maximising bidders. This game assumes a solution under Nash equilibrium, namely that 
given everyone’s moves, no player can be better off than she currently is by shifting to a 
different strategy. There were two important problems mechanism design theorists faced in 
designing the new FCC auction. The first one was related to the complementary character of 
licences in contiguous regions of the spectrum. The second one was related to the existence of 
perfect substitutes in different portions of spectrum. Given these two properties, the value of 
any package of licences would vary according to number and combination of contiguous and 
non-contiguous portions of the spectrum. Moreover, a number of further conditions such as 
affordable technologies and operation costs had to be considered in the design. These further 
conditions added to the perfect substitution and complementary values produced an excessively 
large number of packages with almost each of them having a different value.  
Generally, auction models assume a common value of the items, that is to say, the value 
of the auctioned item is assumed to be the same for every bidder but unknown to all.  The 
design of auctions where items have different values for different bidders was in an early stage. 
The economic theory available at the time did not provide the means for estimating the 
different outcomes of an auction where the items have different values. Some insights pointed 
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to the highly problematic nature of items with complementary properties, whose unstable value 
produces different Nash equilibria with no clear indication as to which of them is optimal. 
Therefore, the design of the FCC auction represented an important challenge due to the lack of 
data on important aspects which no theory could provide. The situation is the same to that of 
the design of the new air propellers to be discussed in the next section, where data which the 
blade element theory could not supply were lacking.  
The FCC hired the economist John McMillan, who suggested an auction in two stages. 
In the first stage, the licences would be auctioned in packages using a sealed bid, and in the 
second stage only individual licences would be auctioned. This mechanism seemed to solve the 
complementarity problem since those bidders who value packages over individual licences 
would place high bids in order to get more than one licence. In the second stage, bidders with a 
preference for individual licences would equally place high bids. In both cases, an auction with 
two stages seemed to be efficient by allocating licences to bidders who could maximise their use 
and exploitation based on their willingness to pay more for them. This design was supported by 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), a public institution 
advising the government and the FCC, which had also suggested package-bidding after getting 
the advice from the economist John Ledyard, who had worked on the design of combinatorial 
auctions.245 Unlike the beauty contest and the lottery, this design was scientifically supported. 
Because this design was fully controlled by FCC and the NTIA, and because these two 
government agencies decide the combination of licences in each package, the design is dirigiste, 
that is to say, it contains some properties of central planning discussed in chapter two, section 
2.3.   
Some telecommunication firms were critical of package-bidding as it was not 
competitive enough because for it prevented some bidders from purchasing some licences, 
which created an unfair advantage for those who may be allocated with a large part of the 
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spectrum; they thought that an open bid could provide equal bidding opportunities to all. 
Telecommunication firms realised that a bad design could actually affect their own interests by 
creating unfair and inefficient allocation, and so they decided to hire their own scientific 
advisors. The economists Paul Milgrom, Robert Wilson and Charles Plott were hired by Pacific 
Bell; Jeremy Bulow and Barry Nalebuff by Bell Atlantic; Preston McAfee by Airtouch 
Communications, Robert Weber by Telephone and Data Systems; Mark Isaac by the Cellular 
Telecommunications Industry Association; Robert Harris and Michael Katz by Nynex, Daniel 
Vincent by American Personal Communications, Peter Cramton by MCI; and John Ledyard and 
David Porter by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration.246 
Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson put forward a new design which they called 
‘simultaneous ascending-bid auction’. Separately, Preston McAfee put forward a similar design. 
A simultaneous open auction constituted the answer to the concerns voiced by private firms on 
package-bidding with a sealed bid, and it also represented an improvement on the two stages 
considered in the FCC initial design.  
In a simultaneous open auction several markets are open at the same time and bidders 
can participate in all of them at once. This was a true innovation in auction design. Unlike a 
sealed bid, an open simultaneous auction allows each bidder to monitor the behaviour of other 
bidders. This valuable information enables her to assess her chances of buying the combination 
of items she prefers. During the auction, bidders can move freely from one combination to 
another by selling back to the market those items over which their preference has changed, until 
they accomplish a combination with the highest value. Another important advantage of this new 
design over a sealed bid is that it helps prevent the winner’s curse, that is to say, the possibility 
of overbidding. This can be prevented because bidders can monitor the pricing behaviour of 
others.  
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147
 Besides the open character of the new auction, simultaneous bidding on several markets 
all opened at the same time was also another important innovation. In the traditional English 
ascending auction, items are auctioned one by one starting with a low price, and bidders 
continue making offers until the market is closed, which usually occurs when no new offer is 
put forward. Therefore, the possibility of getting a combination of items is not directly made 
available. This could only occur if a second market is open where items are resold but not all 
items may be there, and prices would also increase because of the costs and time involved in 
opening a second market.  
In the traditional Dutch descending auction time is fixed and items are sold in packages 
starting with a high price, which prevents other bidders from purchasing individual items they 
have a strong preference for. Again, a secondary resale market could be open but the same 
problems of time and cost rising would appear. Therefore, a direct sale in one single market 
represents a more efficient design. Because in the Dutch auction prices start high and time is 
limited, demand may be prematurely terminated affecting prices and efficiency in the allocation 
of items. A simultaneous ascending auction prevents this situation by allowing more time 
holding a long round until no new bid is put forward. It also prevents a resale in expensive 
secondary market by providing different rounds, where bidders can sell back to the market any 
number of items as well as buy new ones until they are satisfied with a package. 
The final blueprint was prepared and submitted by Paul Milgrom, Robert Wilson and 
Preston McAfee. It contained the descriptions of the three new mechanisms, namely a 
simultaneous market, ascending biding and multiple rounds. This blueprint can be evaluated 
using the types of design discussed in chapter two, namely libertarian and dirigiste, and the five 
principles of design and engineering advanced by Nancy Cartwright. Also, a further evaluation 
can be made using the distinction between minimal and maximal analogy, and by constructing a 
type-hierarchy as it was done in chapter one with the magnetic force models from James 
Maxwell and William Thompson.  
 
 
148
Because the electromagnetic spectrum is controlled and fully regulated by the state 
through the FCC and the NTIA,247 and because these two agencies still controlled part of the 
design, this blueprint retained some aspects of central planning. The blueprint is oligopolistic 
because by allocating the licences to those holding the highest bids, it excludes minority-owned, 
women-owned companies, small businesses and rural telephone companies, so such a design 
fosters the domination of the market by a small number of firms.  
The contrast between the traditional English and Dutch auctions and the new FCC 
auction with multiple-rounds, simultaneous markets and ascending bidding provides a further 
case and illustration of the distinction between traditional and artefactual institutions discussed 
in chapter two, section 2.3. There, the contrast was made between the International Gold 
Standard and the International Monetary Fund. Like the Gold Standard and other cases of 
commodity money, the Dutch and the English auctions were also created without the help from 
scientists, that is, without using mechanism design theory and neoclassical economics. In 
contrast, the FCC auction is the product of scientific design, it is a social machine made up of 
three main mechanisms assembled to create a whole new machine. Friedrich Hayek argued 
against the creation of an international monetary institution endowed with the power to dictate 
national economic policies and produce fiat money, as it had been suggested in the blueprint 
put forward by John Maynard Keynes. This was only a case of a general argument Hayek made 
against design and engineering––which he described as ‘constructivist’—and against dirigisme, 
that is, against central planning and control.  
The first design of the auction in two stages where the FCC and the NTIA decided on 
the combination of licences in each package was a case of dirigisme with central planning. Such 
dirigisme was prevented by the action from telecommunications firms who hired scientists to 
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produce designs where their own interest were fostered and protected. Therefore, the final 
blueprint became partly libertarian by giving those firms the power to decide how to form their 
own licence packages. A full right-libertarian blueprint would have considered giving private 
firms the control and ownership of the electromagnetic spectrum instead of just giving them a 
licence. This would have led to the extinction of the FCC and the NTIA or the reduction of 
them to agencies supervising the quality standards of the telecommunication services. In 
contrast, a blueprint which includes licences for minority-owned, women-owned companies, 
small businesses, and rural telephone companies as it was originally planned would have been at 
least partly egalitarian, although still dirigiste.  
A sharper contrast can be made with the blueprints from left-libertarianism and a 
property-owing democracy, where direct widespread ownership of the electromagnetic 
spectrum among the unemployed, low-income families and other worst-off groups could be 
considered. In this case, without having to wait for the distribution of the revenue raised by the 
FCC auction and taxes through welfare institutions under the blueprint submitted by Milgrom, 
Wilson and McAfee. Additionally, the size of the welfare state would be reduced and also the 
power and size of central government, which in this case is represented by the FCC and the 
NTIA. The contrast with left-libertarianism and a property-owing democracy can only be 
generic because blueprints from these positions are virtually inexistent.248 Mechanism design 
theory and experimental economics are dominated by neoclassical economics and welfare 
economics. This is why in chapter two, I argue for a methodology of design and engineering in 
the social sciences, which can be detached from their current ideological and historical biases, 
and can therefore be made available to other positions; particularly those where design and 
engineering are poor or inexistent.  
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A second evaluation can be made by using the rules on minimal and maximal analogy 
and type-hierarchies discussed in chapter one, sections 1.6. and 1.7. The magnetic force models 
from James Maxwell and William were presented as examples of maximal and minimal 
analogies. The model from Thompson was more progressive because by describing the 
magnetic force as a field it minimised the analogy with the mechanical Newtonian paradigm, 
while the model from Maxwell maximised such an analogy. This analogy was further 
appreciated by building a type-hierarchy. In a similar way, minimal and maximal analogies can 
be applied to blueprints also building a type-hierarchy.   
Eileen Way defines a type as ‘a set of individuals each of which has certain properties 
which are numerically identical with those in other sets of higher type’. Because types have a 
nominal status, the relationship they hold with their tokens cannot be that of ‘qualitative 
identity’, which only holds ‘between the relevant concrete properties of each particular’249; 
numerical identity does the job of establishing the relationship needed between tokens and the 
types. For instance, a ‘gold coin’ is a token whose properties are numerically related to those 
contained in the ‘commodity money’, which is a nominal representation. Types are ordered 
according to their level of generality forming a pyramid or a three-like classification. Because 
commodity money is a traditional kind of money distinct from fiat money, is it necessary to 
distinguish between traditional social kinds and artefactual social kinds. Traditional kinds rely on 
custom and knowledge accumulated across different generations without the intervention of 
science, while artefactual kinds are a product of science, design and engineering. The same 
distinction can be applied in the natural sciences, for instance in chemistry where natural and 
synthetic elements are distinguished, or in synthetic biology where a distinction is made between 
natural and synthetic DNA.  
In chapter one, type-hierarchies were graphically presented using a tree-like shape 
placing at the top  the type with the largest extension, which is called a supertype. The same 
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graphic presentation can be made for the multiple-round simultaneous auction placing 
‘institution’ as the supertype, and also by distinguishing traditional from artefactual auctions:250  
 
 Figure 3.1. A partial type-hierarchy of multiple-round simultaneous auction: 
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Although, there is no paradigm shift in the design of the multiple-round simultaneous auction, 
significant progress was made in the design of artefactual auctions, which started with the work 
of William Vickrey, who designed the second-price sealed-bid auction. The multiple-round 
simultaneous auction is an artefactual auction which combines aspects of the English and the 
Dutch auctions, namely ascending bidding and the combination of items in packages, adding to 
them multiple rounds, the return of any unwanted licences, and bid increments decided by the 
auctioneer. The similarities with the English and the Dutch auction constitute the positive 
analogy, and multiple rounds, the return of unwanted licences and bid increments constitute the 
negative analogy. Because the size of the negative analogy is larger, the blueprint is a case of 
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minimal analogy, and therefore it is a progressive design within the type-hierarchy. Design by 
analogy does not exist as part of the methods in mechanism design theory, it is a topic to be 
developed both in philosophy and the social sciences.    
A third evaluation of the Milgrom-Wilson-McAfee blueprint can be made using the five 
principles for blueprint making from Nancy Cartwright discussed in chapter two, section 2.2., 
namely (i) The parts that make up the machine, their properties and the separate capacities, (ii) 
How the parts are to be assembled, (iii) The rules for calculating the outcome from the joint 
operation of the assembled parts, (iv) What counts as shielding, and (v) How the machine is set 
to run   
Cartwright used the blueprint of a repudiation-proof contract from Oliver Hart and 
John Moore to illustrate how these principles work and how their demands should be met. With 
the help of equilibrium theory and the rules for renegotiation designed by Hart and Moore an 
optimal equilibrium can be accomplished by decisions made by the players, which solves the 
inefficiency created when the contract is repudiated.  Hart and Moore’s blueprint only meets the 
requirements from the first three principles because it describes the parts of the machine, 
namely two individual players the investor and the entrepreneur both displaying specific 
psychological capacities: self-interest, greed, perfect and costless calculation, and full rationality. 
Other parts are structural or external to both players such as the same discount rates, certainty 
in all operations, rules for renegotiation, and the existence of a frictionless second-hand market 
for the physical assets of the project. The structural parts and the players are assembled in a 
single game with two stages, one with an initial negotiation and agreement on a certain 
distribution of the surplus, and a second one when repudiation of the contract occurs and the 
surplus is now divided in equal parts.  However, the blueprint does not provide information on 
how to shield the new contract and how to implement it.  
The evaluation of the multiple-round simultaneous auction blueprint is less positive. The 
parts of the machine were known, namely self-interested telecommunications firms with high 
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purchasing power and the FCC as a greedy government agency wanting to maximise the 
revenue. The structural parts were also known, which consisted of rules defining the three main 
mechanisms, namely a simultaneous market, ascending biding and multiple rounds. Although, 
Milgrom, Wilson, McAfee and others were confident that the auction would work, there was no 
knowledge on how to put all the different parts together and how to set the whole auction 
running; and there were no means either for getting a reliable calculation on the outcome. There 
were concerns about collusion among the bidders and attempts from them to outwit the rules, 
however no precise shielding against these possibilities was part of the blueprint. McAfee and 
Milgrom actually explain that ‘the spectrum sale is more complicated than anything in auction 
theory. No theorem exists–or can be expected to develop–that specifies the optimal auction 
form.’251  
Two of the main problems were complementarity and perfect substitution of the 
licences, and a solution using Nash equilibrium was not feasible. For instance, because licences 
packages would be formed, the existence of complementary values means ‘that market-clearing 
prices may not exist. Equilibrium is likely to exist if the buyers have similar views about how the 
goods should be aggregated, whereas it may not if they disagree about what constitutes good 
aggregations.’252 The solution to this and other problems was provided by the experimental 
economist Charles Plott and his team, who devised the experiments which produced the data 
needed using the method of experimental parameter variation. Milgrom himself recognises this 
when he writes that ‘much of what is known about multi-unit auctions with interdependencies 
comes from experiments.’253  
In the next section, I introduce the method of experimental parameter variation, which 
is taken from aeronautical engineering.  
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5.2. Experimental parameter variation  
The engineer Walter G. Vincenti has produced a methodological account of aeronautical 
engineering, where he surveys different historical episodes of engineering research and design to 
illustrate a number of methodological practices. One of the most suggestive methodological 
practices he identifies in this survey is Experimental Parameter Variation (EPV), which he 
defines as: ‘the procedure of repeatedly determining the performance of some material, process, 
or device while systematically varying the parameters that define the object of interest or its 
conditions of operation.’254 He explains that this method is distinctive of engineering in contrast 
to scientific theories:  
 
Experimental parameter variation is used in engineering (and only in engineering) to 
produce the data needed to bypass the absence of a useful quantitative theory, that is, to get on 
with the engineering job when no accurate or convenient theoretical knowledge is 
available. This is perhaps the most important statement about the role of parameter 
variation in engineering.255 
 
Vincenti illustrates this method by discussing the work from the mechanical engineers William 
F. Durand and Everett P. Lesley, who performed extensive experimental research between 1916 
and 1926 with the purpose of designing and producing new fixed-pitch air propellers superior 
to those available in Europe. Prior to the development of variable-pitch propellers in the 1930s, 
only fixed-pitch propellers were used in aircrafts. Since the shape of a fixed-pitch propeller 
could not be changed during different flight conditions, they were optimised for cruise, climb or 
take-off depending on which one was most critical for the airplane mission. Choices were also 
made selecting a propeller which could attain a compromise general performance, where no 
aspect was optimised.  
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In the United States no significant research had been done since the pioneering 
achievements of the Wright brothers in the first decade of the twentieth century. Although, 
some information on air propellers was available at the time, no systematic data existed which 
could support a new design. Only a few results were available from the experimental work done 
by Gustave Eiffel, a French engineer who had developed a new type of wind tunnel for 
experimenting with three families of different propellers, with each family containing four types 
of propellers. Experimental engineering research work on air propellers began in England, 
France and Germany around 1910. By 1913 in England comparisons were made between 
previous theoretical work and experimental data showing that theory was only useful for the 
general qualitative aspects of design. Accordingly, the quantitative part would have to be 
developed from data to be obtained in the laboratory.   
In contrast, the amount of systematic data on marine propellers was significantly larger. 
By 1905 William Durand had produced experimental results on forty-nine different prototypes 
using the method of experimental parameter variation. By 1908 in England, Robert Froude had 
reported results on thirty-six marine propellers. In the United Stated this was followed by a 
hundred-and-twenty more results reported by David Taylor in 1910. Because of the availability 
of data on marine propellers, Durand and Lesley relied on them for their research on air 
propellers.  
In addition to the existing experimental data on marine propellers, the blade element 
theory from Stefan Drzewiecki was also available. This theory divides the blade of a propeller 
into a large number elements at different radii, and each element is modelled as a small aerofoil 
moving in a straight line with a velocity determined by three components, namely the forward 
speed of the propeller, the tangential speed of the rotating element, and a secondary speed of 
flow induced by the aerodynamic action of the propeller itself. Then, the forces of each element 
at its appropriate velocity are estimated from experimental aerofoil data. Finally, the 
performance of the propeller is determined by summing all those forces.  
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One of the main problems Durand and Lesley faced was the calculation of the 
secondary flow induced by the action of the propeller. They used the blade element theory 
neglecting this secondary force and other complicating effects. By doing this they were able to 
calculate the performance of eighty two-blade air propellers by varying the parameters in a 
theoretical fashion. They compared these results to those obtained through experimentation 
finding that the general trend was same, while the quantitative values were substantially different 
and erratic.256 This discrepancy between theory and experiment is very important because it 
shows the limits of theoretical knowledge for purposes of design. Theoretical knowledge is 
frequently insufficient for design; no reliable and efficient design can exclusively rely on it.  The 
theoretical calculus of trends in the performance of air propellers made by Durand and Lesley is 
analogous to calculus of behavioural tendencies made by experimental economists, who also 
produced experimental data for design which a theory cannot provide. This is shown in the next 
section with the design of the multiple-round simultaneous auction.  
Durand and Lesley produce new data by testing different prototypes of propellers made 
of different materials and with different shapes by systematically varying the parameters within 
the range of practical concern, defined mainly by a set of foreseeable flight requirements and 
conditions. They define the performance of a fixed-pitch air propeller as the function of two 
different sets of parameters, namely the conditions of operation and the geometrical properties 
of the propeller. The former includes the forward speed V and the revolutions per unit time n; 
the latter includes the diameter D and a number of ratios r1, r2, … etc. which contain 
information on the geometrical shape. The propeller performance P is determined by the 
following equation: P = F(V, n, D, r1 , r2 , …). The description in the equation is approximate 
because it leaves out complicated secondary effects from viscosity, compressibility of the air and 
the elastic bending of the propeller. Given the aim of the design, these effects can be neglected. 
Once the value range of concern has been fixed and the list of particular values has been 
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established, ‘parameter variation for the propeller consists of systematically varying the values of 
the parameters within the parentheses and measuring the resulting variation of propeller 
performance.’257 
Because of the crucial role of the geometrical shape of the propeller, the ratios became 
the relevant parameters to be tested. After some preliminary tests, Durand and Lesley selected a 
diameter of three feet for all the small-scale prototypes and they established five parameters of 
relevance defined by ratios r1 to r5. The most important parameter was the mean pitch ratio, 
which is a measure of the angular orientation at some standard representative radius relative to 
the plane of propeller rotation of the blade section. This parameter is particularly important 
because the larger the mean pitch ratio, the higher is the angular orientation of all blade 
sections. The other four parameters contained information on the distribution of the pitch ratio 
along the blade and the type of blade section. They chose three equally spaced values of mean 
pitch ratio and two values of each of the other four parameters. Using all possible combinations 
of values, Durand and Lesley obtained forty-eight different propeller models, which were 
distributed in a representative way over the field of design. Using a wind tunnel, each model was 
tested using a prototype through a series of values of rotational speed n at distinct values of 
forward speed V to determine its performance P. Those with the highest value were selected.  
This was the initial and fundamental stage of the research, where the method of 
experimental parameter variation was crucial for obtaining data needed in further stages until 
the completion of the full design, construction and final test of the new propellers. The research 
continued until Durand and Lesley built and tested a full-scale prototype. Vincenti explains how 
they used laws of similitude and dimensional analysis to proceed from the data obtained on the 
forty-eight small-scale prototypes to the construction and testing of small-scale models and full-
scale prototypes.258 Once the full-scale prototypes successfully passed all necessary tests, the 
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engineering research phase was followed by the manufacturing of propellers ready to be 
assembled into the aircrafts. Propellers only work in combination with the right engine and 
airframe, so new airplanes were designed with engines and airframes adequate to the selected 
propeller. In this way, the vast amount data provided by Durand and Lesley using experimental 
parameter variation became crucial for the design of new superior aircrafts, which had been the 
ultimate aim of the research.  
Their work set a new standard in engineering research and design. Their case 
demonstrates the essential role experimental parameter variation plays in engineering research 
and the limits of theoretical knowledge, in this case the blade element theory. Within a short 
period experimental parameter variation spread and became an established method that 
encompassed the early work from William Durand in the United States, Robert E. Froude in 
Britain, and Karl Schaffran in Germany.259  
In the next section, I show how the method of experimental parameter can be extended 
to design and engineering in economics.  
 
5.3. The engineering of  the FCC auction  
The philosopher Francesco Guala characterises the FCC auction as a case of economic 
engineering. He is mainly concerned with the problem of external validity. In particular, he is 
concerned with the kind of inferences which extend internally valid propositional knowledge 
produced in the laboratory into the outside world. The problem is philosophically relevant 
because those true and reliable inferences made predicting and explaining behaviour in the 
laboratory are not obviously true and reliable when new markets and state institutions are to be 
built. He argues that the combination of inferences by analogy, eliminative inferences and the 
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reproduction of real world conditions in the laboratory explain the success of the FCC 
auction.260  
While the propositional knowledge engineers have is certainly essential, the practical 
knowledge they have for the construction of social machines seems to be more distinctive of 
engineering. Such a practical knowledge from engineering actually starts in the laboratory, where 
new mechanisms are tested. I argue that experimental parameter variation is an example of this 
practical knowledge. Guala himself is aware of the existing gap in the philosophical research on 
this kind of knowledge, which actually explains how while new markets and state institutions are 
built. He acknowledges this in the replies he gives to Anna Alexandrova and Frank Hindriks.  
Alexandrova and Hindriks are both critical of the explanation Guala provides on the role 
experiments have in producing knowledge which lies outside theories and blueprints. They 
actually do not use the term ‘blueprints’, they use the term ‘models’ instead. Alexandrova is 
mainly concerned with the limitations blueprints have on the behaviour and other relevant 
conditions to be found in the outside world; when a new kind of auction is implemented; she 
explains that when  ‘economic models and experiments are used for engineering institutions 
such as spectrum auctions  […] sometimes it is simply not known whether or not some 
assumption essential for deriving a particular effect in the model can be satisfied by the target 
system economists are constructing.’261 Hindriks makes a general criticism to theoretical 
economists who are sceptical or neglect the contributions experimental economists could make 
creating new knowledge, and he criticises Guala for not making wider and stronger case in 
favour of experimental economics beyond inference and external validity. He explains that 
‘except for a few scattered remarks, however, Guala does not directly address the scepticism 
that economists display about experiments.’262  
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In his reply, Guala highlights the good job experimental economists do testing the 
hypotheses contained in the blueprints, while at the same time recognises that ‘the story is very 
different for experiments that are closer to application (‘testbed’ experiments). Here 
Alexandrova is right –no standards account of modelling does a good job at explaining what is 
going on.’263 In his reply to Hindriks he explains that ‘as he correctly points out, MEE [Guala’s 
book Methodology of Experimental Economics] is quite bold in making prescriptive claims about 
experimental inference but relatively modest the role of experimentation in economics as a 
whole.’264  
My argument on experimental parameter variation as a method of experimental 
economics answers the concerns expressed by Alexandrova and Hindriks. The use of 
experimental parameter variation shows the distinctive contribution experimental economists 
make to the design and engineering in economics. Moreover, the scope of experimental 
parameter variation could be extended to experiments performed in other social sciences.  
The blueprint submitted by Milgrom, Wilson and McAfee represented a good solution 
to important problems such as complementary values, perfect substitution and preference 
maximisation on package-bidding. Nonetheless, its implementation represented a great 
challenge, the joint functioning of the three main mechanisms looked too complicated.  
Mechanism design theorists were no able to create a reliable expectation on how it all would 
work. Besides the right functioning, there were also concerns on how to prevent collusion and 
cheating. Unlike the other kinds of auction such as the Dutch and English auctions, multiple-
round simultaneous auctions had never been tried before.  
Rules constitute a fundamental part of mechanisms, and it the case of the FCC auction 
blueprint ‘the most important – and debated – rules concerned increments, withdrawals, 
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eligibility, waivers and activity.’265  The auction would not be continuous but split into rounds 
with no pre-fixed number of total rounds, that is, the rounds would continue until no offer is 
put forward, and the winner is satisfied with the licences she has purchased. To ensure a 
maximal satisfaction of preferences, withdrawals were an important part of the rules. It was also 
important to prevent unnecessary delays speeding up the action without prematurely 
terminating demand, so rules on bid increments and an eligibility based on a deposit were 
considered in the blueprint.  
As part of the activity rules the eligibility of bidders was important because some of 
them may want to slow down the bidding process by following a ‘wait and see’ strategy. Such a 
delay could cause significant inefficiencies, and it would also increase the costs of the auction. 
Therefore, the eligibility of any bidder would be subject to an initial deposit called ‘initial 
eligibility’, which would also set a limit to the number of markets the bidder could participate in. 
This rule of eligibility also prescribed the regular use of such a deposit by spending parts of it in 
each bid. A refusal to do this would affect the eligibility of the bidder by reducing the number 
of bids she could make in the next round. Neither game theory nor auction theory provide 
information on how long an auction with multiple rounds could last, so with the eligibility rule, 
the auctioneer would be able to speed up the auction by enforcing an early commitment from 
all bidders. This rule would also help identify bidders who lacked any real interest in acquiring 
the licences, which was a problem auctions in New Zealand and Australia faced where 
uninterested bidders caused significant delays. 
Three key data were missing on these rules, which no theory or previous knowledge on 
mechanisms could provide information on, namely: 
1) Optimal bid increment. 
2) Estimate of the total number of rounds. 
3) Length cycles produced when licences are sold back   
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          Without reliable data on these three aspects, the efficiency and smooth running of the 
auction would be compromise, and its full implementation could actually fail. The FCC hired 
the economist Charles Plott and asked him to perform experiments on these and other aspects 
of the auction. Guala provides a rich description of the experiments performed by Plott, 
however he does not draw a systematic methodological lesson from it. This is also pointed out 
by Alexandrova.266 Charles Plott also provides a detailed description of the experiments he and 
his team in Caltech performed calling them ‘testbeds’, which he defines as ‘a simple working 
prototype of a process that is going to be employed in a complex environment. The creation of 
the prototype and the study of its operation provide a joining of theory, observation, and the 
practical aspects of implementation.’267  
The idea of a ‘working prototype’ is insightful and it actually corresponds to the term 
used in engineering, however the definition on the whole is poor and uninformative for any 
scientist who would like to have a clear and simplified understanding of the crux of the method. 
There is no abstraction made from the descriptive details, which would enable any scientist to 
see in a simplified manner the nature and systemic side of those practices. This is why I argue 
that by extending the method experimental parameter variation to the design of the FCC 
auction, we draw and extend methodological lessons which otherwise would remain lost in the 
rich description provided. Let us recall that experimental parameter variation consists of 
determining via experimentation the optimal performance of materials, processes or devices by 
varying the parameters of their operation. 
  The most comprehensive report of the experimental practices performed in 
preparation for the implementation of the FCC auction is provided by Plott. However, parts of 
the report are insufficient for producing a richer and more detailed methodological description. 
Another problem is the small number of experiments he performed. Unlike Durand and Lesley, 
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who carried out comprehensive tests of propellers with a great range of variation, Plott and his 
team only conducted a small number of experiments due to the deadline and time and budget 
constraints set by the FCC. He explains that ‘pressures of time and money substantially limited 
the amounts of experimental data that could be collected’, therefore ‘the strategy was to select 
certain key aspects of the parameter/theory space and collect such data as one could.’268 Only 
two parameters were subject to variation, namely the total number of licences and the number 
of those with complementary values. In one case, seven licences were auctioned with two 
collections of three licences each having complimentary values; in the second case nine licences 
were auctioned with all of them having complimentary values. The experiments had two aims. 
The first one was to compare the efficiency of the multiple-round simultaneous auction 
allocating licences to bidders who value them most against a Japanese auction. The second one 
was to provide information on optimal and estimate values of the activity rules from the 
multiple-round simultaneous auction. 
(1) Optimal bid increment. As an auctioneer, the FCC had an interest in identifying the 
winners rapidly, so that the auction could finish as soon as possible without negatively affecting 
the demand. For this purpose, the blueprint considered a bid increment every round. The 
auctioneer would do this by identifying the highest standing bid at the end of each round 
introducing an increment for the minimal bid in the next round. On the one hand, an excessive 
increment could deter potential bidders, causing demand-killing and the reduction of eligibility. 
On the other hand, a too small of an increment would not speed up the auction enough. 
Therefore, the discovery of the optimal increment became an important problem of design.  
During the variation of increments performed the laboratory, Plott and his team 
observed that large increments above the highest standing bid effectively eliminated bidders too 
quickly placing at risk the inefficient allocation of licences. Without specifying the number and 
values of the variations, Plott explains that ‘experiments had also produced evidence of the 
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capacity of large increments to be demand-killing: A bidder failing to bid because of a large 
increment could lose eligibility.’269 The FCC reports that an increment of ten to twenty percent 
above the highest standing bid was found to be the optimal range.270 This was enough to speed 
up the auction but not too big to cause demand-killing and inefficiency.   
(2) Estimate of the total number of rounds. The second data to be obtained was an estimate on 
the total number of rounds. The FCC was concerned about the operation costs if the auction 
extended for a long time. Plott considered different aspects of the behaviour from the bidders 
and the auctioneer, which could compromise the efficiency of the auction. On the one hand, 
there was the strategic interest bidders may have in slowing down the auction. On the other, too 
much pressure on the bidders could also lead to overbidding. A further concern emerged from 
the allowance the blueprint made for the bidders to have time off for revising their strategies 
and budgets; the rule prescribed a stop after a number of rounds starting again the next day. 
This rule also helps prevent the winner’s curse saving the FCC from expensive mistakes by 
preventing a legal case in court. Milgrom explained the case noting that ‘sales of major 
companies take a long time. There are billions of dollars at stake here, and there is no reason to 
rush it when we are talking about permanently affecting the structure of a new industry.’271 
Therefore, getting an estimate of the total number of rounds and intervals became crucial data 
of design with important political, economic and legal implications.  
Hence, time between rounds would allow bidders to put forward more sensible bids, and 
it would also help prevent overbidding. At the same time, it was also important to reduce the 
number of rounds and intervals as much as possible to save on operation costs. In the 
experiments performed, Plott observed that the total time of the auction was mainly dependent 
on the number of rounds, rather on the intervals between them. He explains that ‘many of the 
early experiments that were allowed to terminate naturally involved continuous-time processes 
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without stages. Examination of these data suggested that the FCC auction could go through as 
many as a hundred rounds. The more rapid the rounds, the sooner would be the termination.’272 
This estimate of a hundred rounds was good enough because it allowed the FCC to calculate 
the operation costs and consider the need for an adjustment on the activity rules.   
(3) Length of cycles. The Milgrom-Wilson-McAfee blueprint also included a rule allowing 
withdrawals because the winner decided that the price was too high, or because she just 
changed her preferences.  The rule established that licences could be sold back to the market 
but the bidder returning them would have to pay the price difference, if the final price was 
lower than her own bid. Theoretically, it was expected that withdrawals could lead to ‘cycles’ 
where licences returned to auctioneer would have to be sent back to the market more than 
once, until one of the bidders becomes satisfied with the price. Although this possibility was 
envisaged, there was no way to calculate how long cycles might be.  
Therefore, the production of experimental data on the occurrence and length of cycles 
was another important task which, along with the estimate of the total number of rounds, was 
relevant for estimating the total time of the auction. Too many cycles might significantly delay 
the termination of the auction, or even prevent the auction from ending. The experiments 
showed that a licence package may be released up to three times with the last holder losing 
money. Plott reported that ‘since the new price of the item is above the average value of the 
marginal person, the new holder lost money. Panel B shows that releases can occur more than 
once during an auction. As can be seen in that experiment, the item was released two times, 
leading to a cycle of length three.273 Hence, cycles were short but overpricing was likely to occur.  
These data on cycles and those on bid increments and the total number of rounds were 
crucial for the final design and implementation of the FCC auction, which presumably led to an 
                                            
272 Plott, 1997, p. 633.  
273 Ibid., p. 625.  
 
 
166
efficient allocation of telecommunication licences.274 The revenue from the first round with nine 
auctions run between 1994 and 1996 was of twenty-three billion dollars, a large amount that has 
been hailed as a proof of the efficiency of the auction, and the power of game theory for design. 
However, the same credit should be given to experimental economists whose contribution was 
decisive for the final design and the successful implementation of the auction. The success of 
the FCC auction led governments in Europe to the implementation of auctions also for 
allocation of exploitation rights of the electromagnetic spectrum.275  
In philosophy of science, design and engineering methods are often neglected by the 
excessive attention paid to theories and the methods associated to them. The use of theories for 
the design of blueprints has led some to argue that the success of the simultaneous ascending 
auction was due the advancement game theory and auction theory. While one can recognise the 
use of theories in both cases the fixed-pitch air propeller and the FCC auction, it would be a 
mistake to attribute the successful design and implementation of them exclusively to those 
theories.  
By reducing the explication of such success to the derivation of knowledge from 
theories, theory-testing experiments and externally valid interferences, philosophers of science 
are overlooking the distinctive features of experimental and engineering methods. My aim in 
this chapter has been to show the distinctive epistemic and methodological character of these 
practices and the knowledge they produce. Without a set of systematic practices producing data 
for design, engineers and policy-makers would be left only with a set of abstract models and 
predictions on some tendencies.  
Experimental parameter variation is a good example of practical knowledge which 
produces data theories cannot provide. It is also an example for philosophers and scientists on 
how to get a systematic and insightful interpretation of some of the practices performed by 
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experimental social scientists, which otherwise would remain implicit or lost within long and 
detailed descriptions published in articles and books.  Experimental parameter variation has a 
normative force analogous to any form of argument and inference studied in logic using rules 
such as Modus Ponens, a Celarent syllogism and Bayes’ theorem. These rules provide instructions 
on how to perform inferences, experimental parameter variation provides rules on how to 
perform practices. Philosophers of science have excessively focused on inferential rules and 
propositional knowledge from theories and abstract models; by doing this they have overlooked 
and dismissed the role of scientific practices and the knowledge they produce.  A 
comprehensive philosophy of design and engineering in the natural and the social sciences is 
needed. The subjects discussed and the arguments put forward in this dissertation are presented 
as an advance towards such a philosophy.  
          —O— 
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Chapter 4 
Self-Interested Knaves 
 
4.0. Introduction 
Psychological assumptions constitute an essential component of the design of rules, policies and 
institutions such as electoral systems, public health services, constitutions, contracts and 
auctions. These assumptions are used by theoretical and experimental social scientists for 
making blueprints as well as for the construction and implementation of those rules, policies 
and institutions. Moral psychology constitutes a subset of such assumptions concerned with the 
explanation of moral behaviour. Whereas some assumptions give prominence to attitudes 
towards risk, cooperation and learning; moral assumptions focus on attitudes towards norms 
and values such as free-riding, truth-telling, promise keeping, fairness, envy and knavery.  In 
game theory, for instance, aspects of such moral behaviour are sometimes synthesised using 
analogies with animals such as dove-like and hawk-like behaviour.  
Moral psychology assumptions help regulate the expectations of new policies and new 
institutions by setting up some initial limits on possible behavioural changes. The success or 
failure of any design in the social sciences crucially depends on the accuracy and reliability of 
these assumptions. This is why a good science of facts is needed; in particular for psychology, 
sociology, and some aspects of evolutionary theory. A science of actual moral behaviour must 
be able to measure, explain and predict as well as regulate the expectations of possible 
behaviour brought about by design and engineering. In this chapter and the next, I discuss 
moral psychology and some basic aspects of moral sociology.  
Moral psychology is a branch of psychology, and therefore it should not be considered 
as a philosophical branch. This seems to be an obvious and unnecessary remark. Nonetheless, 
moral psychology is often ambiguously discussed and taught as a philosophical branch. This 
happens in part because moral psychology is not yet a fully developed branch in psychology. I 
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argue that this ambiguous status in philosophy has undermined the progress of moral 
psychology as a scientific branch. Moral psychology should be considered only as a branch of 
psychology, and therefore it should be developed by scientists and evaluated by philosophers of 
science with the methods and criteria used in philosophy of science.  
The philosopher Jay Wallace, for instance, defines moral psychology as the study of ‘the 
psychological conditions for the possibility of binding norms of action; the ways in which moral 
and other such norms can be internalized and complied with in the lives of agents; and a range 
of psychological conditions and formations that have implications for the normative assessment 
of agents and their lives.’276 Currently, the study of all those psychological conditions can only 
be performed by psychologists and neurologists, who have the methods and training needed for 
producing this kind of knowledge.  
I agree with philosophers such as John Doris, Stephen Stich and others when they argue 
that ethics should be ‘richly informed by relevant empirical considerations’ such as field and 
experimental evidence. However, I disagree when they argue that in order to keep a 
‘competitive advantage’ ethics, i.e. moral philosophy, must make ‘empirical claims with enough 
substance to be seriously tested by the empirical evidence’.277 Ethics provide normative 
arguments as to why a set of values should be preferred over a different set. The empirical 
justification or refutation of the definitions and explanations of the moral norms and values 
followed by an individual or a social group is a scientific task, not a philosophical one. An 
individual or a population can de facto act according to certain values and norms, which they may 
not provide an argument for. That is to say, they might act according to certain values and 
norms without being able to explain why those values should be chosen. Until such a normative 
argument is provided there is no moral philosophy.  
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Any moral philosophy presupposes a certain moral psychology and a moral sociology.278 
Calls for an empirically informed ethics make sense and are welcome, because often moral 
philosophers write their argument paying little or no attention to the psychological and 
sociological assumptions they use. They also do it without enquiring into the scientific status of 
those assumptions, by asking whether they have enough empirical support or whether there is 
any scientific controversy over them. Moral philosophy and design in the social sciences must 
be based on a good science of facts, namely a psychology and sociology of moral behaviour.  
One side of the scientific task consists of establishing certain aspects of actual facts, that 
is, of actual individual and social behaviour. The other side consists of establishing the feasible 
set of the behaviour projected in moral arguments or in economic and political blueprints. 
Therefore, this knowledge of design and knowledge of engineering must be added as part of the 
demand for an empirically informed moral philosophy. 
In this chapter and the next one, I analyse and discuss moral psychology as a branch of 
psychology. I do this by evaluating the grounds on which knowledge claims are justified as well 
as the choices made over rival theories. In other words, I treat moral psychology as an ordinary 
case of science. In particular, I discuss and compare the moral psychologies of Bernard 
Mandeville and David Hume, whom I consider to be the early modern founders of moral 
psychology. Because these are cases of early modern science I use, as much as possible, the 
epistemological standards of that period.  
The term ‘moral psychology’ did not exist in the eighteenth century, so Mandeville 
describes his work as ‘moral anatomy’ by creating a methodological analogy with anatomy in 
medicine. He was trained and graduated as a physician, writing a dissertation and a treatise on 
health subjects.279 He had previously graduated in philosophy, where he wrote a dissertation 
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supporting the Cartesian thesis, which neglects that non-human animals have a soul.280 Hume 
also described himself as an anatomist; they wanted to produce a science of moral subjects 
using the methods from the natural sciences.    
It is a challenge to select criteria for evaluating Mandeville’s moral psychology as a 
science, mainly because the normative standards of the time do not fit with the purpose of a 
building a moral psychology. Specifically, there were two main rival standards at that time: the 
Aristotelian and the Cartesian. A third less prominent standard came from Galileo, Gassendi, 
and Bacon. The Galilean and the Cartesian standards share some common grounds on the 
fundamental role of experimentation and systematic observation. However, they disagree on the 
foundational place of metaphysical principles, from which some deductions on physical laws 
and properties could be made. Gassendi criticises the Cartesian method as well as the 
experimental basis shared by Galileo and Bacon.281 The experimental methods and systematic 
observation championed by Galileo, Gassendi and Bacon are the closest to the method 
followed by Mandeville. However, even these standards are not entirely appropriate because 
they were developed from astronomy and physics. In the eighteenth century there was no 
philosophy of medicine and no philosophy of psychology or the social sciences.  
Because of these reasons, I can only partially meet the requirements for an evaluation of 
the methods and knowledge claims from Mandeville’s theory. Such an evaluation consists of 
two parts. The first one in this chapter covers sections 4.1., 4.2. and 4.3.1., which include a 
description of the methods and inferences performed by Mandeville as well as his refutation of 
the moral psychology used by the moral philosopher Lord Shaftesbury. The second part is 
presented in the next chapter, where I discuss David Hume’s refutation to the moral psychology 
of Bernard Mandeville.  
                                            
280 B. Mandeville (1689) Disputatio Philosophica de Brutorum Operationibus. Leiden: Elzevier. Later, he 
changed his views by arguing instead for the similarities and continuation between humans and other 
animals.  
281 See J. Losee (2001), pp. 46-71.  
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Besides the methods and theory of moral psychology produced by Mandeville, I also 
discuss his sociology, which complements his moral psychology. In section 4.4., I discuss 
different accounts which characterise Mandeville’s work as a case of moral philosophy. Against 
these accounts, in section 4.5. I argue that his work is an early modern example of functionalism 
applied to social aspects. The functionalist explanations he provides of the economy and society 
most likely stem from his knowledge as a physician on human anatomy.  
In the last sections 4.6., 4.7. and 4.8, I discuss the ideas Mandeville had on design, which 
are consistent with his moral psychology of universal natural self-interest. Specifically, I examine 
his ideas on the prevention of knavery in politics, and the behavioural changes required for the 
transition from an agrarian society to a precapitalist commercial society.     
     
4.1. Refuting romantic moral psychology 
In Augustan England, the recent increase of trade and the introduction of public credit and 
national debt for financing government were viewed with concern, mainly because besides 
producing large revenues, they also produced big losses for the whole society. Frequently, 
condemnation of material progress came as reaction to what people perceived as a threat from a 
new set of moral values based mainly on greed. In spite of bringing economic prosperity, these 
new values were also considered as fostering corruption in both society and government. The 
rise and accumulation of new wealth was seen as a political threat, because it increased the 
crown’s capacity for patronage. Nonetheless, the exaltation of Christian values like charity, 
frugality and good faith was still common. Such values were presented as the moral foundation 
of a society concerned with securing public benefits like social cohesion, trust and generalised 
welfare. Charity schools became the epitome of these social concerns inspired by Christian 
compassion. Politically, it was also argued that if these values were embraced by politicians in 
parliament and the crown, they would produce good governance and public benefits, including 
respect for civil liberties and the making of new socially beneficial laws.  
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Such was the civic spirit in the humanism from Petrarch, and Ancient Greek and Roman 
philosophers like Horace, Xenophon, and Epictetus, which Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl 
of Shaftesbury, was well acquainted with. Lord Shaftesbury was a leading moral philosopher 
during the period, who was widely read in Britain and in continental Europe. He was a leading 
voice that opposed Thomas Hobbes’s psychological egoism as the basis for organising the state 
and the society. He is also considered by many as the founder of the moral sense theory. His 
most important work, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit,282 assumes a moral psychology 
criticised by Bernard Mandeville as false and romantic.   
Shaftesbury constructs a natural teleology, which he extends to society and moral 
behaviour. His moral psychology, as well as his distinction between virtue and vice, is both built 
to meet the two main tenets of such a teleology, namely happiness and harmony of the whole. 
Holistically, he describes nature and society as a system where balance and harmony are to be 
maintained despite any disorder or imbalance. The main emphasis is placed on harmony and 
balance because they lead to the continuation and survival of the whole. Such balance is 
obtained when each member in a society fulfils their function adequately by behaving virtuously 
just like ‘any Organ, Part or Member of an Animal-Body, or mere Vegetable, to work in its 
known Course, and regular way of Growth. ’Tis not more natural for the Stomach to digest, the 
Lungs to breathe, the Glands to separate Juices, or other entrails to perform their several 
Offices.’283 Virtues such as justice, honesty, modesty and moderate self-interest as well as 
benevolence and love towards the whole humanity fulfil a function, which helps to maintain 
harmony and the preservation of society.  
                                            
282 The Enquiry was first published in 1699, with revised editions published in 1711, 1714, and 1732. 
Currently, Shaftesbury’s work is hardly discussed, however, during the eighteenth century he was widely 
read and discussed. A compilation of his work with a revised version of the Enquiry was published for 
the first time in 1711 with the title Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, with further editions 
printed in 1714 and 1732. Along with J. Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government, Characteristicks was the 
most reprinted book in English language during that century with translations to French and German 
from 1738 to 1779. In English, his influence is notorious in the moral philosophies of Francis 
Hutcheson and Adam Smith.  
283 Shaftesbury (1732), vol. 2, pp.77-79.  
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Shaftesbury was highly critical of Hobbes’s psychological egoism.284 Throughout the 
Inquiry, he tries to disprove it by showing how public interest, benevolence and other kinds of 
social love are actually widely observed in society.285 He holds that that self-interest and virtue 
are not opposed by arguing that moderate self-interest is actually virtuous because it contributes 
to the healthy balance of the whole:  
 
'The Affection towards private or Self-good, however selfish it may be esteem’d, is in 
reality not only consistent with publick Good, but in some measure contributing to it; if 
it be such, perhaps, as for the good of the Species in general, every Individual ought to 
share; ’tis so far from being ill, or blameable in any sense, that it must be acknowledg’d 
absolutely necessary to constitute a Creature Good.'286  
 
According to Shaftesbury, only a narrow, immoderate self-interest is a vice because it harms the 
‘Interest of the Species’ by negatively affecting the balance and harmony of society. Virtue and 
vice are therefore defined using holistic and teleological criteria. Vice occurs when any passion 
or affection becomes immoderate. Vices such as ambition, avarice, vanity and love for luxury 
are all ‘ill’ or ‘unnatural’ passions because they harm society.287 
Besides being moderate and causing no harm to the society, any action has to satisfy two 
further requirements in order to be virtuous: i) It has to be grounded on full affection, ii) and on 
knowledge of the effects it has on society. According to Shaftesbury, any ‘Partial Affection, or 
social Love in part, without regard to a compleat Society or Whole, is in it-self an Inconsistency, 
                                            
284 The attribution of psychological egoism to Hobbes has become increasingly controversial, see B. Gert 
(1967); G. Kavka (1986); and D. Boonin-Vail (1994).  
285 See Shaftesbury (1732), vol. 2, pp. 80-81; and Shaftesbury (1732), vol. 1, pp. 118-119, where he 
criticises Hobbes’s assertion on universal selfishness: ‘Thus Civility, Hospitality, Humanity towards 
Strangers or People in distress, is only a more deliberate Selfishness. An honest Heart is only a more cunning 
one: and Honesty and Good-Nature, a more deliberate, or better-regulated Self-Love [...] And thus Love of one’s 
Country, and Love of Mankind, must also be Self-Love. Magnanimity and Courage, no doubt, are Modifications 
of this universal Self-Love!’ 
286 Shaftesbury (1732), vol. 2, p. 23; see also pp. 16, 66-67 and 161-162.  
287 Ibid., pp. 163, 166-169.  
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and implies an absolute Contradiction.’  Partial and unstable passions and affections in turn rely 
on ‘capriciousness and humour ’. 288 Because they are disorderly and unstable, they harm society 
and reduce individual joy and generalised happiness, which is inconsistent with the holistic 
teleological principles set as the ultimate criteria for virtue and vice. Only a full and stable 
affection in the individual can lead to true virtuous action. Moreover, any action with positive 
effects on the whole cannot be virtuous, unless individuals knew in advance the effects it could 
bring. Shaftesbury explains that ‘we call any Creature worthy or virtuous, when it can have the 
Notion of a publick Interest, and can attain the Speculation or Science of what is morally good 
or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong.’289   
From a factual perspective, Shaftesbury recognises that there is vice and virtue, and 
believes too that punishment and reward can reduce vice in the society and the family. The 
main point of contention is the existence of true virtue with no expected reward or punishment, 
where individuals themselves naturally and voluntarily constrain their own self-interest, and act 
instead in the public interest and, more generally, in the general ‘Interest of the Species’290, that 
is to say, the whole humanity.  
Mandeville argues that the psychological assumptions in Shaftesbury’s argument are 
false, namely his holistic claim on the balance and harmony of a society founded on moderate 
self-interest and other virtues such as justice, modesty and honesty. Mandeville argues that self-
interest is by nature universal and unrestrained, since no action is performed because of public 
interest. In contrast, he claims that immoderate passions are actually necessary for creating a 
thriving economy and keeping society in a good balance and harmony. ‘Dormant’ passions keep 
individuals ‘in a State of slothful Easy and Stupid Innocence’, where no great vices are expected 
but no great virtues either. In contrast, vices such as ambition, luxury, vanity, envy, and pride 
are all necessary: ‘it would be utterly impossible, either to raise any Multitudes into a Populous, 
                                            
288 Ibid., p. 110.  
289 Ibid., p. 31.  
290 Ibid., pp. 23, 17.  
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Rich, and Flourishing Nation, or when so rais’d, to keep and maintain them in that Condition, 
without the assistance of what we call Evil both Natural and Moral.’291  Mandeville regards the 
moral psychology adopted by Shaftesbury as ‘romantick’ and his moral philosophy as mistaken 
in trying to establish ‘Heathen Virtue on the ruins of Christianity.’292     
In his essay, ‘A Search Into the Nature of Society’ (1723), Mandeville states that 
Shaftesbury had completely misunderstood the true nature of society claiming that ‘’two 
Systems cannot be more opposite than his Lordship’s and mine. His notions I confess are 
generous and refined […] What a Pity it is that they are not true’, adding that he has 
‘demonstrated in almost every page of this Treatise [The Fable of Bees, Vol. I], that the Solidity of 
them is inconsistent with our daily experience.'293 The first volume of The Fable of the Bees is long 
and detailed as well as rich in discussions of examples and authors. Because it tries to prove the 
universality of self-interest, the argument and examples there challenge Shaftesbury’s moral 
psychology, although it explicitly refers to Shaftesbury only a few times. It is in the ‘The First 
Dialogue’ of the second volume of The Fable of the Bees, where Mandeville actually explicitly 
states that he is refuting Shaftesbury’s argument by reducing it to the absurd.294  
Trying to gather comprehensive empirical support for his claims, Mandeville discusses 
seven representative cases of groups from different social classes, jobs and professions. These 
seven groups are: laborious poor classes, physicians, lawyers, clergymen, tradesmen, cardinals 
and members of the court. His style is satirical but that was a common and acceptable format 
for an argument also used by Shaftesbury and many others during that period. At the time, both 
satires and essays constituted the corpus of an argument in moral philosophy and politics.  
                                            
291 B. Mandeville (1732), vol. I,. pp. 199-200, 373. All page numbers quoted from this book correspond 
to the original edition, which are normally added in square brackets in all editions.  
292 B. Mandeville (1732), vol. II, p. 432.  
293 B. Mandeville (1732), vol. I, p. 372. In Letter to Dion (1732a, p. 34), Mandeville writes ’I differ from My 
Lord Shaftesbury entirely, as to the Certainty of the Pulchrum & Honestum, abstract from Mode and 
Custom: I do the same about the Origin of Society, and in many other Things, especially the Reasons 
why Man is a Sociable Creature, beyond other Animals.’   
294 B. Mandeville (1732), vol. II, p. 25.  
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The first case is of a poor laborious woman, who goes through hardship and pain saving 
forty schillings to pay for getting her six-year old son into an apprenticeship as a chimney 
sweep. These actions lead to important social benefits in a large number of households, by 
providing them with the conditions needed for clean cooking as well as for keeping the rooms 
warm, in this way preventing illnesses and death during cold periods. Because of the sacrifices 
the woman makes in order to save money, and also by placing her young son into a highly risky 
job, which bring many benefits to the society her actions should regarded as virtuous. However, 
because Shaftesbury’s definition of virtue requires intentionality by demanding knowledge of 
the expected effects into the wider society, the actions of the poor woman are not virtuous 
despite the important benefits they bring to society.  
Therefore, a mere external correlation between individual action and the social benefits 
it creates can be misleading. A further criterion is needed in order to be able to establish if there 
was some knowledge of the effects. Shaftesbury does not provide such a criterion, and does not 
even seem to be aware of the problem. In contrast, Mandeville pays close attention to the need 
for reliable knowledge of psychological motivations in order to qualify any action as virtuous or 
vicious.295 I discuss his own criterion and solution to the problem in the next section.  
The case of the industrious poor woman leads to absurd untenable consequences 
because despite of the public benefits she creates she cannot be virtuous; she is ‘an indigent 
thoughtless Wretch, without Sense or Education’296, who cannot ‘act from such generous 
Principles.’ Mandeville extends the consequences of this case to all the poor, illiterate and 
uneducated working classes, ‘the labouring Poor, which are by far the greatest part of the 
Nation’.297 The extension is important because it challenges the scope of Shaftesbury’s claims.   
The next case Mandeville discusses is that of people from ‘higher stations’, who are 
literate and professionally educated such as physicians and lawyers. These people are literate and 
                                            
295 B. Mandeville (1732) vol. I, pp. 34, 42 and 467.  
296 B. Mandeville (1732), vol. II, p. 23.  
297 B. Mandeville (1732), vol. II, p. 24.  
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their work brings many benefits to society by curing the sick and by helping those who face 
detention and potential imprisonment. In spite of the public benefits created, the actions of 
physicians and lawyers are not virtuous either, this is because the observed ‘Patience’, 
‘Assiduity’, ‘Labour’ and ‘Fatigue’ are all motivated by a search for ‘Fame, Wealth, and 
Greatness’. This becomes evident because none of them would undergo even ‘a quarter’ of such 
a fatigue and effort, if there would be no money and no enhanced reputation in return. 
‘Therefore, when Ambition and the Love of Money are the avow’d Principles Men act from, it 
is very silly to ascribe virtues to them.’298 For the same reasons, no virtue can be attributed to 
tradesmen who bring many social benefits to both the extravagant rich and the poor craftsmen 
by buying all kinds of toys and gadgets from the latter to be sold to the former. They know the 
public benefits brought by their actions but they were not motivated by such benefits.  
Mandeville draws the same conclusions for cardinals and other clergymen, who enjoy 
large fees, housing, food and other comforts for their service. These cases are highly relevant 
because individuals holding such positions are supposed to care for the welfare of the whole 
society, and therefore should be considered among the best candidates for virtuous actions 
following Shaftesbury’s definition of virtue. Mandeville points out the College of Cardinals in 
Rome as ‘the best School to learn the Art of Calling’, where ‘each Member, besides the 
Gratification of his own Passions, has nothing at Heart but the Interest of this Party.’299  Similar 
conclusions extend to members of the Royal Courts, who despite being named and employed to 
serve the public interest, they ‘rob the Publick’ instead and are dominated by ‘excess of Vanity 
and hurtful Ambition unknown among the poor’.  Furthermore, ‘Envy, Detraction and the 
Spirit of Revenge, are more ranging and mischievous in Courts that they are in Cottages’.300    
                                            
298 B. Mandeville (1732) vol. II, p. 26.  
299 Ibid., pp. 34 and 35.  
300 Ibid., p. 42.  
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If there are social groups where ‘the Speculation or Science of what is morally good or 
ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong’301 is to be found, those groups should be the clergy 
and the courts. Again, like in the case of lawyers, physicians and tradesmen, the actions from the 
cardinals, other clergymen and members of the Royal Court cannot be virtues because there is 
no intentionality in the public benefits they create.302  
In this way, Shaftesbury’s moral psychology is reduced to the absurd because of all the 
untenable consequences it leads to. On the one hand, the poor laborious classes are not 
virtuous because they have no knowledge of the benefits they bring to society. On the other 
hand, those who have the knowledge such as the members of the royal courts, cardinals and 
physicians are not virtuous either because they do not have in mind those benefits when they 
act. All the seven types considered are exclusively motivated by self-interest, and therefore none 
of them are virtuous.  
After refuting the moral psychology of natural restrained self-interest from Shaftesbury, 
Mandeville challenges any eventual critic of such refutation to put forward any evidence against 
his own opposite claim of a natural universal unrestrained self-interest. Until such evidence is 
provided his claim stands as a best or true psychological explanation of moral behaviour.  In the 
middle of a dialogue, Horatio, a supporter of Shaftesbury’s moral philosophy, accepts the 
existence of unrestrained selfishness, but he believes it is not universal: ‘I don’t conclude from 
Selfishness in some, that there is no Virtue in others’303. However, Cleomenes, a supporter of 
Mandeville’s views, provides further evidence to finally persuade Horatio of the universality of 
natural immoderate self-interest.  
Lord Shaftesbury died in 1713, so he had no opportunity of replying to Mandeville, who 
first criticised him in 1723.  David Hume responded to Mandeville three decades later in the 
1750s. I argue that the controversy between Shaftesbury, Hume and Mandeville is a problem of 
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302 B. Mandeville (1732), vol. II, p. 39.  
303 Ibid., p. 28.  
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theory choice, which can be tackled by using epistemic criteria.  To avoid as much as possible 
any epistemological anachronism, epistemic criteria from the same period, whenever they exist, 
must be used. Because Hume explicitly says that he is emulating Isaac Newton’s science and 
method, in the next chapter I compare his moral psychology to that of Mandeville using criteria 
from the eighteenth century, namely those from the vera causa, which are analogous to those of 
the inference to the best explanation in current philosophy of science.  
 
4.2. Erecting moral psychology 
Moral psychology as a separate specialised branch of knowledge did not exist in the eighteenth 
century. I argue that the work of Bernard Mandeville represents the first early modern case of a 
psychology of morality, which he produced in great detail and with a large scope. One of the 
main aims of my discussion of Mandeville's work is to vindicate him as an early modern 
scientist, in contrast to those who vindicate him as a moral philosopher. Mandeville's moral 
psychology also provides important insights on important problems of design such as the 
distinction between natural and artificial or artefactual behaviour.  Mandeville's work in moral 
psychology is part of his research into a comprehensive science of human nature, which covers 
subjects such as politics, socialisation, the origin of laughter, good manners, language, suicide 
and the function of religion in war.  
        Mandeville studied medicine, and worked as a physician, specialising himself in 
nervous diseases and digestion. His knowledge of medicine, the anatomy of the human body 
and the brain provided him with the grounds needed for erecting a moral psychology using 
naturalistic methods. Although physiology did not exist as a specialised science during 
Mandeville's lifetime, many of his explanations are functional explanations similar to those of 
the human organs. The main subject matter of his investigations was the functions and 
relationships of passions and affections as causes of moral behaviour.  
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Shaftesbury had already called attention to the need for producing an ‘anatomy of the 
mind’ in support of moral philosophy. As we have seen, his moral argument was mostly 
constructed on a deductive method by drawing the consequences from a set of basic premises 
about the holistic and teleological character of nature and society. The psychological assertions 
he makes on the existence of a natural concern for the public interest are not supported on 
examples or representative cases, therefore his moral argument is almost empirically empty. 
Rather, he takes those empirical assertions as being obviously true. Once the crucial assumption 
has been made of the existence of moderate self-interest, it all becomes an almost exclusively 
analytical argument by expanding and elaborating on teleological and holistic consequences. 
Nonetheless, such a method should not be considered as entirely mistaken, because Shaftesbury 
was mainly concerned with writing a philosophical argument not a scientific theory. He was 
aware of the empirical shortcomings acknowledging the need for an ‘Anatomy’ with the aim of 
determining the ‘Fabrick of the Mind’:   
 
The Parts and Proportions of the Mind, their mutual Relation and Dependency, the 
Connexion and Frame of those Passions which constitute the Soul or Temper, may 
easily be understood by any-one who thinks it worth his while to study this inward 
Anatomy. ’Tis certain that the Order or Symmetry of this inward Part is, in it-self, no less 
real and exact, than that of the Body. However, ’tis apparent that few of us endeavour to 
become Anatomists of this sort. Nor is any-one asham’d of the deepest Ignorance in such 
a Subject.304 
 
Shaftesbury extends his aesthetic principles of order and symmetry to the constitution of the 
mind following an analytic a priori reasoning, which Mandeville criticises. He instead defends a 
posteriori synthetic reasoning based on trained observation. He explains that just like ‘those that 
study the Anatomy of Dead Carcases may see, that the chief Organs and nicest Springs more 
immediately required to continue the Motion of our Machine, are not hard Bones, strong 
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Muscles and Nerves, nor the smooth white Skin that so beautifully covers them, but small 
trifling Films and little Pipes that are either over-look’d, or else seem inconsiderable to Vulgar 
Eyes’305  
Small fine parts with large causal effects can therefore escape the untrained observer, 
who may focus instead on the largest and most obvious parts. Only a scientifically trained 
observer can find those distinctive causes that make a difference for the performance of any 
action. Hence, the moral anatomist has to be able to see the small hidden springs responsible for 
moral action. In this context, the main problem consists of establishing the scope of self-
interest as the true or best explanation for moral behaviour. The rival explanation relies on 
altruism or public interest as the true motivation. Mandeville uses the term ‘self-denial’ to 
describe actions where self-interest is voluntarily restrained because of the influence of custom 
and education with no expectation of reward; it is to ‘prefer the good of others to their own, if at 
the same time he had not shew’d them an Equivalent to be enjoy’d as a Reward for the 
Violence, which by so doing they of necessity must commit upon themselves.’306 The most 
important contention in his argument is the rejection of naturally occurring self-denial 
complemented with the claim of universal natural self-interest.   
In producing such a moral anatomy, Mandeville was critical of the overemphasis moral 
philosophers place on norms, paying little or no attention to the actual causes of behaviour, 
‘Writers are always teaching Men what they should be, and hardly ever trouble their Heads with 
telling them what really are.’307 This important oversight, which he finds in Shaftesbury’s moral 
philosophy and other moral philosophies such as Stoicism, explains why ‘the Theory of Virtue 
is so well understood, and the Practice of it so rarely to be met with.’308  
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In order to prove the universal scope of self-interest as an empirical claim, Mandeville 
uses again representative cases from different social groups, giving special weight to cases where 
self-denial is expected, and it should therefore be likely to find evidence supporting it. Besides 
the seven groups discussed in the precedent section, I am now discussing eight more selected 
from the many cases found in his books. The new groups are mothers, soldiers, nuns, friars, 
beggars, mendicant orders, kings and ministers. The empirical support is enlarged with the 
interesting single cases on Lucrecia in Ancient Rome, the Spanish and the Dutch societies of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and charity schools in England. In the examples, 
Mandeville also identifies different forms of knavish and corrupted behaviour motivated by self-
interest.  
Like any burglar, lawyers survey the law in order to find gaps, which can help them to 
advance their own interests and those of their clients by harming those of other individuals. 
Soldiers do not risk their lives for others, they act motivated by their own self-interest, trying to 
avoid public shame if they hide or run away, while at the same time they also seek personal 
glory and immortality. When priests and nuns provide emotional help and comfort to the poor 
and the rich, they also act motived by self-interest for they want to ensure a place in heaven and 
veneration on earth. Moreover, nuns and friars frequently breach the vow of celibacy by having 
children, which they then abort or hide after being born. Mothers love their children, however 
they love themselves and their own preferences even more. The same woman who can neglect, 
give away or even kill her bastard child because of public shame or burden, can be tender, 
caring and sweet to a child born in proper marriage. By giving excessive care and protection to 
their offspring mothers care more about their own preferences even by ruining their own 
children, who then become spoiled and dependent.309  
Ministers affect the public interest by engaging in bribery and corruption in order to 
advance their own self-interest or that of their own party. Kings send their subjects to death and 
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impoverish their own countries because of a stubborn self-interested motivation in continuing 
with a lost war, or because of excessive spending caused by their love for pomp and luxury. 
Because of self-interest, tradesmen cheat in order to take an unfair advantage over their 
competitors having no concern for the harm they can inflict on them. Beggars and mendicant 
orders deceive people with a pitiful voice to get the money they will later spend indulging in 
their own appetites in the company of their friends.310  
Mandeville claims that human nature ‘has always been the same, and that the Strength 
and Frailties of it have ever been conspicuous in one part of the Globe or other, without any 
Regard to Ages, Climates, or Religion’.311  His moral psychology of universal natural self-
interest, knavish behaviour and widespread vice became known to the wider public with the 
publication of the ‘Essay on Charity and Charity Schools’ in the 1723 edition of The Fable of Bees. 
This essay was strongly rejected by some members of the political establishment in England, 
who took Mandeville to the Grand Jury of Middlesex accusing him causing public nuisance. In 
this essay, as in all previous ones, Mandeville presents a sharp and revealing account of the true 
motivations of apparent virtuous behaviour motivated presumably by compassion based on 
Christian beliefs. Specifically, he argues that charity, one of the most important social pillars in 
England, was not motivated by compassion and public interest but by self-interest.  
Mandeville holds that the rich and famous help the poor and needy to pride themselves 
on charitable behaviour, while they are also eager to be flattered, honoured and praised by the 
public. He explains that charity is given to hospitals, orphanages and universities because ‘they 
are the best Markets to buy Immortality at with little Merit.’312 Charity is a highly relevant case in 
moral psychology and moral philosophy because it was, and still is considered by some, as 
definitive evidence on the existence of true unselfish behaviour, so any successful refutation of 
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such evidence would have important consequences for the respective moral philosophy and the 
moral psychology supporting it.   
Furthermore, in the same essay Mandeville also calls into question the education policy 
associated with charity schools by advancing a functionalist explanation of the role that the poor 
working classes have in the national income. Mandeville realised that the existence of a large 
number of poor uneducated individuals ready to work with low wages had unintended 
consequences for an increase in exports and gross domestic product granting time and wealth 
for the pleasure and ease of a small minority:   
 
It is impossible that a Society can long subsist, and suffer many of its Members to live in 
Idleness, and enjoy all the ease and Pleasure they can invent, without having at the same 
time great Multitude of People that to make good this Defect will condescend to be 
quite the reverse, and by the use and patience inure their Bodies to work for other and 
themselves besides. The Plenty and Cheapness of Provisions depends in a great measure 
of the Price and Value that is set upon this Labour.313 
 
By identifying the function of the poor working classes, Mandeville also refutes the social 
policies based on a moral philosophy inconsistent with the economic system. An extended 
policy on charity schools would cause a dysfunction by spoiling the adequate economic 
functioning of the society as a whole by reducing the number of people willing to accept low 
wages, which would, in time, reduce exports and gross domestic product. On the normative 
side, the actual association of poverty to economic growth and self-interest challenges prevailing 
moral philosophies built upon the influence of Christian values, such as that of Shaftesbury and 
David Hume.  On the positive side, a functional explanation of poverty, self-interest, and their 
unintended consequences was needed to solve the Mandevillian paradox of how widespread 
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vice can actually lead to economic growth and political stability instead of creating decay and 
severe social conflict.   
Mandeville explains that such an outcome is not natural, that is to say, it is not the result 
of a spontaneous order as Friedrich Hayek and others314 would argue but the product of a 
design from ‘the dextrous Management of skilful politicians’315, who can turn private vices into 
public benefits by devising laws and policies, which curb self-interest and vice in the right way, 
and keep the right number of poor workers who can provide cheap labour. His work shows the 
importance moral psychology has as a test and foundation of any moral philosophy, and of any 
design of policies and institutions in economics and political science.316 To succeed both design 
and moral philosophy need accurate and reliable knowledge of the desires, intentions and other 
mental states causing moral, political and economic behaviour.  
 
4.3. The method of  moral psychology 
Mandeville himself explains the method he has been using for producing his psychological 
theory, he calls it the ‘Method of reasoning from Facts à posteriori’317, which consists of reasoning 
from observation and experience only. He recognises reasoning from experimentation in 
chemistry also as an a posteriori method, although he explains that experiments cannot be 
performed on the brain.  Alluding to Descartes, he rejects a priori reasoning by claiming that ‘all 
our knowledge comes à posteriori, it is imprudent to reason otherwise than from Facts.’318 He also 
makes an important distinction between ‘conjecture’ and ‘knowledge’, explaining that the latter 
provides certainty while the former does not.319  
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In this case, ‘certainty’ becomes a decisive epistemic criterion, because a psychological 
theory consists of knowledge of unobservable processes and entities taking place inside the 
mind. Certainty has also been a long-standing problem across the social sciences, where an 
important distinction is made between the inside and outside of any individual or collective 
action. This distinction has produced a methodological divide between naturalism and 
hermeneutics, while in psychology a similar distinction created a divide between behaviouristic 
and cognitive psychology. Mandeville falls into the category of those scientists who try to get 
knowledge of the inside of any action using naturalist methods, that is to say, knowledge of the 
mental entities and processes causing actions. Therefore, the methodological challenge consists 
of producing knowledge of the mind that is certain and reliable.  
Mandeville explicates his own method of inference to get this knowledge of the mind by 
using an analogy with knowledge of the inner parts and functioning of a watch:  
 
I don’t believe there is a Man in the World of that Sagacity, if he was wholly 
unacquainted with the Nature of a Spring-Watch, that he would ever find out by dint of 
Penetration the Cause of its Motion, if he was never to see the Inside: But every 
middling Capacity may be certain, by seeing only the Outside, that its pointing at the 
Hour, and keeping to Time, proceed from the Exactness of some curious Workmanship 
that’s hid; and that the Motion of the Hands, what number of Resorts soever it is 
communicated by, is originally owing to something else that first moves within. In the 
same manner we are sure that, as the Effects of Thought upon the Body are palpable, 
several Motions are produced by it, by contact, and consequently mechanically.320   
 
Note that according to Mandeville only a ‘middling certainty’ can be attained for any knowledge 
about the mind. He explains why full certainty cannot be achieved by pointing to two important 
methodological constraints related to the anatomy of the brain. First, he explains that the 
anatomist can only have access to the brain when it is already dead, so the main ‘spring of life’ is 
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gone, and therefore a full understanding of the inner functioning is not possible. The second 
constraint is set by the limited scope of macroscopic observation, which is constrained to large 
parts and organs such as nerves, blood vessels, folds and windings, while millions of small cells 
remain unobserved. Because of these two methodological constraints, the psychologist cannot 
gather the information needed for producing a theory with a higher degree of certainty. 
Therefore, the ‘best Naturalist must acknowledge that he can only ‘give any tolerable Guesses’, 
or actually admit ‘as to the mysterious Structure of the Brain itself, and the Oeconomy of it, that 
he knows nothing.’321    
 With those limitations, the inference to inner live processes and entities proceeds 
exclusively from observable behaviour. He is aware the epistemic challenge this implies by 
explaining that ‘it is impossible to judge of a Man’s Performance, unless we are thoroughly 
acquainted with the Principle and Motive from which he acts.’322 By becoming thoroughly 
acquainted with information available on the subjects, the scientist can reach a ‘middling’ or 
reasonable degree of certainty.  
Another means for raising the degree of certainty on a theory consists of refuting rival 
theories. Mandeville does this by refuting the moral psychology of Lord Shaftesbury. If it is 
believed that the theories in dispute are exclusive and exhaustive, the refutation of one of them 
confirms the other.  In this case self-interest and self-denial are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive, at least if no gradation between the two is considered. Because only a middle 
certainty is available, the moral psychology of universal natural self-interest from Mandeville can 
obtain a higher degree of certainty or confirmation through eliminative reasoning in the form of 
a disjunctive syllogism between both rival theories.  
Any refutation relies on the amount and quality of the knowledge available from the 
rival theories, which is produced using a specific method. The rules of an early modern method 
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of psychology can extracted from the previous discussion on Mandeville’s methodological ideas, 
they are the following six rules:  
 
 Reason from experience only. 
 Gather as much information as possible on the subjects.  
 Trained observation skills are indispensable. 
 Look for unexpected motivations hidden by self-deception or interest.   
 Test rival claims by trying to refute them. 
 The epistemic aim of these rules is reasonable certainty. 
 
Mandeville does not discuss further or explicate these rules, so they may look poor according to 
current philosophic and scientific standards. However, as an early modern psychologist, he was 
not in a worse position than others. Indeed, as an early modern psychologist David Hume faced 
similar methodological and epistemic challenges when he was also trying to produce a 
comprehensive science of human nature. Moreover, certainty on the knowledge of the inside of 
any action, that is to say, on mental entities and processes remains as a key problem in 
psychology and the social sciences.323    
An evaluation of Mandeville’s method and its products is presented in the next chapter 
by comparing his theory of universal natural self-interest to David Hume’s theory of natural 
sympathy and self-interest; such a comparison becomes a problem of theory choice, which is 
solved by using the vera causa criteria from the eighteenth century.  
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4.4. Defining virtue and vice 
According to Mandeville, self-denial is a decisive psychological feature for the definition of 
virtue. As it was quoted earlier, Mandeville defines self-denial as the restraint of self-interest 
through custom and education.324 That is to say, virtue is not natural but artefactual. Self-denial 
is important because it is a necessary condition for any action to be considered as motivated by 
public interest or altruism.  
Under different names and technical terms, the discussion on self-denial is still relevant 
today in economics and political science. The definition of true ‘self-denial’ addresses similar 
concerns to those expressed by Amartya Sen with his own defence of ‘counterpreferential 
choice’ based on social commitment.325 Ken Binmore has recently argued that the theory of 
revealed preference is superior to psychological theories arguing for universal self-interest 
because revealed preferences leave open the possibility of unselfish behaviour.326 Another 
example is the definition of altruism in sociobiology as ‘reduction of individual fitness’, and the 
response to it given by Gary Becker, who argues that altruism actually increases individual 
fitness, if ‘indirect’ unintended effects are also considered.327 The philosopher Elliot Sober tries 
to provide an ultimate answer by arguing that both selfish and unselfish psychological 
motivations cause behaviour.328 My interest in Mandeville and Hume’s psychological theories is 
therefore historical and contemporary at the same time, for I looked into the modern origin of 
the debate between moral psychologies of universal self-interest, and those arguing for altruism, 
sympathy, counter-preferential choice and similar terms requiring unselfish motivations, that is, 
some form of self-denial.  
Mandeville defines virtue as ‘every Performance, by which Man, contrary to the impulse 
of Nature, should endeavour the Benefit of others, or the Conquest of his own Passions out of 
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a Rational Ambition of being Good.’ Vice occurs when a person satisfying her or his own 
passions or appetites  ‘might either be injurious to any of the Society, or ever render himself less 
serviceable to others.’ 329 Therefore, rational motivation for action distinguishes virtue from vice.  
In spite of bringing public benefits some passions such as greed, envy, vanity and love 
for luxury are not virtuous but the basis of vice because they are motivated by self-interest, and 
also because ‘skilful politicians’ do the job implementing the laws and policies necessary for 
creating those benefits.  
A more interesting case of vice are the actions caused by passions or emotions such as 
pity, compassion and parental love, which can bring public benefits but can also harm society. 
This is because actions caused by those emotions obey ‘an Impulse of Nature, that consults 
neither the publick Interest nor our own Reason, it may produce Evil as well as Good. It has 
help’d to destroy the Honour of Virgins, and corrupted the Integrity of Judges’. Further, ’no 
Pity does more Mischief in the World than what is excited by the Tenderness of Parents, and 
hinders them from managing their Children as their rational Love to them would require.’ 330 
Hence, there is no virtue in such tender passions. First, because there is no reasoning helping 
discriminate between those actions which can bring public benefits from those that can harm 
the society. Second, because even if they do bring some public benefits, they are motivated by 
some expected reward such as fame, adoration and flattery.                                                                                                                                         
Any definition of virtue and vice has two sides, positive and normative. A moral 
psychologist should be mainly concerned with the positive side. The psychologist of moral 
behaviour should engage with the normative debate only for purposes of clarification or 
feedback. To make this distinction may seem obvious and unnecessary, nonetheless both 
aspects are frequently conflated. The distinction between these two aspects in moral psychology 
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constitutes a main claim in this chapter. Moral psychology should be fully recognised as a 
separate scientific branch to be researched and developed by scientists with the use of scientific 
methods. It should not be researched or developed by philosophers, who should instead 
investigate and evaluate such knowledge with the tools and methods available in the philosophy 
of science. Otherwise, confusion can grow further spoiling the advances of scientific knowledge 
of moral behaviour. 
For instance, Frederick Kaye in his comprehensive and still influential study on 
Mandeville finds tension, and even contradiction, between his definition of virtue and the 
refutation of public interest as the motivation for moral action. This happens because if no 
virtuous action exists where public interest is realised through self-denial, there seems to be no 
sense in keeping a definition of virtue which precisely relies on such self-denial. What is then 
the sense in keeping self-denial as criterion if self-interest is universal? For Kaye, the 
introduction of reason and self-denial is actually ‘arbitrary’ and ‘superficial’, a ‘final twist given 
to his thought after it has been worked out in harmony with the opposite or empiric view’.331 
Besides Kaye, three other scholars also try to make sense of the contradiction they find between 
Mandeville definition of virtue and his psychology of universal natural self-interest. They do this 
by trying to establish the ‘true’ moral philosophy Mandeville held.      
Like Kaye, Maurice Goldsmith also recognises the impossibility of distinguishing 
between vice and virtue once self-interest becomes universal. He explains that ‘Mandeville’s 
view destroyed the possibility of distinguishing between virtuous proportionate consumption 
and vicious overconsumption, and thereby undermined the notion that there was a settled social 
order such that what was proper and what was luxury in every rank could be determined.’332 
Once such a distinction collapses, there seems to be no purpose in holding a definition of 
virtue.  
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Goldsmith explains that ‘Mandeville presents the alternative of virtue as a logical rather 
than a practical possibility […] there is no logical inconsistency in holding Mandeville’s strict 
definition of virtue and denying that it is ever exemplified in practice.’333 Indeed, the alleged 
inconsistency disappears if virtue is declared inexistent. He argues that such a ‘strict definition 
of virtue’ was used rather rhetorically to prove the inconsistency between the predominant 
views in moral philosophy and public opinion.  
Hector Monro also believes that virtue is ‘empty’ and that its discussion only carries 
aspirational purposes. He explains that ‘since [virtuous] men do not in fact exist, the best we can 
hope for is that men will control their desires, so as to prevent them from conflicting with the 
good of others.’334 Another scholar, Martin Scott-Taggart also accepts that there are no 
instances of virtuous behaviour but, unlike Kaye, he finds no contradiction in this because he 
argues that Mandeville’s definition of virtue should be understood a ‘regulative notion’ just like 
Kant’s regulative ideals.335  
All four authors place their conclusions on virtue and vice as part of their arguments on 
the kind of moral philosophy Mandeville presumably supported and argued for. Thus, they use 
terms like ‘strict’, ‘rigoristic’, and ‘ascetic’ to describe the definition of virtue. I argue that the 
normative connotations of these terms, and the moral philosophies associated to them, prevent 
any understanding and evaluation of Mandeville’s work as scientific, and therefore as positive. 
They all try to demonstrate that Mandeville was a moralist but none of them considers him as 
an early modern scientist. Consequently, they do not discuss any epistemic standards, 
methodological rules, or any other descriptive and evaluative tools from current philosophy of 
science or any relevant philosophy from the eighteenth century.  
Kaye argues that Mandeville is both a moral anarchist and a utilitarian pioneer, for he 
holds relativist views ‘in theory’, while ‘in practice’ actual moral behaviour was judged as 
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virtuous by its effects on society, i.e. whether they increased or decreased general happiness. 
There is, therefore, a contradiction between theory and practice, and because Kaye believes that 
the morally rigoristic definition of virtue is arbitrary, he solves the problem by arguing for the 
retention of ‘useful vice’ and the rejection of ‘harmful vice’. Once this is done, we can conclude 
that Mandeville was ‘practically, if not always theoretically, a utilitarian’336  
Monro agrees with Kaye, although he goes further by including both vicious passionate 
action and virtuous ‘dispassionate concern for the public good’ as ‘devices’ in a utilitarian moral 
philosophy.337 Goldsmith also believes that Mandeville remained on both sides and served 
utilitarian purposes by ‘retaining definitions of virtue which required acting without a 
consequentialist motive’.338 Against Kaye, Scott-Taggart argues that Mandeville was not a 
utilitarian moralist but a moralist holding mild ascetic views. He claims that if individuals want 
to be consistent, and if they hold an abstract ideal of moral good, they would learn from their 
mistakes and try to meet this ideal by shifting from vice to virtue, that is, from hedonism to a 
mild asceticism.339  
I will not discuss the views from these authors any further because I do not believe there 
is enough evidence to vindicate Mandeville as a moral philosopher, and I do not think that it is 
necessary either. Mandeville did not argue for a moral philosophy in any substantive manner, 
nor did he develop an independent argument that favours some moral philosophy. I believe that 
any attempt at trying to establish a Mandevillian normative ethics as utilitarian, ascetic or 
combining both is mistaken, and it is also alien to the motivations and purposes stated by 
Mandeville himself. In his work, there is an unambiguous commitment to explaining moral 
behaviour by producing a psychological theory.  Evidence from both volumes of The Fable and 
An Enquiry Into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War, show that he fully 
adopted a scientific attitude and used a scientific method for his research into moral psychology 
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and some related social aspects, which led him to a functional explanation of vice and an 
explanation of virtue by design.  
 
4.5. Functional vice 
Kaye, Goldsmith, and Monro do not discuss the existence of a large number of poor workers 
with low wages and no education, which Mandeville recognises as necessary for a booming 
commercial economy based on large exports and an increasing domestic demand for products 
from the rich and middle classes. This omission causes a significant selection bias in their 
arguments because they accept regulated vice as useful, and therefore as consistent with 
utilitarianism, without supplying also a utilitarian argument for the justification of low wages 
and poor education. For the same reasons, the consideration of an ascetic morality by 
Goldsmith and Scott-Taggard is also mistaken. Just like an increase in the number of charity 
schools for the poor is inconsistent with a booming commercial economy, a moral conversion 
of the rich and the middle classes from hedonism and consumerism to asceticism and frugality 
is equally inconsistent, because it would lead to a drastic reduction in the local demand.  
Mandeville explains how self-interest and vice curbed by the government, poor 
education and low income are all functional to a thriving commercial society. Greed, envy, vanity, 
and love for luxury are all examples of vice. Because vice is useful it is turned into a virtue within 
utilitarian moral philosophy. The study of the consequences of individual or collective moral 
behaviour on the society as a whole is often associated with utilitarian arguments in philosophy, 
and related areas of policy-making in economics and political science. However, there is no 
necessary connection between the two. Although utilitarianism relies on functionalism, 
utilitarianism and functionalism are not equivalent. The first one is a moral philosophy; the 
second is a method in the social sciences. Mandeville’s extensive and detailed study of 
unintended consequences must be philosophically analysed and evaluated as a case functional 
explanation in the social sciences. As it was discussed earlier, Mandeville built moral psychology 
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by drawing an analogy with the anatomy and physiology of the human body. This is important 
because explanations in physiology are functional explanations, and because they are taken from 
medicine and biology, functional explanations are a case of methodological naturalism in the 
social sciences.  
Unlike the inferences made by Mandeville on unobservable entities and processes in the 
mind, which can be evaluated using normative standards from the eighteenth century, namely 
those from the vera causa; functionalist explanations cannot be evaluated using criteria from the 
same period because there are none that are appropriate for the task. After the publication in 
1543 of Andreas Vesalius’s book on anatomy De Humani Corporis Fabrica the distinction between 
anatomy and function was not very clear yet.  Later, in 1548 the publication of William Harvey’s 
book Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus on the heart and blood 
circulation laid the initial grounds for the separation between anatomy and function, which were 
fully developed and assimilated decades later. In 1641, Nicolaes Tulp published his influential 
book on anatomy Observationes Medicae; Tulp studied medicine at the University of Leiden, where 
he later became a professor. Encouraged by his father, who was a reputed physician in 
Rotterdam, Mandeville went to Leiden to study medicine and philosophy eleven years after 
Tulp’s death in 1674.340  
In the The Fable of the Bees and other works, Mandeville actually produced functional 
explanations without using any explicit functionalist or physiological vocabulary. This can be 
explained because only a century later physiology emerged as a separate branch in medicine with 
the work of Claude Bernard. Nonetheless, already in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries functional explanations were part of medicine.341     
Due to the lack of methodological standards from that period on functional 
explanations, parts of current criteria can be used. Functionalism in the social sciences has 
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grown in size and sophistication since the publication of the works from Bronislaw Malinowski 
and Alfred Redcliffe-Brown, and more recently those from Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton and 
others.  Many of the methodological standards set by these authors surpass any standard 
applicable to Mandeville’s work, nonetheless the basic but powerful distinction made between 
latent and manifest functions and the basic model of a functionalist explanation can both be 
used.  
Carl Hempel identified four basic components in a functional explanation: a whole or 
system (S), the internal and external conditions around the system (C), a persistent trait in that 
whole (T), and the effects from such a trait which meet a need (N) in that whole or system. If 
the system functions adequately, it is inferred that the effects of the trait have met a certain need 
or condition necessary for the adequate continuous functioning of the system.342  This is the 
basic logical form of functional explanations:   
 
Explanans: • At time t, S functions adequately in conditions C.  
• S functions adequately in conditions C only if condition N is satisfied. 
• If trait T were present in S then, as an effect, condition N would be 
satisfied. 
________________________________________________________ 
Explanandum:       At time t, trait T is present in S. 
 
Using this model, Mandeville’s explanation of vice in England can presented now as a 
functional explanation:  
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Explanans: • In 1723, the English economy was booming having a large number of 
poor uneducated individuals and skilful politicians in government, while 
foreign demand for English woollens and manufactured goods was 
rapidly increasing.  
• The English economy is booming having a large number of poor 
uneducated individuals and skilful politicians in government, while 
foreign demand for English woollens and manufactured goods is rapidly 
increasing; only if employment, wages consumption and exports are 
having a large increase.  
• If every person in England were a self-interested and vice were 
widespread then, as an effect, employment, wages, consumption and 
exports would increase.  
________________________________________________________ 
Explanandum: In 1723, every person in England was a self-interested and vice was 
widespread. 
 
In this functional explanation, S is ‘The English economy is booming’, and C is ‘To have a large 
number of poor uneducated individuals, skilful politicians in government and a rapidly 
increasing foreign demand for English woollens and manufactured goods’. N is ‘Employment, 
wages, consumption and exports have a large increase’, and T is ‘Every person is a self-
interested and vice is widespread’. Hempel identifies a number of problems in functional 
explanations such as the fallacy of affirming the consequent, and he makes a number of 
recommendations on how to fix these problems, for instance by prescribing the use of general 
laws and functional equivalents. It is not necessary to describe these recommendations in more 
detail at this point. All that is epistemically needed in this case is to demonstrate that a persistent 
trait such as self-interest and widespread vide produced unintended effects or consequences, 
which become functional because they satisfy vital needs of the whole society, namely the 
creation of jobs and a rise in wages, consumption and exports.       
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A further appreciation of the functional character of Mandeville’s explanations can be 
reached by comparing it to the functional explanation made by Robert Merton on the 
ceremonial rain dance performed by the Hopi:343  
 
Explanans:  • In 1947 the Hopi tribe remains strong, having an economy based on 
farming and a government with representatives from each village 
forming a council, while it is surrounded by Navajo tribes.  
• The Hopi tribe remains strong, having an economy based on farming 
and a government with representatives from each village forming a 
council, while it is surrounded by Navajo tribes, only if social cohesion 
and group identity are promoted. 
• If a large number of individuals from the Hopi tribe people were to 
participate in the rain dance, then social cohesion and group identity 
would be promoted. 
________________________________________________________ 
Explanandum:   In 1947, the Hopi regularly performed the ceremonial rain dance. 
 
Both the rain dance performed by the Hopi and the self-interested actions with widespread vice 
performed by the English have unintended consequences, which are beneficial to both societies. 
Both explanations produce knowledge of functional properties certain traits have, which are not 
obvious but unexpected and surprising. Merton distinguishes between obvious or manifest 
functions and latent ones. He explains that ‘Manifest functions are those objective consequences 
contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the system which are intended and recognized 
by participants in the system’, and ‘Latent functions, correlatively, being those which are neither 
intended nor recognized.’344 The manifest function of the Hopi dance is to bring rain, while the 
latent function is to promote social cohesion and group identity. The manifest function of self-
interest and vice is to satisfy individual needs, desires and preferences, while the latent one is the 
creation of jobs and a rise in wages, consumption and exports.  
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Merton traces the identification of unintended consequences in the social sciences back 
to Adam Smith and others after him without acknowledging Bernard Mandeville. Such an 
omission is not uncommon, neither Smith nor others gave credit to Mandeville for his scientific 
finding, namely the unexpected functional relationship between public benefits and private 
vices.  
Twenty years later, David Hume produced the first utilitarian definition of virtue based 
on how useful, agreeable or pleasing actions are; this definition set the initial grounds for later 
developments of a utilitarian moral philosophy.345 By a simple definitional change, the whole 
balance between vice and virtue changes since everything Mandeville defined as vice becomes 
virtue.346 Hume did not dispute the overall inner workings of passions and the need for constant 
reward as described by Mandeville, and he did not challenge either the functional relationship 
between public benefits and private vices and self-interest. He only gave a new different 
interpretation to the same set of empirical observations and findings made by Mandeville.  
With his findings on moral psychology and functional explanations, Mandeville forced 
the utilitarian solution to the paradox, which gave rise to a new moral philosophy.  Without 
such empirical findings and explanations, it would not have perhaps been possible for Hume 
and others to contend that usefulness or utility are morally good and self-interest is a virtue. 
Similarly, it would not have perhaps been possible for Adam Smith to produce the metaphor of 
the invisible hand leading self-interest towards the creation of public benefits. Mandeville was 
an early modern forerunner of both functionalism and moral psychology; upon his scientific 
work, utilitarian moral philosophy and the related economic theory were built.   
 
                                            
345 D. Hume (1772), SBN268; see also A. Smith (1790), pp. 178, 188-189; and H. Sidgwick (1907), pp. 
423-426.  
346 See A. Atkinson (1998) and A. Sen (1981) for examples on the significant effect different definitions 
have on measurement in the social sciences.  
 
 
201
4.6. Virtue by design 
It was discussed earlier, all four authors, Kaye, Goldsmith, Monro and Scott-Taggard hold that 
virtue as defined by Mandeville is either inexistent or a mere rhetorical device. Unlike Kaye, 
Goldsmith and Monro leave open the possibility of having cases of virtue open but without 
explaining how such cases can be found. Scott-Taggard argues that reflection guided by a 
regulative ideal would eventually lead to virtue. These ideas were advanced as a solution to the 
negative consequences created by the definition virtue as self-denial.  
Evidence from Mandeville’s work shows that he did not believe virtue was inexistent. 
The opposite conclusion reached by the aforementioned authors can be explained by a failure 
to notice the role of education as a rudimentary form of social engineering. The distinction 
between natural and artificial or artefactual behaviour is crucial for this.  Mandeville distinguishes 
between ‘taught’ and ‘untaught nature’, that is to say, between natural and artefactual. He 
explains that a moral psychology of universal natural self-interest and passions driving human 
behaviour implies the artefactual character of society and its constitution as a polity. Mandeville 
uses the term ‘passions’ instead of the terms ‘emotions’ or ‘sentiments’, which currently are 
more common, he explains that passions such as pride, shame and fear are continuously used 
for shaping human behaviour. For instance, good manners, willingness to fight in a war, 
business partnerships, modesty and restraint of women, marriage and the ability to conceal 
certain passions or emotions are not natural but artefactual, and they all are produced and 
maintained by causing intense fear and shame, and a strong sense of pride and worthiness. It all 
is an intense process of rudimentary social engineering, which starts very early in infancy with 
the use of flattery, threats, punishments and rewards as technologies for shaping human 
behaviour.347    
A more challenging task consists of restraining self-interest and the passions by using 
rational discussion as a technology, which anticipates one of tenets of Enlightenment in 
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continental Europe. In An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity, 
Mandeville explains:   
 
I am willing to allow, that Men may contract a Habit of Virtue, so as to practice it, 
without being sensible of Self-denial, and even that they may take pleasure in Actions 
that would be impracticable to the vicious: But then it is manifest, that this Habit is the 
Work of Art, Education and Custom; and it is never acquired, where the Conquest over 
the Passions had not being already made.348  
 
Already in the second volume of the The Fable of Bees, Mandeville explains that individuals can 
be virtuous ‘by Reason and Experience; and not by Nature, I mean, not by untaught nature.’349 
His definition of virtue is consistent with his refutation of Lord Shaftesbury’s moral psychology 
because Mandeville was refuting the claim that individuals perform actions in the public interest 
by nature. In other words, he was refuting the claims that self-denial is natural. The distinction 
between ‘untaught nature’ and ‘taught nature’, that is, between natural and artefactual behaviour, 
dissolves any possible inconsistency or puzzle between the definitions of virtue and vice. 
Mandeville did not state virtue was inexistent and he did not appeal to logic to solve the 
problem but to education. When he explicates that virtue is ‘the Work of Art, Education, and 
Custom’, he is highlighting the great challenge skilful politicians or other leaders face designing 
and enforcing any law or moral rule either by relying on passions such as shame or pride, or by 
relying on rational discussion. Virtue as self-denial is an artefact; it is the product of art and 
education.  
Mandeville discusses one case only where virtue as self-denial is realised. He finds this 
case in religion, particularly in the Roman Catholics from the eighteenth century and before, 
whose behaviour exhibits a comparatively larger proportion of self-denial than Protestants or 
Muslim Turks. He explains that ‘all Roman Catholicks are brought up in the firm Belief of the 
                                            
348 B. Mandeville (1732b), pp. x-xi.  
349 B. Mandeville (1732) vol. II. p.106.  
 
 
203
Necessity there is of Self-denial. They are strictly forbid to eat Flesh on Fridays; and Pains are 
taken to inspire them from the very Childhood with a Horror against the breaking of 
Commandment. It is incredible, what Force such a Precept is of, and how the Influence of it 
sticks to Men.'  Mandeville explains this successful case of self-denial by referring to the skills 
and knowledge Catholic cardinals and priests had of what can be described as an accurate and 
successful folk moral psychology, which despite not being scientific was highly effective. The 
‘Architects of the Church of Rome’ created the moral rules ‘most difficult to comply with’, and 
were able to get large multitudes to actually follow those rules, ‘not only by Words and in 
Theory, but by Practice and Example.’ 350  
Mandeville acknowledges the existence of vice among Catholics but still finds the 
achievements of the Catholic religious leaders impressive for curbing strong passions such as 
sex, hunger and craving for meet. For analogous reasons, he criticised the moral philosophies of 
Stoicism and that of Lord Shaftesbury, which lack the knowledge of the social technologies 
needed for producing and maintaining the virtuous behaviour they argue for. Because of the 
great success Catholic leaders had in realising the moral philosophy of Roman Catholicism, he 
attributes to them the best knowledge and skills needed for shaping the moral behaviour of 
large multitudes. For instance, he points out to the power of ‘the Fear of an invisible Cause’351 
has shaping the behaviour of large multitudes represented by the devil in different forms, and 
through different means of invisible evil actions. The use the devil was supplemented with the 
skilful design of further devices such as the introduction of a large number of saints people 
could pray asking for help and protection, and a number of rituals such as the confirmation, the 
first communion, the anointing of the sick and many others.  
The case of Catholic behaviour in the eighteenth century and before could be criticised 
as positive evidence of virtue as self-denial; the lack of further evidence could also be criticised 
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but not the lack of any evidence. Kaye, Goldsmith, Monro and Scott-Taggard mistakenly denied 
the existence of any positive evidence put forward by Mandeville. This negative conclusion 
justified the search for the purpose and the moral philosophy that could make sense of the 
choice of the definition of virtue as self-denial. The discussion above shows that such a choice 
was justified and motivated by the idea of making a clear contrast between two Christian moral 
standards, namely the new emerging utilitarian moral philosophy associated to Protestantism, 
and the old moral philosophy of Roman Catholicism.    
Because of the success Catholic religious leaders had shaping behaviour by creating all 
those invisible causes of evil, worship figures and rituals, they proved to have reliable knowledge 
of moral psychology and related social aspects. This success is analogous to that of the skilful 
English politicians in the design of laws, taxes, incentives and penalties during the eighteenth 
century.  In both cases self-interest and the passions were successfully shaped in different 
proportion and through different means with the purpose of creating a booming economy 
based on self-interest, and a widespread religion based on self-denial. Both virtue as self-denial 
and virtue as self-interest curbed with sympathy are artefacts. English politicians and Catholic 
leaders did not have scientific knowledge as we have it now; nonetheless their skills and 
outcomes can be considered as a successful case of folk design and social engineering.  
 
4.7. Design for self-interested knaves  
Besides erecting moral psychology and producing important functional explanations with an 
emphasis on the unintended consequences of moral behaviour, Bernard Mandeville also 
advanced some ideas on design. He did this by arguing for the knaves principle, and by 
discussing some general ideas on a very basic blueprint for a commercial precapitalist society. 
Both the knaves principle and his ideas on such a blueprint are based a moral psychology of 
self-interested passion-driven individuals, who are also knaves. ‘Knavery’ is generic term 
Mandeville uses for referring to any kind of behaviour which remains legal despite being 
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dishonest or corrupt. This kind of behaviour was discussed in chapter two as one of the main 
concerns in current mechanism design theory, there the term ‘cheating’ was used instead also 
with a generic sense. For instance, the economist Leonid Hurwicz explains that the rules in any 
design concerned with an efficient allocation of economic resources ‘requires that no one 
should find profitable to “cheat”, where cheating is defined as behaviour that can be made look 
“legal”.’352  
          Because self-interest and cheating or knavery are universal, it is important to 
design laws and policies that also regulate the behaviour of politicians, this is what the knaves 
principle does.  Later, this principle was also discussed and adopted by David Hume, and more 
recently it has also adopted in public choice theory. The origin of the knaves principle can be 
traced back to 1720, when Mandeville published his essay ‘Of Government’. In this essay, he 
criticises the power kings and their close relatives had to rule in an absolutist fashion, and argues 
instead for a constrained monarchy where the rule of law is applicable not only to all subjects 
but also to all three branches of government, namely the Crown, the Lords and the Commons. 
Mandeville explains how the three forms of government (monarchic, aristocratic and 
democratic) coexist and are actually mixed in the British government. Analysing this mixed 
form of government, he pays special attention to the design of constitutional laws for the 
prevention of tyranny by removing prerogatives of the crown, and by allocating more power to 
parliament.  
Abuse in the use of royal prerogatives such as the arbitrary provision of protection and 
privileges to individuals by exempting them from the rule of law, must be prevented in any 
constitutional contract, this is because ‘all Persons are accountable for their own Actions, and 
that no Order of the King, how plain or express soever, tho’ produced in writing, and 
corroborated with his Sign Manual, can extenuate a Man’s guilt, much less exempt him from it, 
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if in executing that Order he has acted against the Law.’353  Mandeville wanted to prevent cases 
like that that of James II in England, whose dictatorial policies abolished the right to vote for 
members of parliament as well as the right to hold Protestant beliefs. These actions led to the 
Glorious Revolution in 1688, and the eventual coronation of William of Orange and his wife 
Mary as King William III and Queen Mary II.  
The reign of James II came after the restoration of monarchy in England in the 
aftermath of the English Civil War, and the short-lived republican commonwealth under the 
protectorate of Oliver Cromwell. It was a time with continuous political turmoil and prolonged 
social unrest with all events taking place within a short period of five decades. It constitutes the 
historical background in which Mandeville argued for the knaves principle and published the 
essays where he defends individual liberties, religious tolerance and the empowerment of 
parliament, particularly of the Commons and of non-rich Lords. As a result, the knaves 
principle was advanced as a principle for constitutional design:  
 
I have often heard well-meaning People say, that would every Body be honest ours is the 
best Constitution in the World. But this is no Encomium, where every Body will be 
honest and do their Duty, all Governments are good alike. That is the best Constitution 
which provides against the Worst contingencies, that is armed against Knavery, 
Treachery, Deceit, and all the wicked Wiles of humane Cunning, and preserves itself 
firm and remains unshaken, though most Men should prove Knaves. It is that which can 
bear most Fatigues without being disorder’d, and last the longest in Health, is the best.354  
 
Mandeville points out kings and queens as the most conspicuous self-interested knaves, who 
use any prerogative for trying to maximise their own preferences in the social order and the 
allocation of burdens and benefits to specific groups. Queen and kings may engage in matters of 
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public interest and they may eventually play by the rules only because of considerations of self-
interest. Mandeville believed that their knavish and absolutist political tendencies may become 
beneficial to the wider population, if appropriate constitutional constraints are designed and 
implemented for a more equal distribution of political power and land.  
While some prerogatives may be considered necessary and therefore may be granted to 
the king, ‘he has not one that can make him Tyrant, or his Subjects Slaves. The Rights and 
Privileges of Parliament, and the Liberty of the People are as Sacred Branches of the 
Constitution as any thing the King can claim.’355 Echoing James Harrington,356 Mandeville also 
claims that ‘Dominion always follows Property, and that, where the one is wanting, it will ever 
be impracticable for any long Continuance to enforce the other.’357 Therefore, when new 
constitutional reforms are designed, excessive property and excessive power in any of the three 
branches of government must be prevented. Mandeville highlighted the increasing number of 
Lords joining the parliament who were not rich, and estimated that at the time three quarters of 
the total land was owned by the Commons. Such a distribution would prevent any coalition 
between the King and the Lords from overpowering the Commons both economically and 
politically.  
It is impossible for designers to anticipate and prevent all kinds of knavish behaviour 
when they are making a blueprint for a new law or a new constitution. As a generic principle for 
design, the knaves principle meets the requirements of large scope and good knowledge by 
spotting an important problem and suggesting how to solve it. The design of supplementary 
rules and laws is therefore required to deal with specific cases. For instance, on a more specific 
level, Mandeville emphasises the risk of not removing the veto power granted to the Crown as 
part of its prerogatives: ‘Representatives of the People are come on a very foolish Erran[d], if 
there is another Power upon Earth, that without their Consent can make void, and with 
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impunity annul, perhaps the next Day, what they have been enacting with so much Solemnity, 
and after so mature a Deliberation.’358  
The knaves principle is a response to historical events in England and parts of Europe, 
and it also reflects Whig values. 359 The case of tyranny and absolute power exerted by the 
monarchies and the subsequent constitutional changes made leading to parliamentary and 
republican systems, show how the anticipation and effective prevention of undesirable scenarios 
devising new rules are largely determined by past and related experiences as well as on the ability 
to learn from them. Since the time it was published, the knaves principle has been highly praised 
by philosophers and scientists alike as a fundamental principle of design in the social sciences.  
Currently, the knaves principle still captures our basic understanding and fears on 
political abuse and corruption in representative democracies with large bureaucracies. This is 
one of the reasons why this principle still draws the attention of economists, political scientists, 
and philosophers. The knaves principle has been incorporated into public choice theory and 
more widely into game theory, behavioural economics and political theory by economists and 
political theorists such as Ken Binmore360, James M. Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan361, Alan 
Hamlin362, and Bruno Frey;363 and also in public policy by Julian Le Grand364; and in philosophy 
by Philip Pettit365, Daniel Hausman366 and David Gauthier.367 The current impact and influence 
of this principle requires separate research, the current purpose has only been to trace its origin 
and application to design back to the eighteenth century.  
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4.8. Blueprint for a precapitalist commercial society 
In the eighteenth century England was a precapitalist commercial society. Besides studying the 
moral psychology of England during that period, Mandeville also identified some of its main 
structural features, which can be described as a basic blueprint of this type of economy and 
society. Because this economy emerges from a feudal one the blueprint describes two stages. In 
the first stage self-interest and other relevant passions remain ‘dormant’, so the first task 
consists of activating them. In the second stage they are curbed preventing any excess that can 
be harmful to the economy and the society.  
Mandeville compares two types of society: one is a lumpish machine; a frugal and honest 
society that is idle, innocent and ignorant with an opulent and rich society, where the economy 
is booming and the arts and sciences flourish. He explains that without precapitalist reforms 
society remain ‘poor, ignorant, and almost destitute of what we call the Comforts of Life, and all 
the Cardinal Virtues together won’t so much as procure a tolerable Coat or a Porridge-Pot 
among them: For in this State of slothful Ease and stupid Innocence, as you need not fear great 
Vices, so you must not expect any considerable Virtues. Man never exerts himself but when he 
is rous’d by his Desires: While they lie dormant […] the lumpish Machine, without the influence 
of his Passions, may be justly compar’d to a huge wind-mill without a breath of Air.’368 Hence, 
the challenge for the designer consists of producing a blueprint with new laws and moral rules 
that can activate those dormant passions and desires.  
It is the task of skilful politicians as designers to create and pass those new laws and 
policies necessary to turn a feudal society into a precapitalist commercial one. Because 
Mandeville argues that sloth and greed are both self-interested passions, self-interest exists in 
both types of societies. While self-interest, other passions and desires in a feudal society remain 
to a certain extent dormant, in a commercial they are stimulated and turned into greed, vanity, 
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love for luxury and a stronger eagerness for work. This the basic blueprint produced by 
Mandeville for achieving this transformation:  
 
Would you render a Society of Men strong and powerful, you must touch their Passions. 
Divide the land, tho’ there is never so much to spare, and their Possessions will make 
them Covetous: Rouse them, tho’ but in Jest, from their Idleness with Praises, and Pride 
will set them to work in earnest: Teach them Trades and Handicrafts, and you’ll bring 
Envy and Emulation among them: To increase their Numbers, set up a Variety of 
Manufactures, and leave no Ground uncultivated; Let Property be inviolably secured, 
and Privileges equal to all Men; Suffer no body to act but what is lawful, and every body 
to think what he pleases […] Would you have them bold and Warlike, turn to Military 
Discipline, make good use of their Fear, and flatter their Vanity with Art and Assiduity: 
But would you moreover render them an opulent, knowing and polite Nation, teach ’em 
Commerce with Foreign Countries, and if possible get into the Sea, which to compass 
spare no Labour nor Industry, and let no Difficulty deter you from it: Then promote 
Navigation, cherish the Merchant, and encourage Trade in every Branch of it; this will 
bring Riches, and where they are, Arts and Sciences will soon follow.369  
 
Reforms on property rights, exploitation of land and crop production, diversification of 
manufacturing, and expansion of domestic and foreign trade as well as readiness for war, they 
all rely on a folk or scientific social engineering, which can successfully make the transition to 
precapitalist society by reshaping self-interest and other passions and desires. With this 
programme of reforms Mandeville sketches a blueprint for building a rich, warlike, commercial 
society inspired mainly by the Dutch and the English societies of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. These reforms are still fashionable; they are almost the same to those 
implemented in Russia, some East European countries and Chile as it was discussed in chapter 
two. 
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Societies play different games under different social contracts. Different social contracts 
rely on moralities of different kind. The contrast made by Mandeville between a frugal and 
ignorant agrarian society and a lavish and rich commercial society pose a challenge to the 
institutional designer, who has to devise and implement the necessary reforms to transition 
from one social contract to the other preventing chaos and a social collapse. The ultimate aim is 
to have a well-ordered commercial precapitalist society, a rich but vile machine which runs 
steadily and fairly efficiently; a machine whose ‘Vileness of the Ingredients that all together 
compose the wholesome Mixture of a well-order’d society’.370 Such ingredients are described in 
analogy with a ‘Bowl of Punch’:  
 
Avarice should be the Souring and Prodigality the Sweetening of it. The Water I would 
call the Ignorance, Folly and Credulity of the floating insipid Multitude; while the 
Wisdom, Honour, Fortitude and the rest of the Sublime Qualities of Men, which 
separated by Art from the Dregs of Nature the fire of Glory has exalted and refin’d into 
a Spiritual Essence, should be an Equivalent to Brandy.'371    
 
Satirical writing in Mandeville becomes the means for communicating a scientific stance on 
human psychology, which is dispossessed of any romanticism or concession. This is important 
because he criticises that ‘most Writers are always teaching Men what they should be, and hardly 
ever trouble their Heads with telling them what they really are.’372 Mistakenly, some social 
scientists call describe this position as ‘realist’,373 when it should simply be described as 
‘positive’, at least as positive as science can be considering the effect of values. Such a ‘realist’ or 
positive stance has been adopted by the economist James M. Buchanan, founder of public 
choice theory, who calls economists and political scientists to do science ‘without romance’. 
Buchanan explains that he has produced this kind of science thanks to the ‘rediscovery’ of ‘the 
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methods of the eighteenth century philosophers such as Mandeville, Hume, and particularly 
Adam Smith.’374  
Part of the satirical or ‘realist’ attitude of Mandeville may be explained because of his 
Whig position in politics. Ken Binmore, a contemporary Whig economist, shares a similar 
attitude and moral psychology. Binmore explains that a Whig is a leveller who avoids the naivety 
of the Left and the recurrent crisis of the markets by introducing some planning and continuous 
reform. He adopts self-interest as a fundamental moral assumption in game theory and warns 
designers on the naivety and self-deception of those designs that do not rely on penalties for 
enforcing compliance with the rules. He argues that ‘cattle prods’ must be used by the social 
designer preventing excessive deviation and defection. Like Mandeville, Binmore also believes 
that anger, pride and envy are essential elements of human sociality. 375 
From a positive perspective, Mandeville made the first important and long lasting 
contributions to moral psychology, which he placed against mistaken ‘romantic’ psychologies 
like that of Lord Shaftesbury and Stoicism, and he also established important functional 
relationships between individual behaviour and large scale social effects. He exposed the 
functional need for poverty and ignorance in a rich commercial precapitalist society, and also 
the need for producing widespread fear as the means for keeping the population in a permanent 
state of alert in preparation for any eventual war. In the eighteenth century, Mandeville and his 
moral psychology were described by David Hume, Adam Smith and others as ‘malignant 
philosopher’, ‘evil’ and lacking ‘feelings of humanity’.376 This description can be extended to 
current design in economics and political science, which virtually use the same moral 
psychology as it was shown in chapter two. Large parts of current design and the moral 
psychology supporting it are a Mandevillian legacy. Because of the positive nature of moral 
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psychology and design, designers in the social sciences can work for any god or any demon; 
they are highly qualified technocrats who can work for Left and the Right, for the Libertarian 
and the Totalitarian, and for any intermediate position between them. 
 
     —O— 
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Chapter 5 
Self-Interested but Sympathetic 
 
5.0. Introduction  
David Hume has been largely read as a philosopher but not as a scientist. In this chapter I 
discuss his work exclusively as a case of science; in particular as a case of early modern science.  
I examine how the moral psychology of self-interest, sympathy and sentiments of humanity he 
argues for fits with his descriptive sociology of the utilitarian morality in Britain during the 
eighteenth century. I compare the moral psychology from Hume to the moral psychology from 
Mandeville by presenting it as a case of theory choice. I present the ideas on design and 
engineering, which can be extracted from Hume’s work, and I discuss the objections he made to 
the egalitarian distributive justice advanced by James Harrington and by the Levellers.   
David Hume, Adam Smith and Francis Hutcheson regarded the psychology of self-
interest advanced by Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville as the rival theory to be 
defeated; it was a theory ‘making so much noise in the world’, Smith reports377. Hume positively 
praises Mandeville’s theory in the first pages of the Treatise. This volume pays more attention to 
self-interest than An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which Hume discusses the 
disinterested passions of humanity and benevolence in more detail. Both Hume and Smith were 
highly critical of Mandeville’s theory, which they considered to be ‘wholly pernicious’ because it 
leaves no grounds for ‘feelings of humanity’. They actually allude to Hobbes and Mandeville 
with epithets such as ‘sportive sceptic’ and ‘superficial reasoner’, who created a ‘malignant 
philosophy’ and whose reasoning is ‘ingenious sophistry’.378   
Hume strongly criticises the self-interested individuals described by Mandeville who are 
‘monsters’ ‘unconcerned, either for the public good of a community or the private utility of 
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others’379; they are replicas of Ebenezer Scrooge who even at Christmas shows no humanity, no 
concern for others. In contrast, Hume describes a polite, sympathetic and utilitarian individual 
who, despite being self-interested, is capable of performing acts of disinterested benevolence 
and humanity, that is, a Scrooge who is morally reformed by secularised Christian values. Hume 
not only claims that true disinterested charity and beneficence exists grounded in the natural 
sentiments of humanity, but he also claims that these sentiments can ‘overpower’ and ‘over-
balance’ self-interest.380  
The debate between the psychology of self-interested knaves and the psychology of self-
interested sympathetic individuals is about true causes or true motives of moral behaviour. This 
debate is concerned with the ‘metaphysical’ part of moral psychology. Using the same 
naturalistic analogy from Mandeville, Hume explains that the moralist is a painter who is 
concerned with the beauty of moral behaviour, portraying it with ‘the most graceful and 
engaging airs’, whereas the moral anatomist is concerned with ‘the most hideous and 
disagreeable’ parts analogous to the ‘the inward structure of the human body, the position of 
the muscles’ and ‘the fabric of the bones’.381 Hume did not consider himself to be a moralist but 
a moral anatomist; he did not write any substantive normative moral argument. This is why the 
moral philosopher Francis Hutcheson criticised the Treatise because of its lack of ‘Warmth in the 
Cause of Virtue’.382  
Because the different passions and sentiments and their mutual operations cannot be 
observed, such a moral anatomy becomes metaphysics in search for the ‘hidden truths’ and ‘the 
secret springs and principles’ of the inward parts of human nature, which can only be 
discovered by ‘painful’ and ‘abstruse’ enquiry.383 Methodologically, the production of this new 
science represented a great challenge because of the difficulty of producing accurate and reliable 
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knowledge of unobservable entities and processes in the mind by relying on observable 
behaviour. Indeed, Hume wanted to build this new ‘science of man’ as a ‘true metaphysics’ of 
human nature based on ‘experience and observation.’384  
In the introduction to the Treatise and the opening section of the Enquiry, Hume states 
his commitment to the observational and experimental method with an explicit reference to 
Francis Bacon, and also by quoting Isaac Newton. He considers the introduction of the 
experimental method as a key methodological innovation in the study of morality, which would 
allow one to treat ‘passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts’ as ‘matters of fact’ existing ‘in the 
mind’ just as it is done in physics with properties such as ‘sounds, colours, heat, and cold’, so 
that ‘discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable 
advancement of the speculative sciences’.385 In line with this methodological commitment, he 
explicitly appeals to three epistemic criteria in his attempt to refute Mandeville’s psychological 
theory, namely inductive support, experimentum crucis and simplicity. All this seems to provide 
enough evidence for evaluating Hume’s work as case of early modern science. Therefore, the 
new science of man he was erecting must be evaluated by looking into its epistemic merits and 
methodological grounds.  
In section 5.1., I present the controversy between the moral psychologies from Hume 
and Mandeville as a problem of theory choice. I use four criteria for comparing them, namely 
the vera causa principle, inductive support, experimentum crucis and simplicity. On all four criteria 
the moral psychology of universal self-interest from Mandeville performs better than the moral 
psychology of self-interest and sentiments of humanity from Hume, so the first one should be 
chosen as the true or best supported theory. A main problem for Hume’s theory is the lack of a 
refutation of possible self-interested motivations that explain the cases of disinterested 
humanity and generosity. He relies on a simple enumerative induction with a few cases only put 
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forward as evidence. Another important problem is the folk psychology he relies on for building 
his own theory.   
Section 5.2. consists of two main claims. First, I argue that Hume produced a basic 
descriptive moral sociology of utilitarian morality. This is against the characterisation of his 
work as moral philosophy. I do this by showing his explicit commitment to building a moral 
science, and his rejection of the normative method from moral philosophy. Such a descriptive 
moral sociology consists of two major empirical claims, namely the existence of the new moral 
principle of utility and a psychosocial mechanism supporting its implementation. This 
mechanism adjusts individual behaviour to the demands placed by the environment, a utilitarian 
one in this case. Second, I argue that charity, beneficence, clemency, industry and perseverance 
are all artificial virtues, that it to say, they are brought about by incentives and penalties supplied 
by the environment. This is important because Hume argues that these virtues constitute the 
natural support of utilitarian morality.  
In section 5.3., I present and discuss the ideas on design and engineering which can be 
extracted from Hume’s work. Hume was aware of the ontological gap between the ‘is’ and the 
‘ought’, that is, between actual moral behaviour and the possible behaviour depicted in any 
moral philosophy. A moral psychology of self-interest, sentiments of humanity and the ability to 
sympathise does not naturally lead to a utilitarian morality. Therefore, design and engineering 
are needed in order to implement the utilitarian morality closing the ontological gap. I 
summarised the ideas Hume had on such implementation into four principles of design and 
engineering, namely redirection of self-interest, excitement and restraint of sympathy and the 
related sentiments of humanity, propaganda and reinforcement, and rational discussion and 
reflexion.  
Section 5.4. consists of two parts. In the first one, I discuss the case of justice as an 
artificial virtue; there is no instinct, no passion, no affection or any other element of human 
nature which naturally ensures allegiance to justice. Any commitment to it is a product of 
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education and good design and engineering applied to the redirection of self-interest and 
excitement, and restraint of sympathy and the related sentiments of humanity. In the second 
part, I discuss Hume’s rejection of egalitarian distributive justice; he accepted that equality was 
useful and therefore consistent with utilitarian morality, nevertheless he rejected the egalitarian 
ideas advanced by James Harrington and by the Levellers. Hume argues that equality is 
impracticable because people would conceal the real value and size of their wealth and property, 
and pernicious because it can lead to widespread indigence, tyranny and the extinction of 
authority and subordination. I show how these potential problems could be solved rendering 
egalitarianism consistent with a utilitarian morality and with a psychology of self-interest and 
sentiments of humanity.  
In section 5.5., I discuss the case of greedy self-interested individuals who subvert 
utilitarian morality violating the rules of justice; they are the self-interested knaves. In politics 
they act openly and insensibly; in civil society they are act secretly and sensibly. Their behaviour 
compromises the adequate functioning and survival of society, and it also challenges the 
allegiance of the honest and self-interested to those rules. The aim is to evaluate Hume’s 
psychological theory with respect to the means it offers to the designer and engineer for turning 
self-interested political knaves into patriots with a public interest, and self-interested civilian 
knaves into honest members of society. 
 
5.1. Refuting the selfish theory  
As it was explained in the previous chapter, current epistemic criteria used for theory choice 
such as novel predictions, falsifiability or ontological heterogeneity can be inappropriate for a 
choice between moral psychologies of the eighteenth century. Therefore, I use the three criteria 
used by Hume himself, namely inductive support, experimentum crucis and simplicity adding those 
from the vera causa principle, which in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century became 
the systematised expression of the rules Isaac Newton advanced in the Principia. The vera causa 
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principle addresses epistemic concerns analogous to those of Hume and Mandeville concerning 
the knowledge of ‘passions, motives, volitions and thoughts.’386 By using these four criteria, the 
controversy between the psychology of universal natural self-interest from Mandeville, and the 
psychology of natural self-interest and sympathy from Hume, becomes a standard case of 
theory choice.   
This early modern controversy between these two psychologies not only has historical 
value because the debate about self-interest and unselfish behaviour or altruism continues. In 
recent years, rational choice theory and neoclassical economics have been a main battle ground 
for this controversy. The controversy is also relevant today because some of the criteria used 
such as inductive support and simplicity are currently used in theory choice. Today, the 
inference to the best explanation addresses almost the same problems the vera causa principle 
was trying to solve.387   
 Here it is the list with the four criteria to be discussed:  
 Vera causa  
 Inductive support 
 Experimentum crucis 
 Simplicity  
 
Vera causa. To get true and reliable knowledge of unobserved entities and processes 
causally responsible for observable effects became a major challenge in the eighteenth century. 
Hume’s main concern, and indeed the main problem for Newton and other natural scientists at 
the time, was about the standards for accepting an explanation based on unobserved entities. 
The rules of reasoning advanced by Newton constitute a response to this concern. Mandeville’s 
methodological analogy with the inference to the inner pieces and functioning of a spring-watch 
                                            
386 D. Hume (1739-40), SB468-469.  
387 See P. R. Thagard (1978); P. Lipton (2004); and N. Cartwright (1983), pp. 6, 87-99.  
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also reflects the same concern and awareness of the problem. The epistemic justification of the 
existence and causal efficacy of gravitation, self-interest and sympathy was a main scientific 
challenge. In the late eighteenth century this led to the development of the vera causa principle by 
Thomas Reid, John Hershel and Charles Lyell. This method was later used by Charles Darwin 
in his defence of genetic variation across very long periods of time as the true cause for the 
origin of new species, and migration as the true cause for the existence of colonies of the same 
species found in distant places.388  
The first rule of natural philosophy as stated by Newton dictates that ‘No more causes of 
natural things should be admitted than are both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena. As the 
philosophers say: Nature does nothing in vain, and more causes are in vain when fewer suffice. 
For nature is simple and does not indulge in the luxury of superfluous causes.’389 By appealing to 
this methodological rule, Newton was trying to prove the existence of gravitation as the vera 
causa of the attraction between celestial bodies against the vortex theory advanced by Descartes, 
which, by multiplying causes unnecessarily, depicted nature as superfluous and idly complex.390 
Therefore, theoretical simplicity was not an instrumental principle but a realist one justifying the 
choice for theories with fewer unobservable entities.  
Like Newton, Thomas Reid also defines the vera causa principle by using the two criteria 
of truth and causal sufficiency; he writes that ‘when men pretend to account for any of the 
operations of nature, the causes assigned by them ought, as Sir Isaac Newton taught us, to have 
two conditions, otherwise they are good for nothing. First, they ought to be true, to have a real 
existence, and not to be barely conjectured to exist without proof. Secondly, they ought to be 
sufficient to produce the effect.’ 391  John Herschel explained that ‘Newton has applied the term 
verae causae; that is, causes recognized as having real existence in nature, and not being mere 
                                            
388 See M. Ruse (1976); and R Laudan (1982).  
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390 See I. Newton (1726), Book II, proposition 53 and Scholium, and Book III, General Scholium.  
391 T. Reid (1785), p. 80.  
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hypotheses or figments of the mind.’392  As we know, Mandeville draws a similar distinction 
between ‘conjectures’ and ‘knowledge’, arguing that only ‘middling certainty’ can be attained in 
the knowledge of the passions and the mind. 
Just as the controversy between Newton and Descartes was about the true causes of the 
same set of phenomena, namely the motion of the planets, the controversy between Hume and 
Mandeville was about the true causes of the same domain of human behaviour. Newton 
introduced the first rule to prove that his theory had only used the sufficient number of causes, 
whereas Descartes used more than a sufficient number of them. In spite of stating his 
commitment to Newton’s method for the creation of a new moral science, Hume does not 
mention nor discuss Newton’s first rule. Nonetheless, I believe the use of this rule for 
evaluating his moral psychology is both justified and adequate. To explain the same domain of 
human behaviour, Mandeville uses one cause or motive only, i.e. self-interest, whereas Hume 
uses two, i.e. self-interest and the sentiment of humanity and benevolence.   
The actions from Greek and Roman characters such as Pericles, Marcius Berea Soranus, 
Publius Thrasea Paetus and King Henry IV of France are presented as examples of unselfish 
acts of patriotism, statesmanship and friendship motivated by sentiments of humanity and 
benevolence. The main problem with them is the lack of consideration Hume gives to the 
possible existence of self-interested motivations, which he could then refute. In contrast, 
Mandeville considers and refutes possible unselfish motivations for precisely the same kinds of 
actions Hume is using in support of his own theory. Because of this refutation Mandeville’s 
theory must be chosen as the simpler one, while Hume’s theory loses the contest standing as a 
theory ‘indulging in the luxury of superfluous causes’ just like Descartes’s vortex theory did 
against Newton’s theory of gravitation. This is shown in the paragraphs below where the cases 
of Pericles, Marcius Berea Soranus, Publius Thrasea Paetus and King Henry IV of France are 
discussed.    
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Inductive support. Newton’s rule number four explains the epistemic power of 
induction as follows: ‘In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should 
be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena 
make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. This rule should be followed so that 
arguments based on induction may not be nullified by hypotheses.’393 The refutation of 
Mandeville’s psychological theory relies on the existence of acts of disinterested benevolence 
and humanity motivated by sympathy, which Hume claims is a natural component of the 
human mind. Because Mandeville’s theory is universal, one case of disinterested benevolence is 
enough for refuting it. Hume, however, wants to do more than that because he is seeking to 
reduce the scope of self-interest by enlarging the scope of sympathy, producing as many cases 
as possible of disinterested benevolence and humanity. 
The psychological capacity humans have for sympathising with others is the main 
foundation for any benevolent and humanitarian action. Hume defines sympathy as the 
‘communication’ of the ‘inclinations and sentiments’ of others ‘however different from, or even 
contrary to our own’, so ‘hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, mirth and melancholy; all 
these passions I feel more from communication than from my own natural temper and 
disposition’, ‘and ‘tis certain that we may feel sickness and pain from the mere act of 
imagination, and make a malady real by often thinking of it.’394 Within the different passions and 
inclinations sympathy may elicit, Hume selects only those related to humanitarian and 
benevolent actions.  
There are hardly any cases of disinterested benevolence and humanity discussed in the 
Treatise, so specific cases can only be found in the Enquiry.  There, Hume quotes statesmanship, 
patriotism, motherly love, friendship and love relationships as strong evidence for disinterested 
actions, which can prove the existence of humanitarian motives. 
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The first particular case he discusses is that of Pericles, the ‘great Athenian statesman 
and general’, who in his death-bed stopped his friends from paying tribute to him by citing all 
his great achievements as a statesman. He described them as ‘vulgar advantages’ in comparison 
to the ’the most eminent’ of his accomplishments, namely that ‘no citizen has ever yet worne 
mourning on my account.’ Further cases include Marcius Berea Soranus, roman proconsul in 
Asia, and Publius Thrasea Paetus, roman senator and republican leader, who rebelled against the 
emperor Nero; they were ‘intrepid in their fate, and only moved by the melting sorrows of their 
friends and kindred. What sympathy then touches every human heart!’ Then, he quotes the case 
of the mother who ‘loses her health by assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards 
languishes, and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the slavery of that attendance’. And 
also friendship and love relationships when people love and care for others even at the expense 
of being hurt, like King Henry IV of France whose ‘amours and attachments’ ‘during the civil 
wars of the league, frequently hurt his interest and his cause.’395 Hume argues that in all these 
cases, a sympathetic sentiment prompts humanitarian and unselfish actions, which benefit the 
citizens within a country, children within a family and friends and lovers within a close circle. 
No self-interested motivation is considered, self-interest plays no role. 
Unlike Mandeville, Hume does not consider if statesmen, mothers, friends and lovers act 
expecting to be flattered, adored and glorified. This is important because it would allow Hume 
to advance an argument against any self-interested motivation. His method instead is that of 
simple enumerative induction, which was criticised by Francis Bacon, who explained that ‘the 
induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is childish; its conclusions are precarious and 
exposed to peril from a contradictory instance.’396 Both in the Treatise and the Enquiry, Hume 
highly praised the work of Newton and Bacon, whose methods he claimed to be following. The 
lack of consideration to ‘contradictory instances’, that is, to self-interested motives is an 
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important flaw in Hume’s method, who takes the obvious as true making no further enquiry. 
An expectation for glory and public tribute might be the motivation for Pericles, Marcius and 
Publius, whereas overindulgence in sexual passions and fun might be the motivation for Henry 
IV, even at the expense of losing a war. Similar considerations apply to the devoted mother, 
who might be motivated by the veneration she gets from her child. Because Hume does not 
consider opposite motivations, the cases he presents provide poor support to his theory leaving 
it vulnerable to refutation.  
Another important weakness of Hume’s argument is the very small number of cases he 
presents of disinterested actions in both the Treatise and the Enquiry. He was aware of this 
because he finishes his defence of disinterested benevolence by claiming that ‘these and a 
thousand of other distances are marks of general benevolence in human nature’,397 which is a 
poor justification for not providing further evidence. The cases discussed above are cases of 
‘particular benevolence’ delivered to individuals we have a close connection with. In contrast, 
‘general benevolence’ refers to all those individuals outside this close group, for instance those 
living in other countries and any distant place. Hume gives no example of this type of general 
benevolence; in a footnote he only writes: ‘I assume it is as real, from general experience, 
without any other proof’.398  
Hume’s inductive evidence of disinterested benevolent and humanitarian actions is 
clearly small, and it is subject to easy dismissal because he does not consider the existence of 
self-interested motivations and how they could be contested.  As it was shown in the previous 
chapter, the cases discussed by Mandeville are numerous and diverse, ranging from the 
behaviour of businessmen, lawyers and soldiers to motherly care, suicide and moral behaviour 
in other societies such as Spain and Holland. Besides the two volumes of The Fable, there is also 
An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War as well as several other 
essays and books, where Mandeville refined his psychological theory and enlarged the number 
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of cases supporting it. The amount of evidence he provides largely surpasses the evidence 
supplied by Hume in the Treatise and the Enquiry. In consequence, Hume’s argument is poor 
and hardly compelling, and therefore Mandeville’s theory remains stronger and more 
convincing. 
Experimentum crucis. If inductive support is considered insufficient to decide the 
controversy between Hume and Mandeville, it could perhaps be settled by presenting a 
successful limiting case in the critical region of the domain. The experimentum crucis could do this. 
Hume explains that ‘it is easy to attain what natural philosophers, after Lord Bacon, have 
affected to call the experimentum crucis, or that experiment, which points out the right way in any 
doubt or ambiguity.’399 The experiment under consideration is a case of benevolence to enemies. 
Because of its exceptional features within the domain of benevolent actions, it becomes a 
limiting case, even though it actually is not an experiment but rather a case of ‘cautious 
observation’ and ‘experience’ from records in history.400  
Hume describes how Demosthenes, a prominent Greek politician of the fourth century 
B.C., helped his long-standing enemy Aeschines, who was leaving the city after being sent out to 
political exile. Demosthenes ‘secretly followed, offering him money for his support during the 
exile, and soothing him with topics of consolation in his misfortunes “Alas!” cries the banished 
statesman, “with what regret must I leave my friends in this city, where even my enemies are so 
generous!”’401 The case is presented as proving the existence of true generous sympathetic 
passions causing benevolent acts, which overpower selfish sentiments of hatred and revenge. 
Hume concludes that ‘compelled by these instances, we must renounce the theory, which 
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accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love.’402 According to him universal 
self-interest has thus been refuted and, because benevolence to enemies is a limiting case, the 
likelihood of finding disinterested benevolence in the middle regions increases.  
Compared to the Mandevillian theory, Hume’s conclusions seem naïve and deceptive, or 
at least incomplete. This is because he does not consider testing his own explanation against the 
existence of self-interested motivations by asking how much admiration, social tribute, 
reputation and power or personal relief from remorse Demosthenes would get by giving money 
to his enemy. An explanation based on a humanitarian act motivated by true sympathy can raise 
the degree of belief of a true concern for relieving Aeschines’s emotional pain and economic 
hardship, by showing how the rival explanation based on a self-interested passion could be 
dismissed.  This omission undermines the confirmation value of the evidence Hume is 
presenting.  
Hume should have considered at least as equally likely a self-interested motivation, that 
apparent benevolence to enemies could be a calculated act of self-promotion. Indeed, because 
his theory holds that both self-interest and sympathy cause moral behaviour regardless of the 
external aspect of it, both of them should in principle be considered as equally likely. Then, a 
test should be performed or further evidence provided for choosing one cause over the other, 
which could then become an experimentum crucis. Methodologically and epistemologically, a 
theory with two or more causes is more challenging because the number of tests and the need 
for evidence as well as the overall uncertainty increases proportionally to the size of the causal 
set. These are the consequences of multiplying unnecessarily the number of unobserved causes, 
in this case self-interest and sympathy, which is a violation of the first rule from Newton 
discussed above. A further and potentially more damaging problem arises from Hume’s 
decision to stop at the most obvious explanations of moral behaviour which are accepted in 
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‘common life’, that is, folk psychology explanations. This problem is discussed in the next 
paragraphs.  
Simplicity. Hume argues that a theory which holds both self-interest and disinterested 
benevolence is simpler than a theory based only on self-interest. His argument consists of two 
parts, the first one proceeds by a direct comparison between self-interested and disinterested 
actions; the second part relies on an analogy with secondary self-interested passions.  
First part. Hume actually criticises simplicity as a criterion by expressing doubts on the 
prospects for accomplishing in moral psychology the ‘perfect simplicity’ observed in physics. In 
spite of these reservations, he still insists that a theory with two fundamental motives is simpler 
or, more precisely, imperfectly simpler.403 The ‘selfish theory’, he claims, is more complex 
because it uses ‘very intricate and refined reflections’, where ‘metaphysical’ effects of self-
interest are ‘twisted and moulded, by a particular turn of the imagination’ of the scientist, so it 
can explain a ‘variety of appearances’. Hume accepts that people may deceive themselves with 
respect to the ‘predominant motive or intention’, that ‘is indeed, frequently concealed from 
ourselves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives, which the mind, from vanity 
or self-conceit, is desirous of supposing more prevalent.’ However, he thinks that theoreticians 
such as Mandeville have gone too far by inferring self-interested motivations. All this makes the 
selfish theory more complex in the theoretical or ‘imagined’ descriptions it provides of the inner 
workings of self-interest. Because of such descriptive complexity, Hume argues that the theory 
is ‘fallacious’404, that is, false. By contrast, folk psychology–which he calls ‘common life’ 
psychology–offers simpler explanations, and because of this simplicity it should be considered 
as the probable true psychology of moral behaviour: 
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Many an hypothesis in nature, contrary to first appearances, has been found, on more 
accurate scrutiny, solid and satisfactory […] that there is a general presumption for its 
arising from the causes, which are the least obvious and familiar. But the presumption 
always lies on the other side, in all enquiries concerning the origin of our passions, and 
of the internal operations of the human mind. The simplest and most obvious cause, 
which can there be assigned for any phenomenon, is probably the true one.405 
 
Hume recognises that physics has succeeded in going beyond first appearances. However, he 
believes that going beyond the most obvious causes is a methodological mistake in psychology, 
mainly because of the ‘abstruseness’ of the alleged motive and its functioning. He illustrates this 
by explaining how such ‘imagined’ functioning is false in the case of a rich patron who is 
grieving at the death of a poor man, who was also his friend: ‘how can we suppose, that his 
passionate tenderness arises from some metaphysical regards to a self-interest, which has no 
foundation in reality.’ The ‘common life’ psychology tells us that because the patron is rich, it is 
unlikely or false that he grieves the death of a poor friend because of self-interest. In contrast, 
the same folk psychology tells us that if the rich patron dies, the poor man falsely ‘may flatter 
himself, that all his grief arises from generous sentiments, without any mixture of narrow or 
interested considerations.’ The standards of ‘common life’ psychology establish that the 
‘simplest and most obvious cause’406 is the vera causa, the true cause.  
Again, following Mandeville’s method, the alternative hypothesis with non-obvious 
concealed motivations explaining the same behaviour must also be tested with the information 
available. For instance, it should be considered if the same false or self-deceptive flattery Hume 
places on the poor man grieving a rich friend and patron should also be considered in the case 
of the rich man, who may flatter himself for grieving the death of a man who is actually poor, 
dull and ignorant.  
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Hume is right suggesting that by taking a step into a deeper explanatory level the risk of 
failing increases. Nonetheless, physics had proved the success of taking this methodological step 
with the many scientific advances it made. Only by disregarding this success as Hume does, his 
own argument can gather some support. Why psychology should be different from physics? He 
would have to answer this question in order to gain more support for the division he makes by 
placing moral sciences in a separate category. The philosophical debate on such a divide 
between social and natural sciences remains open, and the current advances made by both 
behaviouristic and cognitive psychology have not solved the problem yet. 
With Mandeville, Hume shares the commitment to produce a metaphysics of human 
nature, that is, a psychology postulating unobservable entities and processes. Because of this 
commitment they both share the same epistemological and methodological challenges and risks. 
However, the argument Hume puts forward rejecting on the one hand the metaphysical 
descriptions of the selfish theory, and accepting the metaphysics of folk psychology on the 
other is weak and unpersuasive. Concealed self-interested motives are a main challenge to his 
theory, they are hardly considered and the few occasions when they actually are, they are quickly 
and unconvincingly dismissed. Those concealed motives were the main contribution from 
Hobbes and Mandeville to the explanation of moral and political behaviour.  
Second part. Hume presents an argument by analogy trying to prove the simplicity of his 
theory. He explains that ‘If we consider rightly the matter, we shall find, that the hypothesis, 
which allows of a disinterested benevolence, distinct from self-love, has really more simplicity in 
it, and is more conformable to the analogy of nature’.407 The analogy is set against primary 
appetites like hunger and thirst, which have the acts of drinking and eating as their primary 
ends. When drinking and eating are independently performed without feeling hunger or thirst, 
both their motivation and pleasure are ‘secondary and interested’. Similarly, the desire for fame 
and power becomes independent and secondary, although it is derived from the primary 
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passion of ‘self-love and a desire of happiness.’ In the same manner, acts of benevolence and 
humanity are performed even when people are not in need, such acts are also secondary. By 
analogy, if the love of fame and power ultimately derives its pleasure from self-interest; 
generosity to the prosperous person must ultimately derive its pleasure from disinterested 
benevolence or, as Hume writes, ‘from the combined motives of benevolence and self-
enjoyment’.408 Therefore, any secondary passion, interested or disinterested, cannot be explained 
unless the respective primary passions exist.  
The comments and remarks I have made earlier also apply to this case, i.e. secondary 
passions also have to be tested against self-interest. Enumerative induction is too weak, and a 
single case is even weaker unless supplementary support is provided. Even if the analogy is 
accepted as it stands now, it is still weak like most analogies are. Further tests or evidence have 
to be provided, so that the analogy can gain epistemic strength. However, even if the analogy 
becomes fully warranted, it still remains difficult to accept that a theory with two fundamental 
motives is simpler just because it relies on the non-abstruse, clear and easy metaphysics of folk 
psychology.  
In sum, on all four criteria for theory choice, namely vera causa, inductive support, 
experimentum crucis and simplicity, the psychological theory from Hume achieves a lower score 
than the psychological theory from Mandeville. Consequently, there are better grounds for 
believing in a psychology of universal self-interest than in a psychology combining both self-
interest and sentiments of humanity and generosity.   
Compared to Hume, Mandeville was epistemically more cautions, more rigorous and 
was more aware of the uncertainty involved in making inferences to unobserved entities and 
processes in the mind. There are six rules in his method as well as the analogy he makes with 
the inference to the inner pieces and functioning of a spring-watch. For tackling the problem of 
rival explanations, Mandeville’s own method has two important steps. The first one consists of 
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a test and a deductive inference, that is, any claim on disinterested benevolence as the 
motivation for action must be tested against the rival hypothesis, namely self-interested motives. 
This test takes the form of a refutation. If the rival hypothesis becomes refuted, then via a 
disjunctive syllogism the alternative one significantly increases its chances of being true. The 
second step supplements the first one, first by adding a detailed, penetrating and sharp 
description of how self-interested motives may operate in the particular case under scrutiny, and 
second by adding numerous cases where selfish motivations are confirmed via a simple 
induction leading to a generalisation from other similar cases. In contrast, Hume relies on 
enumerative induction and the number of cases he presents is small. Moreover, the folk 
psychology he relies on had already been discredited, among others, by Thomas Hobbes409 in 
Britain and François de La Rochefoucauld410 in France.  
 
5.2. Moral sociology 
In both the Treatise and the Enquiry Hume states his methodological commitment to 
investigating vice and virtue as a ‘matter of fact’ by ‘uniform experience and observation’, which 
he complements with the rejection of the rationalistic method and deductive inference in 
science, and the rejection of the normative method from moral philosophy.411 He applies this 
factual or empirical inductive method for the explanation of moral behaviour and for 
establishing the moral preferences of society, which he calls ‘moral taste’. The first leads to the 
production of a moral psychology, the second to a descriptive moral sociology. His 
psychological theory explains moral behaviour as caused by self-interest and sympathetic 
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sentiments of humanity and generosity, while his descriptive sociology finds that the British 
society of the eighteenth century has a utilitarian flavour.412 
Currently, in the social sciences there are a number of methods for data collection, data 
interpretation and measurement that were not available in the eighteenth century. Hume 
performs the task of establishing the moral taste of society by collecting evidence on the 
judgements people make approving and disapproving different kinds of moral behaviour and 
architectural styles from houses and buildings. That is to say, he gathers evidence on moral and 
aesthetic judgement to demonstrate the utilitarian flavour of society.  
He realises that the tasks of a descriptive sociology can be tedious. If the metaphysical 
speculation on the passions and the inner working of the mind becomes ‘abstruse’ and ‘minute’, 
the description of the moral judgements of ‘common life’ becomes a ‘superfluous’ task. He 
explains that ‘to prove, by any long detail, that all the qualities, useful to the possessor, are 
approved of, and the contrary censured, would be superfluous. The least reflection on what is 
every day experience in life, will be sufficient.’413 This happens because Hume had to prove 
something that was already obvious to many, and also because of the character of a scientific 
task which consists of reporting findings on the existence, size and characteristics of a social 
feature. Indeed, to the reader the description of conventional judgements on the utilitarian 
approbation of individual and social behaviour of cases like discretion, assiduity, flowing 
affability and delicate modesty may seem uninteresting. However, any judgement on this should 
consider the positive value of the basic descriptive sociology Hume was producing.   
From this sociological perspective, Hume finds that the British society of the early 
eighteenth century had a utilitarian flavour. With this finding he is not making a moral 
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philosophy but a descriptive science; he does not argue in any substantive manner for utility as a 
norm; the purpose is only to demonstrate the predominance of public utility as the actual social 
standard. He explains that ‘it appears to be a matter of fact, that the circumstances of utility, in 
all subjects, is a source of praise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all moral 
decisions concerning merit and demerit of actions: That it is the sole source of that high regard 
paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity: That it is inseparable from all other 
social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation. And, in a 
word, that it is a foundation of the chief part of morals’.414 He unifies the different types of 
utilitarian behaviour he observed into a general principle of utility:  
 
Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and if it is a contradiction in terms, that 
any thing pleases as means to an end, where the end itself nowise affects us. If 
usefulness, therefore, be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not 
always considered with reference to the self; it follows, that everything, which 
contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself to our approbation and good-
will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality.415   
 
Hume was very pleased with this empirical finding as a key element of his science of man, as he 
was aware that no ‘moral writer’ in the past explained morality using utility as a fundamental 
universal criterion.416 By analogy with the explanatory and unifying power of gravity in 
Newtonian physics, he attributes the same explanatory and unifying power to utility, which, he 
claims, binds all individuals with each other just like gravity keeps the planets orbiting around 
the sun.417 Utility therefore becomes a universal principle, which is used in the moral 
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judgements and choices made on different kinds of behaviour. Hume did not produce a moral 
argument justifying the choice on utility as the new moral value and principle for distinguishing 
virtue from vice, he only stated the principle and used it, as a scientist does, for classifying 
particular cases of behaviour as vice or virtue. Therefore, the origin and justification of such a 
principle remain unexplained in his work.  
There are two basic kinds of utilitarian virtuous action, namely self-interested and 
humanitarian or benevolent. The first one is caused by the passion of self-interest; the second 
one is caused by the ability of humans to sympathise with the pain of others. As evidence of the 
first kind of action, Hume quotes the cases of the statesman who serves the public interest and 
the patriot soldier who risks his life for others.418 In contrast, the behaviour of a tyrant is subject 
to social disapproval because of the harm it inflicts onto society as well as the behaviour of the 
industrious person who withholds a number of social benefits by being also a miser. The tyrant 
and the miser are self-interested but their actions are not virtuous, while the actions of the 
statesman and the patriot are both self-interested and virtuous. Hume explains that the ‘open 
demand for praise and admiration’ and ‘an impatient desire for applause’419 from the statesman 
and the patriot do not undermine the virtuous character of their actions because of public 
benefits they create. In contrast, the self-interested actions of monks and friars are not virtuous 
because ‘celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the 
whole train of monkish virtues’ are socially useless, they create no social benefit. More 
specifically, Hume quotes the cases the Roman Catholic Saints Dominic and Ignatius of Loyola 
as examples of such moral vice.420   
                                                                                                                                
in Europe and America, or of the light of a kitchen fire and the sun, or of the reflection of the light on 
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As evidence of the second kind of utilitarian behaviour, Hume quotes the case of the 
generous industrious person who gives charity to the poor and needy421 and the three cases 
discussed in the previous section, namely the rich patron grieving the death of a poor man, 
benevolence to political enemies and motherly love. Hume observed that actions of 
benevolence and humanity are also socially praised as virtuous because of their utilitarian 
properties, he explains that ‘nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the 
sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree; and that a part, at least, of its merit arises from 
its tendency to promote the interest of our species, and bestow happiness on human society.’422 
This set of actions form a separate source of virtue and utilitarian value, which Hume defines as 
follows:  
 
The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which 
recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most 
men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, 
so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and 
conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure, 
according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established. These two 
requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of humanity here insisted on.423 
 
With those examples, Hume wants to demonstrate that this universal sentiment of humanity 
meets those two ‘require circumstances’, namely approval from public opinion and the rule of 
right, which is the utilitarian principle quoted above. Recall that this universal sentiment exists 
because of the ability humans have for sympathising with the pain and suffering of others.424 
Both self-interest and sympathy constitute the psychological foundations of utilitarian morality, 
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which regulates behaviour by promoting disinterested acts of benevolence and self-interested 
actions in pursuit of wealth, fame and admiration.  
Hume explains how the utilitarian morality is maintained through the judgements the 
society as a whole makes upon each individual in combination with an inner psychological 
mechanism. This mechanism consists of the ‘constant habit of surveying ourselves’ examining 
how our actions ‘appear in the eyes of those, who approach and regard us’ in our ‘continual and 
earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in the world’, which ‘is the surest guardian of 
every virtue.’425 As a mechanism it is purely social and psychological or positive without being 
attached to any specific set of moral norms. It is positive because it also regulates criminal 
behaviour within organised crime such that of the robbers and pirates quoted by Hume.426 Only 
when a definition of virtue is added does a moral sense emerge, which ensures the social 
reproduction of a specific set of moral norms.  
Hume argues that such moral sense is natural because of the existence of those natural 
‘generous sentiments’ of humanity, where even the weakest one can produce a basic inner sense 
of right and wrong.427 An internal moral sense, which ‘nature has made universal in the whole 
species’428 makes moral judgements possible. The simplest natural foundation of this sense are 
the sensations of pleasure and pain, so that ‘virtue is distinguish’d by the pleasure, and vice by 
the pain’.429 No moral judgment can be made without these sensory grounds. Reason alone 
cannot be the source of moral judgements. Nonetheless, it holds an important function 
performing the calculation of the amounts of pain and pleasure expected from the different 
choices available. This is important in any social choice because having a concern for ‘justice’ 
and the ‘happiness of mankind’ in the design of ‘municipal laws’ and the ‘debates of civilians’ 
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and the ‘reflections of politicians’, ‘reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and 
humanity makes a distinction in favour of those, which are useful and beneficial.’430   
In this way, as an early modern scientist Hume produces a basic moral sociology which 
consists of two major empirical claims, namely the existence of a new moral principle and a 
psychosocial mechanism supporting its implementation. Judgements from society and laws and 
policies from the government shape individual behaviour giving it a new utilitarian face, such a 
social engineering is accomplished by relying on a psychosocial mechanism, which adjusts 
individual behaviour to the demands placed by the environment. This moral sociology and 
design are supported on a moral psychology with three main claims, namely the existence of 
natural self-interest, natural sentiments of humanity and a universal moral sense. A natural 
psychological ability to sympathise enables those sentiments of humanity by association with 
sensations of pain and pleasure, and those sentiments constitute a natural moral sense, which 
self-interest alone cannot produce.   
As part of this moral psychology, Hume makes a further distinction between natural and 
artificial virtues, which is also relevant for the utilitarian moral sociology he is advancing. For 
instance, he identifies humanity and industry in work as natural, and justice and chastity as 
artificial. By artificial he means that behaviour which can be elicited by changing the 
environment, in particular the structure of incentives and penalties. Against Hume, I argue that 
acts of humanity and generosity he quotes such as charity and beneficence, and self-interested 
ones such as industry in work, and in general the highly diversified expressions of self-interest 
he observed in Britain and other parts of Europe in the early eighteenth century, were not 
natural but artificial. My argument relies on the moral psychology of universal natural self-
interest advanced by Bernard Mandeville. The argument and analysis on ‘artificial virtue’ in this 
chapter is an extension of my argument and analysis on ‘artefactual behaviour’ in chapter two. I 
use terms ‘artefactual’ and ‘artificial’ as synonyms with each other. Both terms refer to 
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behaviour which does not exist naturally, however ‘artefactual’ carries a stronger technological 
connotation.   
In the Treatise Hume asks whether virtue in general is natural or artificial. On the one 
hand, he explains that ‘if ever there was any thing, which cou’d be call’d natural in this sense, the 
sentiments of morality certainly may, because there never was any nation of the world, not any 
single person in any nation, who was utterly depriv’d of them’. On the other hand, he 
recognises that ‘’tis absurd to imagine, that […] these sentiments are produc’d by an original 
quality and primary constitution. For as the number of our duties is, in a manner, infinite, ‘tis 
impossible that our original instincts shou’d extend to each of them’.431 Therefore, a 
considerable number of virtues are artificial. This conclusion has far-reaching consequences for 
the kind of folk social design and engineering performed in early modern times.  
The manipulation of the environment via the provision of rewards and punishment, 
praise and blame makes the difference between artificial and natural virtues. Hume explains that 
justice, allegiance to government, obligation of promises, chastity and sexual fidelity are artificial 
because they ‘may be chang’d by motives of reward and punishment, praise and blame. Hence, 
legislators and divines, and moralists, have principally applied themselves to the regulating these, 
and have endeavour’d to produce additional motives for being virtuous.’432 In contrast, virtues 
such as ‘meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency’433 are natural because they are 
based on the natural sentiment of humanity and benevolence. Other virtues such as ‘industry, 
perseverance, patience, activity, vigilance, application, constancy’434 are also natural because they 
are based on natural ‘qualities of the mind’, which are not voluntary and cannot be elicited with 
the provision of rewards and punishment either. We know, he says, ‘that to punish a man for 
folly, or exhort him to be prudent and sagacious, wou’d have but little effect; tho’ the same 
punishments and exhortations, with regard to justice and injustice, might have a considerable 
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influence.’435 In contrast, I argue that charity, beneficence, clemency, industry and perseverance 
are all artificial, that is to say, they are brought about by incentives and penalties supplied by 
legislators, the clergy, moralists, parents and the society as a whole.  
The psychosocial mechanism described above, where individuals ‘survey themselves’ by 
examining the opinions others have of them in order to calculate the overall balance of their 
own pleasure and pain is a positive psychological description with no moral significance. That is 
to say, those opinions and the pain and pleasure attach to them are mere ‘impressions’. 
Therefore, Hume recognises that ‘the next question is, of what nature are these impressions, 
and after what manner do they operate upon us? Here we cannot remain long in suspense, but 
must pronounce the impression arising from virtue, to be agreeable, and that proceeding from 
vice to be uneasy.’436 Hence, impressions become morally significant only after a notion of 
virtue and vice is attached to them. Mandeville describes a similar mechanism for the origin of 
morality, where shame and pride are the grounds upon which virtues are socially constructed 
through the work of politicians and the clergy.437 Like Mandeville, Hume also accepts the effect 
education and the work of politicians have on the creation of artificial virtues but he makes a 
warning against the extension of this claim to all virtues, that is to say, against the claim that all 
virtues can be constructed without being ‘founded on the original constitution of the mind’, so 
that ‘Tho’ the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary.’438   
The previous chapter showed how Mandeville saw the transition from a largely agrarian 
society to a precapitalist commercial one as the product of large-scale reforms on property 
rights, division of land and crop production, diversification of manufacturing and the expansion 
of domestic and foreign trade. All these reforms lead to the transformation of self-interest from 
a ‘dormant’ state to an intensely active state. The concept of ‘dormant passions’ in agrarian 
societies complements Mandeville’s ideas on design and artificial virtues. He explains that 
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‘dormant passions’ keep every individual as a ‘lumpish Machine, without the Influence of his 
Passions, may be justly compar’d to a huge Wind-mill without a breath of Air’, so ‘Man never 
exerts himself but when he is rous’d by his Desires: While they lie dormant, and there is nothing 
to raise them, his excellence and Abilities will be for ever undiscover’d’.439  
He observed that sloth, ease and ignorance in an agrarian society are also cases of self-
interest, which are opposed to the standards of utilitarian morality. In this way, self-interest 
became far more active and diversified because of the new incentives provided with the new 
reforms. Envy, greed, industry in work and politeness were constructed and reshaped under the 
new economic laws. Therefore, self-interest remains active in both an agrarian and a 
precapitalist commercial society, and during the transition between them. The different 
expressions of an intensively active and diversified self-interest such as industry, perseverance, 
activity, application, constancy, vanity, love of fame and others discussed by Hume were the 
artificial product of the political and economic reforms implemented after the Glorious 
Revolution, which led to a rapid economic growth; by 1750 England was the largest economy in 
Europe.440 A recent case with similar artefactual behavioural changes and an economic boom 
took place in the city of Shenzhen in China, where the first capitalist market was established in 
1979 as a special economic zone; Shenzhen was rapidly transformed from a coastal city with a 
weak local economy based on fishing and agriculture to a thriving industrial commercial port.    
 The same analysis and conclusions on the artificial character of self-interest in England 
during the eighteenth century can also be applied to the disinterested actions of benevolence 
and charity, which Hume argues are natural because they based on a natural sentiment of 
humanity. Mandeville criticised Lord Shaftesbury for mistakenly trying to build a moral 
philosophy upon ‘the ruins of Christianity’441, which had already experienced radical changes 
through the protestant movements and the economic and political reforms of the period. I 
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argue that Hume’s defence of benevolence and humanity as natural was a secularised response 
to the decline of Christian morality as it had been constructed and maintained by the Roman 
Catholic Church for more than ten centuries.  
The Scottish and the English Reformation movements of the sixteenth century gradually 
implemented less demanding Christian moral standards, which Hume witnessed in the 
eighteenth century. In fact, Hume’s rejection of the monkish virtues and his defence of the 
sentiment of humanity and benevolence reflect the Protestant choice, which retained charity 
and beneficence from the Roman Catholic morality. Hume’s choice is remarkable because he 
rejected those virtues from Roman Catholicism, which were more demanding in terms of self-
denial, and therefore less compatible with the new economic order such as fasting, penance, 
celibacy, silence, solitude and mortification. He retained only humanity and benevolence which 
still require self-denial, although comparatively less, and also because these virtues were 
consistent with the new utilitarian morality.  
The previous chapter showed how numerous actions of self-denial were not perceived as 
such by multitudes thanks to the skills of the clergy, who devised a large number of rules, rituals 
and other reinforcement mechanisms. In his book An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the 
Usefulness of Christianity in War, Mandeville recognises the great skills the Roman Catholic clergy 
had, which successfully restrained the self-interested passions of large multitudes with actions 
such as fasting, chastity and no consumption of meat on certain days. He also observed that 
Roman Catholic leaders were more skilful at doing all this than any Protestant or Muslim 
religious leaders at the time. He explained that the quality of those skills could be appreciated 
when individuals ‘contract a Habit of Virtue, so as to practice it, without being sensible of self-
denial and even that they may take Pleasure in Actions that would be impracticable to the 
vicious. But then it is manifest that this Habit is the Work of Art, Education, and Custom; and 
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it never was acquired, where the conquest over the Passions had not been already made.’442 He 
described this as ‘taught nature’ instead of ‘artificial behaviour’.   
Therefore, what Hume saw as disinterested benevolence was the product of moral 
standards, which had been designed and successfully implemented by Roman Catholicism and 
retained by the Church of Scotland.443 They were the product of the design, education and 
continuous reinforcement performed across many generations making the restraint of self-
interest and self-denial almost insensible.  
The utilitarian taste, the intense and diversified self-interest and the acts of charity and 
beneficence Hume observed in eighteenth century Britain, were the artefactual product of 
economic reforms implemented after the Glorious Revolution and the retention of moral 
virtues originally implemented by the Roman Catholic Church. The new utilitarian morality 
based on self-interest and supplemented with acts of benevolence and humanity reflected the 
new Protestant morality and the emergence of a precapitalist commercial economy. Unlike 
Hume, Mandeville shows a sharper awareness of the effects economic reforms and religion 
have on moral behaviour. This explanation tries to answer the question of the origin of the 
utilitarian flavour and the related social behaviour observed by Hume in Britain during the early 
eighteenth century. A historical explanation of virtue built upon Mandeville’s work 
complements the descriptive sociology and psychology from Hume. A historical explanation of 
virtuous behaviour reduces the scope of naturalistic explanations such as that of Hume, and it 
opens new possibilities for constructivist explanations, which place a significant challenge on 
the idea of human nature and natural behaviour with important implications for design and 
engineering in the social sciences.   
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5.3. The engineering of  utilitarian behaviour 
The science of human nature David Hume wanted to erect was a science of matters of fact. 
Nevertheless, he became aware of the gap between those matters of fact, or actual states of 
affairs, and those states of affairs projected in some social and political blueprints available at 
the time. Such an ontological gap implied a new scientific challenge and a shift from a science 
concerned with establishing matters of fact to a science concerned with how to bring about 
states of affairs projected in social blueprints; that is to say, a shift from a factual science to a 
science of design and engineering. In his work, Hume devoted less space to the discussion of 
aspects related to design and engineering, nonetheless they are crucial for the social and political 
matters he was concerned with. In this section, I present the ideas on design and engineering 
which can be extracted from his work.  
A moral psychology of self-interest, a sentiment of humanity and the ability to 
sympathise does not naturally lead to a utilitarian morality.  There is a gap between what Hume 
called human nature and the realisation of any moral standard. There are two important 
challenges related to this gap. The first one consists of accomplishing a successful first 
implementation of new moral norms; the second consists of preventing defection, deviation and 
different forms of corruption of such moral norms. Another important challenge is the moral 
conversion or cooperation from those who remain opposed to the new norms. These 
challenges belong to a science of design and engineering, which has to devise the rules, policies 
and further conditions needed for constructing and maintaining the new behaviour. 
Furthermore, such rules, policies and conditions have to be consistent with the moral 
psychology adopted.  
Hume identifies two important problems for the realisation of the utilitarian morality. 
The first one consists of the narrow scope of generosity, which is limited to a small circle of 
family and friends:  
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When experience has once given us a competent knowledge of human affairs, and has 
taught us the proportion they bear to human passion, we perceive, that the generosity of 
men is very limited, and that it seldom extends beyond their friends and family, or, at 
most, beyond their native country. Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we 
expect not any impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle.444  
 
The second one consists of the dominant role of self-interest as a cause for behaviour, which 
needs to be constantly redirected in order to prevent any harm to society:  
 
no affection of the human mind has both a sufficient force, and a proper direction to 
counterbalance to love of gain, and render men fit members of society, by making them 
abstain from the possessions of others. Benevolence to strangers is too weak for this 
purpose […] There is no passion, therefore, capable of controuling the interested 
affection itself, but the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction.445  
 
Therefore, self-interest is dominant while generosity is weak. Hume claims that nature provided 
us only with the generosity and benevolence necessary for keeping together families and a small 
group around them. Hence, any extension of generosity beyond the close circle and any 
restraint of self-interest are artificial. This is important because it presents the policy-maker and 
the social scientist with the task of fixing and completing the unfinished job of nature by trying 
to make women and men fit for any large or small society, such as nation-states and the 
eventual union of some of them in even larger polities such as the European Union. Any large 
society can function and remain together only through artificial means. From the daily work of 
making new policies and laws to the constitutional changes and the creation of new institutions, 
the designer and engineer face the challenge of devising the means for constructing and 
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maintaining public spirit in society, extended generosity, patriotism, honesty and promise-
keeping among many other types of artificial behaviour.  
Hume explains that self-interest can be redirected from socially harmful greed and theft 
to a socially beneficial greed, which is also beneficial to the individual. This can be done by 
showing the larger benefits to be gained by restraining greed and by cooperating with strangers 
in society, in contrast to ‘running into the solitary and forlorn condition’ if harm is done to 
society. Unrestrained self-interest is narrow and myopic, and it is therefore less rational or 
‘folly’.446 By redirecting it, it becomes ‘sagacious’447, that is, it becomes rational or enlightened 
self-interest.  Therefore, the psychological lesson to be learnt by the designer is not to rely on 
other means except self-interest itself. Hume criticised John Locke’s ideas on a social contract 
and the Whig doctrine of consent because they ignored this important lesson by relying instead 
on promises made among the parties making no provision for self-interest. He insisted on 
claiming that ‘interest is the first obligation to the performance of promises.’448 The case shows 
again the crucial role moral psychology plays in design and engineering.  
How can generosity be extended outside of the close circle of kin relations and friends 
to the wider national society and any foreign one? This can be done by exciting the imagination 
with relevant images of pain and suffering, so that sympathy is artificially produced exciting a 
sentiment of humanity for any person outside the close circle. Sympathy is a fundamental 
psychological mechanism that plays a crucial function in Hume’s moral psychology. It is a 
‘communication of sentiments’ which takes place in our imagination from the sensory input we 
receive from observing other individuals.449 It operates through the capacity the human mind 
has for representing the pain felt by others by associating it with our own. Because of the actual 
use of empathy in psychology and the social sciences as a means for understanding others, it is 
important to explain that for David Hume and Adam Smith sympathy was fundamentally and 
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distinctively about the communication of the sensations of pain and pleasure and the 
production of the related emotions. It was not an intellectual ability allowing us to understand 
others remaining emotionally unaffected.450  
‘Limited generosity’, Hume explains, is the psychological foundation of ‘justice and 
property’, while ‘extended sympathy’ is the psychological foundation of virtue.451 Thus, 
generosity to strangers both local and distant can only be extended through the psychological 
ability of the human species to sympathise with the pain of others. We can sympathise with the 
hardship and pain of the poor feeling compassion for them, and we can also sympathise with 
the pleasure the rich enjoy feeling envy and admiration.  But sympathy can also have negative 
social effects since it is also the source of ‘popular sedition, party zeal, [and] a devoted 
obedience to factious leaders’452, and it can also encourage ‘idleness and debauchery’ through 
charity and beneficence.453 Therefore, extended sympathy has to be both excited and curbed, 
which are important tasks for the designer and the engineer.  
Hume mentions some of the means available for promoting and reinforcing the norms 
of a utilitarian morality, such means include conversation, church services, school education and 
theatre. More generally, he argues that reason and reflection can also be used as means for 
correcting self-interest and extended sympathy, when they are misled by narrow or irrational 
motives, or when they become biased by proximity with those living around us. Thus, ‘the 
intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us from some general 
unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners.’454 
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Earlier, reason only had a calculative function, working out the utilities of different actions. Now, 
as a discursive means, it plays a major role in correcting both self-interest and sympathy.  
Education, religion, conversation and public entertainment become the means for such 
correction ensuring the realisation and adequate functioning of utilitarian morality. Hume 
acknowledges the power of these means in the creation of artificial virtues, which in some cases 
can surpass nature. He explains that ‘precept and education must so far be owned to have a 
powerful influence, that it may frequently increase or diminish, beyond the natural standard, the 
sentiments of approbation and dislike; and may even, in particular instances, create, without any 
natural principle, a new sentiment of this kind’.455  
Socially beneficial sympathy becomes an important feature of human psychology 
because it makes wider socialisation possible by extending emotional affectation and bonds 
beyond the close circle of family and friends. Any extension of sympathetic feelings beyond our 
close circle is artificial, so extended generosity crucially depends on it. The redirection of self-
interest is also artificial and it crucially depends on education. Recall that before being 
restrained, self-interest is intensely activated with the economic reforms that transform any 
agrarian society into a commercial precapitalist one. Therefore, the success of a utilitarian 
morality crucially depends on the balance between self-interest and extended sympathy; the first 
one has to be redirected while the second one has to be both excited and curbed. Hence, 
utilitarian behaviour is artificial; it is the product of design and social engineering. 
Recently, economists and game theorists in social choice theory and welfare economics 
have been using sympathy as a psychological mechanism, which can help solve problems of 
interpersonal utility comparisons as well as for extending generosity beyond close kinship and 
friendship. Kenneth Arrow uses extended sympathy to justify social choices.456 John Harsanyi 
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uses sympathy as a justification for utilitarian norms of distribution,457 while Ken Binmore 
distinguishes sympathy from empathy, using the latter as the psychological foundation for 
extending our concerns on fairness to the whole society.458   
To sum up, the implementation of utilitarian morality requires of the following five 
tasks:  
 Narrow self-interest must be redirected.  
 Limited sympathy must be extended.  
 Socially harmful cases of sympathy must be prevented. 
 Moral norms must be promoted in schools, churches, public entertainment 
centres and in conversation.   
 Deviations from the utilitarian norms must be corrected using rational discussion 
and reflexion. 
 
These five tasks can be summarised into the following four principles, which can be 
described as principles of design and engineering :  
 
i) Redirection of self-interest. 
ii) Excitement and restraint of sympathy and related sentiments of humanity. 
iii) Propaganda and reinforcement. 
iv) Rational discussion and reflexion.   
 
The first two principles are closely related to the utilitarian morality described by Hume, while 
the last two have a more general scope. As it can be appreciated, the implementation of morals 
norms is a difficult scientific and social task. Again, self-interest, sympathy and the sentiment of 
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humanity do not naturally lead to a utilitarian morality, and there is actually no necessary 
connection between the two. Such a moral psychology could support different sets of moral 
norms. No psychology supports one unique set of moral norms. By analogy with theories in the 
natural sciences, we can say that the same moral psychology can support more than one moral 
philosophy. That is to say, moral philosophies are underdetermined by psychological facts and 
theories. This claim can be appreciated further in the next section where two different cases of 
distributive justice are discussed.  
The first two principles listed above are concerned with a utilitarian morality, which 
holds implicit a criterion of distributive justice challenged by alternative criteria existing at the 
time; Hume discusses and resists some of them. They are groups deviating from utilitarian 
morality, ‘common sense’ and the ‘common life’ such as the Covenanters in Scotland, the 
Levellers in England, the Camisards in France and the Anabaptists in Germany, which are 
described as ‘superstitious’ or ‘enthusiasts’.459  Ironically, Hume himself was an enthusiast of the 
new economic order and the new morality it brought with it. The case of the Levellers and the 
Commonwealth of Oceana from James Harrington are discussed in the next section.  
 
5.4. Artificial justice  
Justice, allegiance to government and obligation of promises are all artificial. This is because 
there is no element in the psychological constitution of the human species supporting the 
behaviour expected from these rules. Self-interest, sympathy and the sentiment of humanity do 
not imply a natural inclination to them. Distributive justice deserves attention because it was a 
subject discussed by Hume in the context of his own utilitarian view and rival views on justice 
at the time, and because the concerns and views of that period are still relevant today.  
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Hume explains that property is ‘the object of justice’ which comprises three basic 
general rules, namely ‘the stability of possession, of its transference by consent and of 
performance of promises.’460 With these rules ‘justice evidently tends to promote public utility 
and to support civil society’ but the related sentiment of justice attached to any idea of justice is 
not natural but artificial, because it is ‘derived from our reflecting on that tendency’.461 More 
specifically, justice is the product of convention and education:  
 
Unless, therefore, we will allow, that nature has establish’d a sophistry, and render’d it 
necessary and unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is not 
deriv’d from nature, but arises artificially, tho’ necessarily from education, and human 
conventions.462  
 
Hence, there is no instinct, no passion, no affection or any other part of human nature that 
supports a commitment to the rules of justice. First, he explains that ‘property’ is not a sensible 
quality of any material object, such as an acre of land, so it cannot be considered to be part of 
the land itself or any other material object. Second, he compares justice with virtue and vice, 
which can be defined by degrees whereas the dominion over land or any other material object is 
complete. Third, he describes how proximity and self-interest lead to biased judgements on the 
distribution of property, which are contrary to the abstract character and generality of the rules 
of justice.463 Two further reasons for the artificial character of property are the high variation of 
local ‘municipal laws’, and the ‘finer turns and connexions of imagination, and from the 
subtleties and abstractions of law-topics and reasonings.’464  
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Therefore, a commitment to the rules on property can only come from ‘reason’, 
‘reflexion’, and ‘forethought’ on the ‘whole plan or system.’465 Rational discussion and reflexion 
must appeal to considerations of common interest and public utility in order to redirect narrow 
self-interest: ‘The same self-love, therefore, which renders men so incommodious to each other, 
talking a new and more convenient direction, produces the rules of justice, and is the first motive 
of their observance.’466 Once it has been redirected by reflection, self-interest is best satisfied by 
following the rules of justice for ‘‘tis evident, that the passion is much better satisfy’d by its 
restraint, than by its liberty, and that in preserving society, we make much greater advances in 
the acquiring possessions, than in the solitary and forlorn condition, which must follow upon 
violence and an universal licence.’467 Therefore, a good design on the distribution of property 
must on the one hand be consistent with self-interest, and on the other it must rely on 
education and continuous reinforcement for the prevention of theft and violence.  
Besides self-interest, sympathy and the related sentiment of humanity are also 
fundamental in Humean moral psychology, while in his descriptive sociology moral 
utilitarianism is the dominant theme. Given that justice and the rules of property are artificial, 
there is the important political question closely related to the distribution of property: what kind 
of distributive justice is consistent with a population of self-interested sympathetic individuals 
who have a preference for utilitarian morality?  
As was discussed earlier, within utilitarianism one of the most important artificial tasks 
of design and engineering is to extend sympathy in order to create overall a more egalitarian 
distribution of wealth and property for the benefit of the poor unemployed and low income 
working classes. Thus, equality becomes relevant because it seems to be consistent and the next 
step within the utilitarian rationale, which relies on the extension of sympathy and the related 
sentiments of humanity and benevolence. On the one hand, there is no precise answer on how 
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much wealth should be redistributed without spoiling the motivation and output from the 
industrious self-interested individuals, who can also be sympathetic. On the other hand, there is 
no precise answer on how much inequality should be allowed without creating dangerous 
tensions that lead to conflict and violence from the poor unemployed and low income working 
classes. The amount of inequality can vary significantly. Moreover, any constitutional reform 
must also consider other aspects such as the current form of government, manners, climate, 
religion and commerce.468  
In his essay ‘The Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, Hume considers Oceana from James 
Harrington as the ‘only valuable model of a commonwealth’ in comparison with Plato’s Republic 
and Thomas More’s Utopia.469 Harrington criticised absolute monarchy, pure aristocracy and 
regulated monarchy because all of them excluded the majority of the population from owning 
any share of land. In absolute monarchy ‘one man has the whole, or two parts in three of the 
whole land or territory’; in a pure aristocracy ‘a few men have the whole, or two parts in three of 
the whole land or territory’ having no monarch ruling over them; and in a regulated monarchy 
those few men having ‘the whole, or two parts in three of the whole land or territory’ are ruled 
by a monarch. In contrast, ‘if the many, or the people, have the whole, or two parts in three of 
the whole land or territory, the interest of the many or of the people is the predominant interest, 
and causes democracy.’470  
Harrington devised an agrarian law, which was the fundamental component of the 
blueprint for a republic based on an egalitarian distribution of land. This agrarian law prescribed 
£2000 as the maximum monetary value of any share of land an individual could own in this new 
republic. He assumed that £10,000,000 was the total rental value of the land in England, so the 
minimum number of land owners would be 5000, which represented a large redistribution. 
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Moreover, the number of owners would grow equalising property further because this law also 
prescribed inheritance of land in equal parts to all children in a family.471  
Harrington claims that political power and representation must be supported on wealth 
and property. He explains that ‘empire is of two kinds, domestic and national, or foren and 
provincial. Domestic empire is founded upon dominion’ and ‘Dominion is property real or 
personal, that is to say, in lands, or in mony and goods.’ 472 Political representation with no 
wealth and property means little or no power, so widespread land ownership would be the 
‘foundation’ of the new English polity, which would be reflected in the ‘superstructures’ of 
political representation, namely a Senate with 300 members and Representatives with 1,050 
members. Individuals with a yearly income lower than £1000 would constitute the majority of 
Representatives by filling four-sevenths of the places in order to constitute a popular 
government.473  
Hume dismisses the whole blueprint of the commonwealth of Oceana. He rejects the 
economic foundation because it is ‘impracticable. Men will soon learn the art, which was 
practised in ancient Rome, of concealing their possessions under other people’s names’, while 
rotation of the political superstructure ‘is inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever abilities, 
by intervals, out of public employments’, and it ‘provides not a sufficient security for liberty, or 
the redress of grievances’ between the Senate and the Representatives.474 He then presents his 
own blueprint on the superstructure of a republic describing the different rules and composition 
of the Senate and the Representatives. However, he does not advance any economic reform 
supporting such a political representation. Epistemically and methodologically this is an 
important step back, which ignores the important political discovery Harrington made relating 
the distribution of wealth and property to any design in politics, arguing that the latter one must 
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be adequately supported by the former. Therefore, political blueprints must be consistent with 
the distribution of wealth and property. A blueprint in politics supported on an inadequate 
distribution of wealth and property is a bad blueprint; it constitutes an error of design.  
Note that Hume has rejected equality because it is impracticable but not because it is 
inconsistent with a utilitarian morality. In the Enquiry, he discusses the egalitarian reforms 
proposed by the Levellers; there he recognises that ‘it must, indeed, be confessed, that nature is 
so liberal to mankind, that, were her presents equally divided among the species, and improved 
by art and industry, every individual would enjoy all the necessaries. It must also be confessed, 
that, whenever we depart from this equality, we rob the poor of more satisfaction than we add 
to the rich.’475   
Hume accepts that the ‘the rule of equality’ ‘would be highly useful’ and quotes the cases 
of Sparta, Rome, and ‘many Greek cities’ as successful examples of such equality. However, he 
still rejects such a rule again because it is ‘impracticable’, and also because it is ‘pernicious’. It 
can be pernicious because it can produce opposite effects by increasing poverty instead of 
reducing it. This can happen because any accomplished equality would almost immediately 
break apart due to individual differences in ‘art, care and industry’. First, because if individual 
art, care and industry are supervised this can affect productivity causing ‘most extreme 
indigence’, so that ‘instead of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the 
whole community.’ Second, because in order to maintain strict equality the government needs 
extensive powers, which can easily lead to tyranny. Third, because perfect equality destroys the 
grounds for authority and subordination by reducing ‘all power to a level, as well as property.’476  
On the whole, Hume’s argument against equality is unbalanced, and therefore his 
conclusions are not entirely justified. He quotes at least three cases of success implementing 
equality and makes four objections, namely the possibility of concealing the value and size of 
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property, widespread indigence and poverty, tyranny and the extinction of authority and 
subordination. Although, these objections are plausible they remain hypothetical because no 
example or evidence is quoted, and they may also clash with the cases of success he quotes.  He 
does not explain why equality was successfully accomplished in those cases.  A comparison of 
laws and policies between successful and unsuccessful cases of equality would have made a 
balanced argument with stronger conclusions. For instance, by comparing whatever similarities 
may be found with the Commonwealth of England, which seems to be a case Hume had in 
mind. Surely, there would be important design and engineering lessons to be learnt from both 
successful and unsuccessful cases, which would be in the interest of utilitarian morality.   
I reply to Hume’s objections by referring to some of the solutions discussed in previous 
chapters taken from current design. The four principles of design and engineering listed in the 
previous section are used in the next section, where the problem of self-interested knaves is 
discussed. Harrington does not anticipate the possibility of people concealing the value and size 
of their land, so this objection from Hume is a fair one; it poses a challenge for the designer 
who has to devise the mechanisms which can prevent such behaviour. In chapter two this 
problem is discussed as a problem of ‘cheating’, where cheating can be made look legal. 
Currently, it is the job of mechanism design theorists to try to solve this problem by devising 
mechanisms for the revelation of true preferences.477   
The prediction Hume makes on the creation of widespread indigence and poverty 
deserves two replies. First, in a general unspecific sense, constant control and the requisition of 
part of the productive output from any individual could indeed cause a decrease in productivity 
and the overall output from society. However, just as the problem of concealing the value and 
size of land can be solved with the design of appropriate mechanisms, the bad effects of 
equality may have in reducing productivity could also be solved. Decentralisation, small 
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government and direct local distribution of social outputs are some of the recent solutions 
devised for this problem and for the prevention of tyranny and oppression.  
Second, in a specific concrete sense widespread indigence and poverty existed already 
before and during the eighteenth century when the new English commercial economy was 
booming, and the new utilitarian morality had been adopted. Charity and beneficence were 
clearly insufficient to tackle the problem. This prompted and justified the debate for an 
egalitarian distribution, which would not only reduce indigence and poverty preventing the 
outbreak of war and violence, but it would also increase the social output by stimulating self-
interest and productivity through widespread ownership of land and new opportunities for 
income. Both James Harrington and the Levellers did not argue for the abolition of private 
property, where self-interest may be severely reduced. Instead, they argue for an egalitarian 
distribution of property, which essentially relied on self-interest.478  
The objection Hume makes on the extinction of authority and subordination caused by 
a more egalitarian distribution of property stands against the long struggle for liberty, which 
started with the English Civil War and continued through the Glorious Revolution, and which 
the Levellers and James Harrington were a part of.  Such an extinction seems to be consistent 
with utilitarian morality because of the public benefits it can create by reducing the size of 
government, particularly the part tackling the bad effects of unemployment, low income and 
lack of property or land, such as poverty, crime, illiteracy, illness and food deprivation. 
Furthermore, Hume does not provide a utilitarian argument which justifies the preservation of 
authority and subordination. His defence of authority seems to represent the values inherited 
from the Restoration, which materialised with the formation of the Parliament of Great Britain 
and the bureaucracy of ministries and offices attached to it. 
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If the replies to Hume’s objections are accepted, equality becomes practicable and its 
possible pernicious effects can be prevented, while its consistency with a utilitarian morality and 
a psychology of self-interest, sympathy and sentiments of humanity is retained. The progress 
Hume made on design is comparatively less than the progress he made on moral psychology. 
Both Hume and Mandeville laid the foundations of modern moral psychology, making a lasting 
contribution. One of the most important of these contributions has been the distinction 
between natural virtues and artificial virtues such as justice. This distinction opened up a vast 
new domain for the design and engineering of artificial behaviour in politics and economics, 
which can meet the requirements of distributive justice.   
 
5.5. Self-interested knaves   
In section 5.3., the redirection of socially harmful greedy self-interest became crucial for human 
sociality and for the realisation of utilitarian morality. Hume explains that only ‘the degrees of 
men’s sagacity or folly’ should be considered for turning harmful narrow self-interest into an 
enlightened socially useful one. So, the question ‘concerning the wickedness or goodness of 
human nature, enters not in the least into that other question concerning the origin of 
society.’479  
Most likely, the rejection of natural wickedness was a response to Mandeville, who 
argued that humans are already wicked in the state of nature, so any explanation of human 
sociality must include this psychological feature. ‘Sagacity’ and ‘folly’ are semantically equivalent 
to the current terms ‘rationality’ and ‘irrationality’, so according to Hume a fool or irrational 
greedy self-interested individual would break the rules by seizing wealth and property she is not 
entitled to. She would then be expelled from society, and as a consequence her own expected 
utility would be drastically reduced. In contrast, a rational greedy self-interested individual keeps 
the same expected utility by following the rules.  
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A third possibility opens when wickedness is added to rationality, greed and self-interest 
giving rise to the knave. The first case of a knave to be discussed belongs to party politics, the 
second to civil society. In the first case, self-interested knaves act openly and insensibly; in the 
second case they act secretly and sensibly. The aim of the analysis and discussion of these two 
cases is to evaluate Hume’s psychological theory on the means it offers to the designer for 
preventing knavish behaviour, which harms society and therefore subverts utilitarian morality.  
Knaves in politics. In 1741, twenty-one years after Mandeville introduced the knaves 
principle, Hume reintroduced the principle to politics in his essay ‘Of the Independence of 
Parliament’, where he discusses a failure in the design of the mixed government established after 
the Glorious Revolution. Mandeville was mainly concerned with the abuses and absolute power 
exerted by the Crown, so he argued for a constitutional reform reducing the power of kings and 
queens. Hume had similar concerns for the Commons but unlike Mandeville he did not argue 
for a constitutional reform to solve the problem.  
In his essay, Hume does not acknowledge Mandeville as the author of the knaves 
principle; he makes only a generic reference to those ‘political writers’ who have established this 
maxim. It is important to point this out because currently economists, political scientists and 
philosophers refer to Hume as the proponent of the knaves principle and some ideas related to 
it. Hume presents the knaves principle as follows:  
Political writers have established as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of 
government, and fixing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, every man 
ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private 
interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, 
notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to public good. Without 
this, say they, we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution, and shall find, 
in the end, that we have no security for our liberties or possessions except the good will 
of our rulers; that is, we shall have no security at all. It is, therefore, a just political maxim, 
that every man must be supposed to a knave.480    
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          Like Mandeville, Hume regards self-interest as a dominant psychological motivation in 
politics, that is to say, public interest is not the dominant motivation. Because greed from self-
interested politicians can actually harm society, Hume argues for placing constraints on them, so 
that public interest can be met. This can be done by preventing the concentration of wealth and 
power in the hands of a few politicians by redistributing wealth and power among the different 
branches of government. He explains that ‘where the power is distributed among several courts, 
and several orders of men, we should always consider the separate interest of each court, and 
each order; and, if we find that, by the skilful distribution of power, this interest must 
necessarily, in its operation, concur with the public, we may pronounce that government to be 
wise and happy.’481  
Hume was concerned with the lack of effective controls the Crown and the Lords had 
over the Commons. The Commons had become too independent since they had full power to 
decide many laws and other important decisions such as the allocation of a budget to the 
Crown.  New bills voted in both houses were simply approved by the Crown, which made no 
use of the veto power it had to stop laws that were harmful to their interest and that of the 
Lords. The king did not have any real power since he needed the approval from the Commons 
on many decisions and actions, and the Commons were not expected to give away any share of 
their power. To think otherwise would be foolish and inconsistent with the moral psychology of 
self-interest.482  
Hume explains that ‘Honour, is a great check upon mankind’483 which can help prevent 
abuse and corruption mostly when women and men act individually, but not when they act 
collectively organised in groups such as political parties. Abuse, knavery and other forms of 
corruption in politics become worse when there is no enforcement and no punishment 
considered in the law. He argues that after the Glorious Revolution the distribution of power 
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became corrupted because there was no control over the actions of the Commons. The mixed 
form of government, which was devised as the means for curbing the Crown by giving more 
power to Commons, relied on a mistaken moral psychology applied to political behaviour. It did 
not consider the universality of self-interest and its bad effects; it ignored the knaves principle 
advanced by Mandeville twenty years earlier.   
Consistently with considerations of self-interest and knavery, it would be equally naïve to 
grant more power to the Crown, simply because this would create a harmful imbalance of 
power, placing at risk the democratic progress made with the Glorious Revolution.  The 
allocation of more power to the Lords was not an option either because they were allies of the 
Crown, so it would create a greater imbalance of power. Hume correctly describes these 
imbalances as the ‘paradox of limited monarchy’, he regarded these imbalances as a form of 
political ‘corruption and dependence’,484 which he ultimately accepts making no suggestion on a 
new constitutional design. Although, he believes that a republican form of government is a 
better alternative because ‘checks and controls are more regular in their operation’ and 
‘authority is distributed among several assemblies or senates’, he makes no commitment and no 
argument for it, he just accepts that ‘a limited monarchy admits not any such stability.’485 
Politically and economically Hume was largely conservative; he maintained a generally moderate 
position and supported only a few progressive reforms. In France he was actually praised as a 
conservative intellectual.486 
A shift in the behaviour of the Commons from self-interest to public interest could 
provide a solution to the paradox. As an example, he points out the inefficiencies created in the 
delivery of public services by the imbalance of power, which occurs when the Commons places 
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further conditions for approving the budget or by slowing down its release. He argues that this 
problem, and in general the paradox of a limited monarchy, could be solved if the ‘honest and 
disinterested’487 part of Commons cooperated with the Crown, acting with moderation by 
voluntarily restraining their own self-interest. He believes that the king could reciprocate the 
move by also restraining his own self-interest seeking the preservation of the monarchy; the 
Crown ‘will always command the resolutions of the whole so far, at least, as to preserve the 
ancient constitution from danger.’488 However, these hypotheses and arguments are inconsistent 
with the knaves principle itself, namely the claim that self-interest and knavery dominate in 
party politics and government. The solution Hume offers calling for patriotism and honesty 
enters into conflict with such a principle. This conflict follows from a moral psychology with 
two fundamental features, namely self-interest and sentiments of humanity.  
The conflict may find a solution in the four principles of design and engineering 
discussed in section 5.3. Such principles must be tested against the prospects they have for 
turning self-interested knaves into patriots with a public interest.   Principle number (i) dictates 
redirection of self-interest. In this case it cannot be applied because there is no better alternative 
offered to the Commons, and there is no threat either to dissolve government or have a pro-
monarchy uprising, which would place the interest of the Commons at risk.  Principle number 
(iii) had already failed, because no education, conversation or religious indoctrination had the 
expected effects on the self-interested knaves because they were actually harming the public 
interest.  
Principle number (ii) requires the prevention of cases of sympathy which harm the 
society; party zeal is one of them quoted by Hume himself. Because no redirection of self-
interest is available, the designer can only rely on sentiments of humanity and benevolence, 
which could be excited through sympathy. This actually is what Hume is trying to do when he 
calls for patriotism and honesty. Principle (iv) requires the holding of a rational discussion, 
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which appeals to the moral principles regulating the whole society and the government, that is, 
to utilitarian principles. Hume does not discuss this option in his essay but we can imagine the 
debates held in the Parliament at the time making calls to the Commons to curb their zealous 
partisan attitude, so that the public interest could be properly met by releasing the budget in a 
timely manner to the Crown and by sharing power with it.  
Hume argues that the patriot and the statesman are motivated by ‘generous humanity’.489 
However, the Commons are not patriots because they care more for their own interest than for 
the public interest. In contrast, Hume seems to believe that kings, queens and their appointed 
ministers are patriots who have just been stopped from fully meeting the public interest because 
of the constraints imposed on them by the Commons. Such ambivalent claims and the null 
effects of principle (ii) are the product of a psychology which includes sentiments of humanity 
as one of its foundations, in contrast to a psychology of universal self-interest which is simpler 
and more likely to be effective in preventing knavery in politics.  
It is a major problem not to have the means for preventing knavery and restraining self-
interest which are harmful to the public interest. The moral psychology and the principles of 
design and engineering offer no effective means for solving the paradox, and because Hume 
dismisses the possibility of a republican constitutional reform, no further design solution is 
available. Therefore, the British society of the eighteenth century has no option but to accept 
the paradox of a limited monarchy and the bad effects it has on the public interest. 
Furthermore, the problem is not exclusive of politics but it extends to civil society, where there 
are also self-interested knaves.  
Knaves in civil society. Hume recognises the existence of self-interested knaves in civil 
society as a problem for justice and for the utilitarian morality. An honest greedy self-interested 
individual follows the rules of justice because she is aware of the comparative advantages of 
doing so, when she considers the negative economic and social effects of violating those rules. 
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The insensible greedy self-interested individual violates the rules of justice exposing herself to 
easy punishment and losing all economic and social benefits. The sensible greedy self-interested 
individual violates the rules of justice without exposing herself to punishment, so she keeps all 
economic and social benefits for herself.  
The rules of justice comprise civil laws, laws of war, laws of nations and rules of 
property,490 which as we saw in the previous section consist of three rules, namely stability of 
possession, of its transference by consent and of the performance of promises.491 Hume 
explains that all rules of justice have a utilitarian justification, that is to say, ‘public utility is the 
sole origin of justice; and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the 
sole foundation of its merit.’492 Therefore, sensible and insensible greedy individuals who violate 
the rules of justice affect public utility. The insensible knave is punished by society also for 
utilitarian reasons493 but the sensible knave escapes punishment, so her case represents a 
difficult challenge.  
Within Humean moral psychology and the related principles of design, the prospects of 
turning the sensible knave into an honest self-interested member of society are no better than 
those of turning self-interested knaves in politics into patriots with a public interest. Hume 
explains that:  
 
A sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think, that an act of iniquity or infidelity 
will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable 
breach in the social union and confederacy. That honesty is the best policy may be a 
good general rule; but it is liable to many exceptions.494   
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         The four principles of design and engineering from section 5.3. also fail to deal with the 
sensible knave. Knaves cannot be publicly exposed and punished because they ‘cheat with 
moderation and secrecy’.495  For the same reasons, no rational discussion can be held with them, 
so they cannot be called into reflection and change, and there is no possibility either of directly 
producing in them sympathy and sentiments of humanity. As long as they continue breaking the 
rules of justice it becomes clear that no personal reflection has been powerful enough, and that 
no general attempt at producing sentiments of humanity and benevolence has succeeded either. 
Education, religion and conversation with others have also failed.  
Hume makes a last attempt at minimising the value of the ‘worthless toys and gewgaws’ 
and ‘the feverish empty amusements of luxury and expense’ enjoyed by the knaves, who could 
instead enjoy the ‘conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of nature, 
but above all the peaceful reflection of one’s own conduct.’496 But individual sensible knaves 
and those acting in organised crime also enjoy the benefits just listed by Hume and, contrary 
what he claims, they have no remorse. They enjoy peace of mind and they often feel proud of 
their actions and the material benefits they get just like robbers and pirates do, which are the 
groups Hume quotes as also needing rules of justice for their survival and adequate 
functioning.497 Knaves know that allegiance to the rules of justice is artificial, that is to say, a 
‘noble lie’ and an ‘artificial duty’ as Marcia Baron points out. Because of this awareness and their 
greedy self-interest, they ‘attach less importance to acting justly and will be guided in their 
actions by personal interest, attachments to friends, or the variable, moral standards associated 
with the natural virtues rather than the inflexible rules governing the artificial virtues.’498 David 
Gauthier also believes that Hume has lost the battle against the knave, and agrees with Baron 
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that allegiance to the rules of justice is a lie. However, unlike her, he claims that ‘people need 
not to be lied to, because they lie to themselves’ creating ‘an imaginary motive’.499  
Indeed, in one of his last essays Hume accepts defeat; he explains that the knave has no 
‘humanity, no sympathy with his fellow-creatures, no desire of esteem and applause […] no 
remorse […] I must repeat it, my philosophy affords no remedy in such a case’.500 From this 
conclusion, it follows that any honest self-interested individual in society becomes ‘the cully’ of 
his own ‘integrity’.501 Generalised knavery severely weakens society and it can easily lead to 
chaos and violence. In contrast, moderate knavery can keep the society functioning, particularly 
when the probability of spotting it is low and when the benefits the knaves get are large, which 
can be used to pay for protection from the police, judges and other parts of government. The 
sensible knave challenges the allegiance to rules of justice and the rationality from honest greedy 
self-interested individuals, who now may become fools unless further reasons are provided 
justifying their choices and behaviour.  
Both the sensible knave in society and the knave in politics remain an unresolved 
anomaly in Hume’s moral psychology and for the related principles of design and engineering. 
In contrast, a moral psychology of universal self-interest like that from Mandeville seems to 
provide better means for preventing knavish behaviour. This is because it shows the need for a 
smarter design of incentives, penalties and controls in society and adequate checks and balances 
in politics, which could have been implemented two decades before Hume published his own 
psychological theory of self-interest and sympathy and his descriptive sociology of utilitarian 
morality.  
Currently, the Humean psychological theory of sympathy and the related sentiments of 
humanity and generosity prevail in social choice theory and welfare economics. However, this 
theory has lost the debate in public choice theory and neoclassical economics, where universal 
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self-interest has been adopted. Mistakenly, some neoclassical economists and public choice 
theorists quote Adam Smith, and occasionally David Hume, as the original source of the 
psychology of self-interest, when Mandeville should be quoted instead. The moral psychology 
of universal self-interest from Mandeville is quoted by Right-Libertarian economists such as 
Friedrich Hayek and James M. Buchanan in support of their ideas. However, as I have argued 
such a moral psychology and the related ideas of design and engineering should also be 
considered by Left-Libertarians. Similarly, they could retrospectively be applied to the 
republican egalitarian blueprint from James Harrington and the egalitarian reforms championed 
by the Levellers. 
     —O— 
 
 
267
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
Ahmed, Amel (2013) Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice: Engineering Electoral 
Dominance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Alexandrova, Anna (2008) ‘What Experimental Economics Teaches Us About Models’, Journal 
of Economic Methodology 15 (2): 197-204 
 
Arrow, Kenneth (1977) ‘Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice’, The American 
Economic Review 67 (1): 219-225 
 
________ and Hurwicz, Leonid (ed.) (1977) Studies in Resource Allocation Processes. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Atkinson, Arthur B. (1998) Poverty in Europe. Oxford: Blackwell.   
 
Bacon, Francis (1620) Novum Organon, The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. 4, edition by J. Spedding, 
R. L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath (1857-1874). London: Longman & Co.  
 
Baier, Annette C. (1992) ‘Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response 
to Gauthier’, Hume Studies XVIII (2): 429-440. 
 
Bailer-Jones, Daniela (2009) Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 
University Press. 
 
Baker, Philip; Vernon, Elliot (ed) (2012) The Agreements of the People, the Levellers, and the 
Constitutional Crisis of the English Revolution. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Baron, Marcia (1982) ‘Hume’s Noble Lie: An Account of His Artificial Virtue’, Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy 12 (3): 539-555. 
 
Bartha, Paul (2010) By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical Arguments. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
 
Barry, Norman (1982) ‘The Tradition of Spontaneous Order’, Literature of Liberty 5 (2): 7-58.  
 
Becker, Gary (1976) The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Bengson, John and Moffett, Marc (ed.) (2011) Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and 
Action. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Bentham, Jeremy (1833) The Rationale of Reward, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 2, John 
Bowring (ed.), Edinburg: William Tait Publisher.   
 
Binmore, Ken (1994) Game Theory and the Social Contract, vol. 1, Playing Fair. Cambridge, USA: 
The MIT Press.  
 
 
 
268
________ (1998) Game Theory and the Social Contract vol. 2, Just Playing. Cambridge, USA: The 
MIT Press.  
 
________ (2005) Natural Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
________ (2009) Rational Decisions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
________ and Klemperer, Peter (2002) ‘ The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G 
Telecom Licences’, The Economic Journal 112 (478): C74-C96. 
 
Bjørnskov, Christian and Potrafke, Niklas (2011) ‘Politics and privatization in Central and 
Eastern Europe’, Economics of Transition 19(2): 201–230. 
 
Black, Max (1962) Models and Metaphors. New York: Cornell University Press.  
 
________ (1993) ‘More about metaphor’, in Metaphor and Thought, A. Ortony (ed.), New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Bongie, Laurence (2000) David Hume: Prophet of the Counter-revolution. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
 
Boonin-Vail, David (1994) Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Borhnstedt, G. W., and Stecher, B. M. (eds.) (2002). ‘What we have learned about class size 
reduction in California’. CA, USA: California Department of Education. 
 
Boudon, Raymond (1974) Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons.  
 
________ (1981) The Logic of Social Action. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
 
Boycko, Maxim et al. (1995) Privatizing Russia. Cambridge: The MIT Press.  
 
Brennan, Geoffrey and Buchanan, J. M. (1981) ‘The Normative Purpose of Economic 
'Science': Rediscovery of an Eighteenth Century Method’, International Review of Law and 
Economics I (2): 155-166.  
 
Brennan, Geoffrey and Hamlin, Alan (2000) Democratic Devices and Desires. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Brown, Peter M. (2002) ‘Einstein’s Gravitational Field’. CERN: European Council for Nuclear 
Research.  
 
Buchanan, James M. (1979) ‘Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice 
Theory and its Normative Implications’, IHS-Joumal 3: B1-B11. 
 
________ and Geoffrey Brennan (1983) ‘Predictive Power and Choice Among Regimes’, 
Economic Journal 93 (369): 89-105. 
 
________ and Geoffrey Brennan (1985) The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. With 
a Foreword by Robert D. Tollison and a Note by J. M. Buchanan, 2000, Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund. 
 
 
269
________ et al. (1990) Europe’s Constitutional Future. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.   
 
Bunge, Mario (1999) The Sociology-Philosophy Connection. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.  
 
________ (2004) ‘How Does It Work? The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms’, Philosophy of 
the Social Sciences 34 (2): 182-210. 
 
Campbell, Norman R. (1920) Physics: The Elements. London: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Catania, Charles (ed.) (1988) The Selection of Behaviour: The Operant Behaviorism of B. F. Skinner. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Carnap, Rudolf. (1928) Logical Construction of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. Edition 
with minor correction published in 2003 by Open Court Publishing Company, Illinois. 
 
________ (1934) The Logical Syntax of Language. Edition from 1959 published by Littlefield, 
Adams and Co, New Jersey.  
 
________ (1939) ‘Foundations of Logic and Mathematics’, International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science, vol. I. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
________ (1945) ‘On Inductive Logic’, Philosophy of Science 12 (2): 72-97 
 
________ (1962) Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
________ (1980) “A Basic System of Inductive Logic Part II”, in Studies in Inductive Logic and 
Probability, vol. 2, R.C. Jeffrey (ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Carr, Edward H. (1945) The Twenty Years’ Crisis. With a new introduction by Michael Cox, 2001, 
New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd.  
 
Cartwright, Nancy (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Claredon Press.  
 
________ (1989) Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford: Claredon Press.  
 
________ (1992) ‘Aristotelian Natures and the Modern Experimental Method’, Inference, 
Explanation, and Other Frustrations, J. Earman (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
________ (1999) Dappled World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
________ (2007) Hunting Causes and Using Them. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
________ (2009) ‘Evidence-Based Policy: What’s To Be Done About Relevance?, Philosophical 
Studies 143 (1): 127-136. 
 
________ and Stegenga, Jacob (2011) ‘A Theory of Evidence for Evidence-Based Policy’, 
Proceedings of the British Academy 171: 289–319. 
 
________ and Hardie, Jeremy (2012) Evidence-Based Policy: A Practical Guide To Doing It Better. 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
 
 
270
________ and John Pemberton (2013) ‘Aristotelian Powers: Without them, What Would 
Modern Science do?’, in Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, J. Greco, 
and R. Groff (eds.), 2013, New York: Routledge.  
Cesarano, Filippo (2006) Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Chang, Hasok (2004) Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Chalesworth, James (ed.) (1967) Contemporary Political Analysis. New York: The Free Press.  
 
Cherkaoui, Mohamed (2005) Invisible Codes: Essays on Generative Mechanisms. Oxford: The 
Bardwell Press.  
 
Chiesa, Mecca (1992) ‘Radical Behaviorism and Scientific Frameworks: From Mechanisms to 
Relational Accounts’, American Psychologist 47 (11): 1287-1299.  
 
Chipman, John et al. (ed.) (1990) Preferences, Uncertainty, and Optimality: Essays in Honor of Leonid 
Hurwicz. Boulder: Westview Press.  
 
Chomsky, Noam (1971) ‘Review of B.F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity’, The New York 
Review of Books, Dec 30: 18–24. 
 
Clarke, Edward, H. (1971). "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods", Public Choice 11 (1): 17–33. 
 
Coleman, D. C. (1977) The economy of England 1450-1750. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Collingwood, Robin G. (1946) The Idea of History. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Corbett, Krystilyn (1996 ) ‘The Rise of Private Property Rights in the Broadcast Spectrum’, 
Duke Law Journal 46: 611-650.  
 
Cramton, Peter (1997) ‘The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment’, Journal of Economics 
& Management Strategy 6 (3): 431–495. 
 
Da Costa, Newton and Newton, Steven (2000) ‘‘Models, Theories, and Structures: Thirty Years 
On’, Philosophy of Science (67): S116-S127. 
 
Davidson, Donald (2001) Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
De Finetti (1937) ‘Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources’ in Studies in Subjective 
Probability (1964), H. E. Smokler (eds), New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
De Vries, Marc; Hansson, Sven; Meijers, Anthonie  (eds.) (2012) Norms in Technology. Dordrecht: 
Springer.  
 
Demeulenaere, Pierre (ed.) (2011) Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Doran, Barbara G. (1975) ‘Origins and Consolidation of Field Theory in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain: From the Mechanical to the Electromagnetic View of Nature’, Historical Studies in 
the Physical Sciences 6: 133-260.  
 
 
271
Doris, John M. (ed), (2010) The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Duhem, Pierre (1906) The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
 
Dupré, John (1993) Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, 
USA: Harvard University Press.   
 
________ (1994) ‘Could There Be a Science of Economics’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18: 
363-378. 
 
________ (1996) ‘The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will’, Noûs 30 (10): 385-
402.  
 
_________ (2001) ‘Economics without Mechanism’, in The Economics World View, U. Maki (ed), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Durkheim, Émile (1887) ‘La Science positive de la morale en Allemagne’, Revue Philosophique 24: 
33-58, 113-42, 275-84; translated to English as Ethics and the Sociology of Morals (1993) by 
Robert T. Hall, New York: Prometheus Books. 
 
Dusheiko, Mark et al. (2007) ‘The Impact of Budgets for Gatekeeping Physicians on Patient 
Satisfaction: Evidence from Fundholding’, Journal of Health Economics 26: 742–762. 
 
Einstein, Albert(1905) ‘On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’, in M. N. Saha and S. N. 
Bose (1920) The Principle of Relativity: Original Papers by A. Einstein and H. Minkowski, 
University of Calcutta. Original publication in German: Einstein, A. (1905), "Zur 
Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper", Annalen der Physik 322 (10): 891–921 
 
________ (1920) ‘Ether and the Theory of Relativity’, in Sidelights of Relativity (1922) Trans. by 
G. B. Jeffery and W. Perrett. London: Methuen & co. Ltd.  
 
Elster, Jon (1989) Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
________ (1995) ‘Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process’, Duke Law 
Journal 45 (2): 364-396. 
 
________ (1999) Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
________ (2007) Explaining Social Behaviour: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
________ Offe, Claus; and U. Preuss (1998) Institutional Design in Post-communist Societies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Enthoven, Alain (1985) ‘Reflections on the Management of National Health Service’, Research 
Report. London: Nuffield Trust.  
 
________ (1999) In Pursuit of an Improving National Health Service. London: The Nuffield Trust.  
 
 
 
272
________ (2002) ‘Introducing Market Forces into Health Care: A Tale of Two Countries’, 
Research Report. London: The Nuffield Trust.  
 
Eulau, Heinz (ed.) (1969) Behavioralism in Political Science. New York: Atherton Press.  
  
Fahlman, Scott E. (1979) NETL: A System for Representing and Using Real-world Knowledge. 
Cambridge, USA: The MIT Press 
 
Faraday, Michael (1846) ‘Thoughts on Ray-Vibrations’, in Experimental Researches in Electricity vol. 
III (1855), London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
________ (1851) ‘Twenty-Fifth series’, in Experimental Researches in Electricity vol. III (1855), 
London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
________ (1851) ‘Twenty-Sixth Series’, in Experimental Researches in Electricity vol. III (1855), 
London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
________ (1855) Experimental Researches in Electricity vol. III. London: Taylor and Francis.  
 
________ (1852) ‘On the Physical Character of the Lines of Magnetic Force’, in Experimental 
Researches in Electricity vol. III (1855), London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
________ (1852) ‘On Lines of Magnetic Force; Their Definite Character, Their Distribution 
within a Magnet and Through Space’, in Experimental Researches in Electricity vol. III (1855), 
London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
________ (1855) ‘On Some Points of Magnetic Philosophy’, in Experimental Researches in 
Electricity vol. III (1855) London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
________ (1858) Addendum to ‘On the Conservation of Energy’, in M. Faraday (1859) 
Experimental Researches in Chemistry and Physics. London: Taylor and Francis. 
 
Frey, Bruno (1997) ‘A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues’, The Economic Journal 
107 (443):1043-1053 
 
________ and Stutzer, M; Benz, M. (2001) ‘Trusting Constitutions’, Économie Publique 7 (1): 25-
41. 
 
Foster, Michael (1901). Lectures in the History of Physiology during the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and 
Eighteenth Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Fox, Robert (1971) The Caloric Theory of Gases: from Lavoisier to Regnault. Oxford: Claredon Press.  
 
Frege. Gottlob (1879) Begriffsschrift, in From Frege to Gödel: A source Book in Mathematical Logic 
1879–1931 (1971), Jean van Heijenoort (ed), Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press.  
 
________ (1979) Posthumous Writings, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach  (eds.), 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
Frigg, Roman (2006a) ‘Models’, in The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, vol. 2, S. Sarkar, J. 
Pfeifer, J. Garson (eds.). New York: Routledge.    
 
 
 
273
Frigg, R. (2006b) ‘Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories’, Theoria 55: 49-
65.  
 
Fulton, John F. (1966) Selected Readings in the History of Physiology. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas 
Publisher Ltd. 
Galison, Peter (1987) How Experiments End. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press.  
 
Gauthier, David (1982) ‘Three against Justice: The Foole, the Sensible Knave, and the Lydian 
Shepard’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1): 11-29. 
 
________ (1992) ‘Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave’, Hume Studies, XVIII (2): 401-428.  
 
Geertz, Clifford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books 
 
Gert, Bernard (1967) ‘Hobbes and Psychological Egoism’, Journal of the History of Ideas 28 (4): 
503-520.  
 
Giddens, Anthony (1984) The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Giere, Ronald (1988) Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
Gigerenzer, Gerd & P. Todd (1999) Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Gilles, Donald (2000) Philosophical Theories of Probability. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Goldsmith, Maurice M. (2001) Private Vices, Public Benefits: Bernard Mandeville’s Social and Political 
Thought. Christchurch, New Zealand: Cybereditions Corporation.  
 
Gooding, David (1980) ‘Faraday, Thomson, and the Concept of the Magnetic Field’, The British 
Journal for the History of Science 13 (02): 91–120. 
 
Gooding, Robert (ed.) (1996) The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Goodman, Nelson (1977). The Structure of Appearance. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company. 
 
Granovetter, Mark (1978) ‘Threshold Models of Collective Behaviour’, The American Journal of 
Sociology 83 (6): 1420-1443.  
 
Greig, J. Y. T. (1932) The Letters of David Hume, vol. I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Groves, Theodore (1973). "Incentives in Teams". Econometrica 41 (4): 617–631 
 
________ et al. (1987) Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms: Essays in Honor of Leonid 
Hurwicz. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
Guala, Francesco (2005) The Methodology of Experimental Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
 
 
274
________ (2008) ’The Experimental Philosophy of Experimental Economics: Replies to 
Alexandrova, Hargreaves Heap, Hausman, and Hindriks’, Journal of Economic Methodology 15 
(2): 224-231 
Hallyn, Fernand (ed.) (2000) Metaphor and Analogy of the Sciences. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers.  
 
Harman, Gilbert, (1965) ‘The Best Explanation: Criteria for Choice Theory’, Philosophical Review, 
74: 88–95. 
 
Harman, Peter M. (1990) The Scientific Letters and Papers of James Clerk Maxwell: 1846-1862, 
Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Harsanyi, John (1977) ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour’, Social Research 4 (1): 
623-656. 
 
Harré, Rom (1960) ‘Metaphor, Model and Mechanism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60: 
101–122.  
 
________ (1961) Theories and Things: A Brief Study in Prescriptive Metaphysics. London & New 
York: Sheed and Ward. 
 
________ (1970) The Principles of Scientific Thinking. London: The Macmillan Press 
 
________ (1972) The Philosophies of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 ________ (1986) Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
________ (1988) ‘Where Models and Analogies Really Count’, International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science 2 (2): 118–133.  
 
________ (1999) ‘The Rediscovery of the Human Mind: The Discursive Approach’, Asian 
Journal of Social Psychology 2 (1): 43–62. 
 
________ and Secord, Paul F. (1972) The Explanation of Social Behaviour. Oxford: Basil Blackwell  
 
________ and Madden, Edward (1975) Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
 
________ and Arronson, J. L., and Way, Eileen C. (1995) Realism Recued: How Scientific Progress is 
Possible. Illinois: Open Court.    
 
________ and Arronson, J. L., and Way, Eileen C. (2000) ‘Apparatus as Models of Nature’ in 
Metaphor and Analogy in the Sciences (2000) F. Hallyn (ed),  Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
publishers.  
 
Hart, Oliver and Moore, John (1994) ‘A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human 
Capital’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (4): 841-879.  
 
Harrington, James (1656) The Oceana and Other Works. Edited by John Toland, London: Becket 
and Cadell, 1771. Quotations are taken from the digitised edition published by Liberty 
Fund, 2004, Indianapolis.  
 
 
 
275
Hausman, Alan (1979) ‘Goodman’s Perfect Communities’, Synthese 41: 185-237.  
 
Hausman, Daniel (1998) ‘Rationality and Knavery’ in W. Leinfellner, and E. Köhler (eds.) Game 
Theory, Experience, Rationality, 1998, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Hawley, Katherine (2003) ‘Success and Knowledge-How’, American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1): 
19-31. 
 
Hayek, Friedrich (1943) ‘A Commodity Reserve Currency’, The Economic Journal 53 (210/211): 
176-184. 
 
________ (1945) ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, The American Economic Review 35 (4): 519-
530. 
 
________ (1967) Studies in Philosophy Politics and Economics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
 
________ (1978) New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
 
________ (1982) Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and 
Political Economy. London: Routledge.  
 
Hedström, Peter and Swedberg, Richard (1996) ‘Social Mechanisms’, Acta Sociologica 39 (3): 281-
308. 
 
________ (ed.) (1998) Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hedström, Peter (2005) Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
Helman, David. (ed.) (1988) Analogical Reasoning: Perspectives of Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science 
and Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
 
Hempel, Carl. (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays. New York: The Free Press.   
 
Hesse, Mary (1953) ‘Models in Physics’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (15):198-214. 
 
________ (1961) Forces and Fields: The Concept of Actions at a Distance in the History of Physics. 
London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd.  
 
________ (1964) ‘Analogy and Confirmation Theory’, Philosophy of Science 31 (4):319-327. 
 
________ (1965), ‘The explanatory function of metaphor’, in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of 
Science; Y Bar-Hillel (ed), Amsterdam: North-Holland 
 
________ (1966) Models and Analogies. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.   
 
________ (1970) ‘An Inductive Logic of Theories’, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 
IV, M. Radner and S. Winocur (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
 
 
276
________ (1975) ‘Bayesianism and Initial Probabilities’ Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science VI, G. Maxwell and R. Anderson (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
________ (1988) ‘Theories, Family Resemblances and Analogy’ in D. Helman (ed) Analogical 
Reasoning. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   
________ (1993) ‘Models, Metaphors and Truth’, in Knowledge and Language Vol. III: Metaphor 
and Knowledge, F. R. Ankersmit and J.J.A. Moij (eds), Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
 
Herschel, John (1831) A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. Original edition 
reprinted in 2009 by Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hitlin, Steven and Vaisey, Stephen (eds.) (2010) Handbook of the Sociology of Morality. New York: 
Springer.  
 
Hindriks, Frank (2008) ‘The Scope of Experimental Economics’, Journal of Economic Methodology 
15 (2): 216-222. 
Hobbes, Thomas (1642) De Cive. Critical edition by Howard Warrender, 1983, New York 
Oxford University Press.  
 
_________ (1651) Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power of Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil. 
Critical edition by Noel Malcom, 2012, Oxford University Press. 
 
Hume, David (1739-40) A Treatise of Human Nature. Critical edition in two volumes by David F. 
Norton and Mary J. Norton for The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, 
2007. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
________ (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Critical edition by Tom L. 
Beauchamp for The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, 2000. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
_________ (1772) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Critical edition by Tom L. 
Beauchamp for The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume, 1998. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
________ (1777) Essays: Moral, Political and Literary. Revised edition by E.F. Miller, 1987. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
 
Hurwicz, Leonid (1960) ‘Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation 
Processes’, in Mathematical Methods in The Social Sciences, K. J. Arrow,  S Karlin, and P. 
Suppes (eds.) Stanford: Stanford University Press.  Quotations taken from a reprint in K. 
J. Arrow and Hurwicz (1977) Studies in Allocation Resource Processes. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
________ (1972) ‘On Informationally Decentralized Systems’, in C. B. McGuire and R. Radner 
(eds.) Decision and Organization: a Volume in Honor of Jacob Marshak (1972) Amsterdam and 
London: North-Holland. Quotations taken from a reprint in K. J. Arrow and Hurwicz 
(1977) Studies in Allocation Resource Processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
________ (1973) ‘The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation’, The American Economic 
Review 63 (2): 1-30. 
 
 
 
277
________ and Reiter, Stanley (2006) Designing Economic Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Hutcheson, Francis (1726) An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two 
Treatises. Edition by Wolfgang Leidhold, 2004, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
 
Jackson, Frank and Smith, Michael (eds.), (2005) The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Jacobson, Marcus (1993) Foundations of Neuroscience. New York: Plenum Press.  
 
Jones, Bence (1870) The Life and Letters of Faraday vol. II. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 
 Kahneman, Daniel; Slovic, Paul, and Tversky, Amos (1982) Judgement Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Kavka, Gregory (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton university 
Press.  
 
Keynes, John Maynard (1921) A Treatise on Probability. London: MacMillan and Co. Limited.   
 
________ (1923) A Tract on Monetary Reform. London: Macmillan and Co. Limited.  
 
________ (1943) ‘The Objective of International Price Stability’, The Economic Journal 53 
(210/211): 185-187.  
 
Klemperer, Paul (2004) Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Kripke, Saul (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press.  
 
La Rochefoucauld, François de (1678) Collected Maxims and Other Reflections. Critical edition by 
E.H. Blackmore, A.M. Blackmore, and F. Giguère, 2007, New York: Oxford University 
Press.   
 
Laudan, Rachel (1982) The Role of Methodology in Lyell’s Science’, Studies in the History of 
Philosophy of Science 13 (3):215-249. 
 
Layton, Edwin (1987) ‘Through the Looking Glass, or News from Lake Mirror Image’, 
Technology and Culture 28 (3): 594-607.  
 
Ledyard, John et. al. (1997) ‘Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms’, Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy 6 (3): 639-675. 
 
Le Grand, Julian; Mays, N; and Mulligan J. (eds) (1998) Learning from the NHS Internal Market. 
London: King's Fund.  
 
________ (2003) Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights & Knaves, Paws & Queens. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Levy, Michael (1983) ‘Freedom, Property and the Levellers: The Case of John Lilburne’, The 
Western Political Quarterly 36 (1): 116-133. 
 
Lewis, David (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  
 
 
 
278
Little, Daniel (1991) Varieties of Social Explanation. Colorado: Westview Press 
 
________ (1998) Microfoundations, Method and Causation. New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers:  
 
________ (2013) ‘Disaggregating Historical Explanation: The Move to Social Mechanisms in 
the Philosophy of History’, Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 1-7. 
 
Lipton, Peter (2004) Inference to the Best Explanation. London: Routledge.   
  
Livingston, Donal (1984) Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.  
 
Losee, John (2001) A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Macpherson, Crawford B.  (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. 
With a new introduction by F. Cunningham, 2011, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
McAfee, Preston and McMillan, John (1996) ‘Analyzing the Airwaves Auction’, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 10 (1): 159-175.  
 
Mandeville, Bernard (1720) Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church and National Happiness. Edited 
with an introduction and textual notes on the first (1720) and second (1729) editions, 
bibliography and supplementary index by Irwin Primer. 2001. New Jersey: Transactions 
Publishers.   
 
________ (1732) The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, 2 vols., with a Commentary, 
Critical, Historical, and Explanatory by F.B. Kaye, 1988, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.  
 
________ (1732a) Letter to Dion, with an Introduction by Jacob Viner, 1953,  Los Angeles: 
University of California Press.  
 
________ (1732b) An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War. 
Facsimile edition with an Introduction by M. M. Goldsmith, 1971, London: Frank Cass & 
Co. Ltd. 
 
Martin, Thomas (1932-1936) Faraday's Diary: Being the Various Philosophical Notes of Experimental 
Investigation Made by Michael Faraday during the Years 1820-1862, vol. V. London: G. Bell and 
Sons Ltd.  
 
Maskin , Eric and J. J. Laffont (1979) ‘A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing 
Mechanisms’, in Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences (1979) J. J. Laffont (ed.), Amsterdam: 
North Holand.  
 
________ &  S. Baliga (2003) ‘Mechanism Design for the Environment’, in Handbook of 
Environmental Economics, Vol. 1, K.G. Mäler and J. Vincent (eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science.  
 
Maxwell, James Clerk (1855-1856) ‘On Faradays Lines of Force’, Transactions of the 
Cambridge Philosophical Society, Vol. X, Part I.  
 
 
 
279
________ (1861-62) ‘On Physical Lines of Force’, The London, Edinburg and Philosophical 
Magazine and Journal of Science; in four parts: Vol. XXI, pp. 161-175, 281-291, 338-348 parts 
1-III, Vol. XXIII, pp. 12-24, 85-95 parts III-IV. Also, in The Scientific Papers of Clerk 
Maxwell, vol. I (1890), W. D. Niven (ed.), Cambridge University Press.  
 
Maynard, Alan (1986) ‘Performance Incentives in General Practice’, in Health Education and 
General Practice, Teeling Smith G. (ed.), London: Office of Health Economics. 
 
________ Marinker, Marshall and Pereira, Denis (1986) ‘The Doctor, The Patient, And Their 
Contract: I. The General Practitioner's Contract: Why Change It?, II. A Good Practice 
Allowance: Is It Feasible?, III. Alternative Contracts: Are They Viable? ’, British Medical 
Journal 292(6531): 1313-1315, (6532): 1374-1376, (6533): 1438-1440.  
 
McMillan, John (1994) ‘Selling Spectrum Rights’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (3): 145-
162.  
 
Menger, Carl (1871) Principles of Economics. Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007, with a 
foreword by Peter G. Klein and introduction by F. A. Hayek. 
Merton, Robert (1968) Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press. 
 
________ (1936) ‘The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action’, American 
Sociological Review 1 (6): 894-904. 
 
Milgrom, Paul (1994) ‘Access to Airwaves: Going, Going, Gone’, Stanford Business School 
Magazine, June 1994. 
 
________ (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Miller, Eugene (1962) ‘David Hume: Whig or Tory?’, New Individualist Review 1 (4): 19-27.  
 
Monro, Hector (1975) The Ambivalence of Bernard Mandeville. Oxford: Claredon Press.  
 
Morgan, Mary and Morrison, Margaret (eds) (1999) Models as Mediators: Perspectives in the Social 
and the Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Mossner, E. C. (1980) The Life of David Hume. Edinburg: Nelson. 
 
Myerson, Roger B. (1979) ‘Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem’, Econometrica 
47: 61–74. 
 
________ (1981) ‘Optimal Auction Design’, Mathematics of Operation Research 6: 58-73. 
 
________ & Satterthwaite, M. (1983) ‘Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading’, Journal of 
Economic Theory 29: 265-81. 
 
Nersessian, N. (1984) Faraday to Einstein: Constructing the Meaning in Scientific Theories. Dordrecht: 
Marinus Hijhoff Publishers.  
 
Newton, Isaac (1717) Opticks. London: William Innys Printer.    
 
 
 
280
________ (1726) The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. New translation by J. 
B. Cohen and A. Whitman with a Guide by J. B. Cohen, 1999, California: University of 
California Press. 
 
Norris, Pippa (2004) Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behaviour. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
North, Douglas (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
________ L. Aston, and T. Eggertsson (1996) Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Nurmi, Hannu (1998) Rational Behaviour and the Design of Institutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Inc.  
 
Oakeshott, Michael (1947) ‘Rationalism in Politics’, Cambridge Journal 1 (2): 81-98, 145-157. 
Quotations taken from M. Oakeshott (1991) Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. New 
and Expanded Edition with a Foreword by Timothy Fuller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. A 
new edition of this paper published with minor revisions in 1962, which was reprinted in 
1991.    
Ormrod, David (2003) The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of 
Mercantilism, 1650-1770. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Ortony, Andrew (1993) Metaphor and Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Ostrom, Elinor (2005) Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Parsons, Talcott (1939) ‘The Professions and Social Structure’, Social Forces. 17 (4): 457-467.  
 
________ (1947) ‘Certain Primary Sources and Patterns of Aggression in the Social Structure 
of the Western World’, Psychiatry 10 (2): 167-181. 
 
________ (1951) The Social System. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Quotations taken 
from the 1991 edition with a New Preface by Bryan S. Turner also published by Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. 
 
Persaud, T. V. N. (1997) A History of Anatomy: The Post-Vesalian Era. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas 
Publisher Ltd. 
 
Peters, B. Guy (2012) Institutional Theory in Political Science. New York: Continuum Publishing 
Group. 
 
Pettit, Philip (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
________ (2002) Rules, Reasons and Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Pitt, Joseph (2001) ‘What Engineers Know’, Tecné 5 (3): 17-30. 
 
Plott, Charles R. (1997) ‘Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction’, 
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 6 (3): 605–638. 
 
 
281
Polanyi, Michael (1940) The Contempt of Freedom. London: Watts & Co.  
 
Popper, Karl (1961) The Poverty of Historicism.  London: Routledge.  
________ (1966) The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge. Quotations taken from 
the 2002 one-volume hardback edition with a ‘Preface’ by Václav Havel, and ‘Personal 
Reflections’ by E. H. Gombrich, also published by Routledge.  
 
Quine, Willard van O. (1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
 
Rawls, John (1999) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
________ (2001) Justice as Fairness. Cambridge, USA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press.  
 
Reid, Thomas (1785) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Critical edition by D. Brookes, 2002, 
Edinburg: Edinburg University Press.  
 
Reilly, Benjamin (2001) Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict 
Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo (1999) ‘Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 965-982.  
 
Rothschuh, Karl E. (1973) History of Physiology. Florida: Krieger Publishing Co. 
 
Ruse, Michael (1976) ‘Charles Lyell and the Philosophers of Science’, British Journal for the 
History of Science 9 (2): 121-131. 
 
Ryle, Gilbert (1946) ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 46: 1-16. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni (1968) ‘Political Development and Political Engineering’, Public Policy 17: 261-
298.  
 
________ (1997) Comparative Constitutional Engineering. New York: New York University Press.    
 
Schelling, Thomas (1978) Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Quotations taken from the 2006 edition also published by W. W. Norton & Company.  
 
Sen, Amartya Sen (1977) ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of 
Economic Theory’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4): 317-344. 
 
________ (1982). Poverty and Famines. Oxford: Oxford University Press,.  
 
Shaftesbury, A. A. Copper, Earl of (1732) Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. 3 vols., 
Douglas den Uyl (ed.), 2001, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
  
Skinner, B. F. (1938) The Behaviour of Organisms. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
 
________ (1948) “Superstition’ in the Pigeon’, Journal of Experimental Psychology 38 (2): 168-172. 
 
 
 
282
________ (1958) ‘Reinforcement Today’, American Psychologist 13(3): 94-99. 
 
________ (1963) ‘Operant Behaviour’, American Psychologist 18 (8):503-515. 
________ (1971) Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.  
 
________ (1981) ‘Selection by Consequences’, Science 213 (4507): 501-504. 
 
________ and C. B. Ferster (1957) Schedules of Reinforcement. New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts.  
 
Schilpp, Arthur (ed) (1963) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Illinois: Open Court.  
 
Scott-Taggart, J. M. (1966) ‘Mandeville: Cynic or Fool?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (64): 221-
232.  
Sidgwick, Henry (1907) Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 
 
Simon, Herbert (1996) The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
Smith. Adam (1790) The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Critical edition by D. D. Raphael and A. L. 
Macfie. Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, 1976. 
Photographic reproduction published by Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1982. 
 
Sober, Elliot and Wilson, David. S. (1999) Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish 
Behaviour. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Spoor, Christopher and Munro, James (2003) ‘Do Budget-holding Physicians Respond to 
Price? The Case of Fundholding in the UK’, Health Services Management Research 16 (4): 261-
267. 
 
Stanley, John (2011) ‘Knowing (How)’, Noûs 45 (2): 207–238 
 
________ and Williamson, Timothy (2001) ‘Knowing How’, The Journal of Philosophy 98 (8): 
411-444.  
 
Steil, Benn (2013) The Battle of Breton Woods. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Tao, Y. and Zhiguo, L. (2012) China's Economic Zones: Design, Implementation and Impact. Reading, 
UK: Paths International Limited. 
 
Taylor, David W. (1924) ‘Comparison of Model Propeller Experimentation in Three Nations’, 
Transactions of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers 32: 61-83.    
 
Thagard, Paul R. (1978) ‘The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice’, The Journal of 
Philosophy 75 (2): 76-92.  
 
Than, Mya and Tan, Joseph L. H. (ed.) (1993) Vietnam’s Dilemma and Options. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  
 
Thompson, Silvanus P. (1910) Life of William Thomson. London: Macmillan & Co. Limited. 
 
Thomson, William (1847) ‘On a Mechanical Representation of Electric, Magnetic and Galvanic 
Forces’, Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal (2) 61-64.  
 
 
283
________ (1851) ‘A Mathematical Theory of Magnetism’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London 141 (1851): pp. 243-268.  
________ (1872). Reprint of Papers on Electrostatics and Magnetism. London: MacMillan & Co.  
 
Van Fraassen, Bas (1980) The Scientific Image. Oxford: Claredon Press.  
 
Valdés, Juan Gabriel (1995) Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Vallentyne, Peter and Steiner, Hillel (ed.) (2000) Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics. New York: 
Palgrave.  
 
Vickrey, William (1961) ‘Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders’, The 
Journal of Finance 16 (1): 8-37.  
 
Vincenti, Walter (1990) What Engineers Know and How They Know It. Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University.  
 
Voigt, Stefan (ed.) (2002) Constitutions, Markets and Law. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited. 
 
________ (ed.) (2013) Design of Constitutions. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 
 
Weber, Max (1922) Economy and Society, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, 1978, Berkeley: 
University of California Press.  
 
Weggel, Oskar (2007) ‘Vietnam’s Policy of Economic Zoning’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian 
Affairs 26 (6): 79-97. 
 
Weimer, David (ed.) (1995) Institutional Design. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
 
Weisbrot, Mark and Johnston, Jake (2012) ‘Venezuela’s Economic Recovery: Is it Sustainable?’, 
Research Paper, Washington: Center for Economic and Policy Research 
 
Webster, Charles (ed) (1974) The Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century. Oxford: 
Routledge.  
 
Williamson, Oliver (2000) ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead’, 
Journal of Economics Literature 38 (3): 595-613.   
 
Wispé, Lauren (1991) The Psychology of Sympathy. New York: Plenum Press.  
 
Zeng, Douglas Z. (ed) (2010) Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness In China. Washington: 
The World Bank.  
 
Zielonka, Jan (2001) Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, vol. 1: Institutional Engineering. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Zwolinski, Matt (2007) ‘Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation’, Business Ethics Quarterly 17 (4): 
689-727.  
      —O— 
